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ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL INTERACTION

THROUGH COMMUNICATION THEORY

A Dissertation

Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School

of

Yale University

in Candidacy for the Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

by

Richard Sprague Beth

December, 1976

ABSTRACT

ANALYSIS OF POLITICAL INTERACTION
THROUGH COMMUNICATION THEORY

Richard Sprague Beth

Yale University, 1976

Whatever else politics is, it is, at least, a form of
social interaction. However, no existing approach to politics deals
with the events of which political interaction is made up in terms
of a systematic theory; there is no general theory of political
events. Political interactions may be viewed as acts of communica-
tion. It is therefore plausible that the organizing concepts of
communication theory could serve as a basis for the systematic
analysis of political interaction.

A political event may be viewed, as a communication
event, in terms of the signal transmitted, its sender and receiver,
and the channel of communication; that is, of what act is enacted,
who enacts it and whom it is directed toward, and the relation be-
tween actor and recipient. Human beings, in communication terms,
are terminals with the capacity not only to receive and transmit
signals, but to recognize and respond to the complex patterns making

up communication events, even when they are also participants in those events. An attitude structure, which defines the way in which one perceives and responds, is like the coding of a terminal; "internal" responses which condition subsequent overt responses, or behavior, are like states of a terminal.

A social group is defined by a stable pattern of relations among identifiable individuals. These stable patterns may be established by normative attitudes shared among members of the group, or otherwise. Since people are capable of recognizing such patterns, they are capable of trying to act so as to affect them; such action defines politics.

Data about political events can be expressed in statements. The referent of such a statement will be either events themselves, identified by their channels; terminals of events, identified by their codings; or the substance of events, identified by the signals transmitted. Political events can be systematically described by classifying them along each of these dimensions; statements about political events can be classified by that classification of their referents.

The signal transmitted in a political event may also be considered as, and attitudes and states of mind in political situations be formulated as, statements, and classified in the same way. Any such statement will refer to its referent in one of several modes of reference, defined by the kind of judgment the speaker makes of the referent. Two of these modes are description and

evaluation. Another is intention to enact the referent. A fourth judges events in terms of the correctness of the logical relations among signals, states, or other elements. A fifth judges them in terms of conformity to socially expected patterns; this is a normative mode. The definition of the first three modes follows Robert Bales; of the first four, Charles Morris; the formulation of the normative is innovative.

Statements in, and about, political events may thus be classified by their referents (terminals, channels, signals: respectively, actors, events, and policy content) and their modes of reference (descriptive, evaluative, prescriptive, formative, normative). The last chapter illustrates the application of this theoretical scheme. It reformulates definitions and hypotheses of Richard Fenno about Congressional committees in terms of what aspects of events and what kinds of judgments they refer to. One hypothesis is that committee members interested in floor success will pursue nonpartisanship in committee, and those interested in promoting policy preferences will pursue partisanship. The testing of this hypothesis in terms of the theoretical scheme advanced is demonstrated with interview data from field research on the U.S. House Judiciary Committee, classified in the way proposed.

for Janna,
who understands what it's about.

PREFACE.

I am grateful to the many Members of the United States House of Representatives, and others on and around Capitol Hill, for the time and information they gave me in connection with my field research. They are too many to name, yet my respect for them is great. I am especially indebted to the late William St. Onge of Connecticut, and to Andrew Jacobs, Jr., of Indiana, for giving me office space during the period of my research.

My committee, Professors Robert A. Dahl, Charles E. Lindblom, and David Mayhew, has been very patient with me, which I much appreciate, and their comments inspired, in particular, many of the considerations advanced in chapter one.

The field research, and part of the subsequent period of analysis, were supported by a National Science Foundation Graduate Fellowship.

Claire Beard wrote a computer program for sorting and classifying my data, which I much needed and much appreciate. Both the Political Science Department of Yale University, and Boston

University, afforded me computer time, and the computer centers of both institutions were generous with technical assistance.

Of those who have given me support and encouragement in this work, both emotional and intellectual, none have been more important to me than my friends Janet McFerren, Roger D. Lewis, and Christopher Conly.

I consider it redundant to take, in the preface, responsibility for what follows. My name is on the title page.

Richard S. Beth

Brighton, Mass., August, 1976.

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CHAPTER ONE.

INTRODUCTORY ESSAY.

> Nous sommes nais à quester la vérité; il
> appartient de la posseder à une plus grande
> puissance.   —Montaigne. (1)

a. Introduction.

Politics is a kind of human activity. It is made up of
events that consist of human actions. Much of the political sig-
nificance of such events lies in their relation to other political
events. Therefore, politics can properly be understood only
through an understanding of those events and of the ways in which
they are related. These are the basic presuppositions from which
this work proceeds.

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[1] Michel de Montaigne, Essais, III:8.

Most contemporary approaches to the study of politics, however, do not focus on these events and their relations. Instead, they address chiefly the attitudes that condition events, the ways in which events are perceived, and the structures in which events take place. Approaches that do address events tend to direct attention away from the characteristics by which such events and their relations could be systematically understood.

It is my aim here to propose concepts that may contribute to systematic understanding of this sort. I contend that the actions of which politics consists can be regarded as acts of communication, in an exact sense of that word, and that the processes made up of those acts constitute processes of communication. Therefore, I hold, concepts originally developed for the understanding of communication can illuminate the study of politics. Most of what follows is an exposition of those ideas and of how they may be used to orient and organize the study of politics.

I judge, therefore, that this work may best be understood as a proposal about how to think about politics. In order to justify making such a proposal, I conceive that I must, first, explain why I consider existing approaches inadequate for purposes that interest me, which I do in the following four sections of this chapter. Second, I must explain what the theoretical concepts are, and what the data are, on the basis of which I propose to offer an alternative; I attempt this in sections f and g below.

As a whole, therefore, this chapter is intended to elaborate the
assertions which I have summarized, for purposes of orienting the
reader to my argument, in this introductory section. The discus-
sion in this chapter is discursive and suggestive, rather than
rigorous, because its purpose is to orient the reader to the argu-
ments developed more systematically in the body of the work.

b. Critique.

If one wants to know what "politics" means, one may
reasonably begin by looking at what people talk about when they
talk about politics. I will, therefore, begin by observing that
in ordinary discourse, or in journalistic or historical writing,
descriptions of politics typically deal with acts of individuals
or of groups, with the effects of those acts on other individuals
or groups, and with subsequent acts responding to those earlier.

On the basis of this observation I can already assert
several things about politics. First, politics is made up of
events, things that happen. Second, those events are inter-
personal acts. Third, those events are connected to each other
over time, so that a complex of political events forms a political
process.

All of these statements are, of course, subject to revision as their consequences are pursued, and as one achieves a clearer idea of what precisely it may be useful to apply the term "politics" to in a systematic theoretical context.

Further questions are raised by the statements in the first paragraph of this section. In particular, I want to ask exactly what is meant empirically by the act or response of a group. If I were to see something called the act of a group, I would empirically observe a number of acts by individuals in the group, structured and related in an appropriate way. Those component acts, when appropriately structured, may be described in summary as the act of the group. Therefore, I consider that political events may always, in principle, be empirically regarded as composed of acts of individuals.

It accordingly seems to me that, in order to understand politics, one would have to be able to answer the following questions. First, what makes an event, an interpersonal act, political? Second, how are such events related to each other in group acts? Third, how are such events related to each other over time in a political process? It follows, I consider, that a political science ought to address itself chiefly to the understanding of political events.

However, existing theoretical approaches seem to me not fully suited to the pursuit of these questions, and not quite to focus on political events in the way that I would find useful. It

might be supposed, for example, that the behavioral approach would address my interests, since the "events" or "actions" I speak of consist largely, if not entirely, of people's behavior. For historical reasons, however, the term "behavior" tends to be associated with concerns somewhat different from mine. Behavioralism in political science defines both its method and its subject in contradistinction to the "traditional" normative discussion of authority structures, or institutions of government. It distinguishes its method as empirical rather than evaluative, and, because of its roots in natural science, has tended to regard quantitative analysis as the highest form of empiricism. It distinguishes its subject as the observed behavior of individuals rather than the expected behavior of authorities, and has therefore tended to study society at large rather than holders of formal political roles.

This subject and this method have complemented each other; quantitative techniques are well adapted to the analysis of data from large numbers of people. The canonical behavioral method has become survey research, which allows systematic collection, and sophisticated quantitative analysis, of data about widely replicated behavior, attitudes, and personality characteristics. In particular, "political behavior" has come to name the field that treats, not generally of what people do when they act politically, but specifically of standardized forms of political participation among non-elites, and of the attitudes and socio-

economic characteristics that condition such participation.

While behavioralism defines its subject to include the
behavior I began by being interested in, in practice it offers no
very distinctive or appropriate method for the analysis of how
politicians act or of what happens in political situations. When
it approaches topics such as legislative processes, it has tended
to do so by such means as roll call analysis and attitude surveys
of legislators.[2]

For similar reasons, the study of "political processes"
does not capture my main concerns. The term is intended to direct
attention away from the description of governmental institutions
to political activity not bound by formal prescriptions. It is
therefore used to refer, not generally to what goes on in a polit-
ical milieu, but specifically to the functioning of "informal,"
quasi- or non-governmental structures, such as political parties
and interest groups.

Again, studies of political norms, political culture,
and socialization concentrate on the attitudes that lie behind
political phenomena, rather than on the phenomena themselves.
Wahlke and his colleagues go so far as to argue that political
science can be based on attitude studies alone, and that the study

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[2]Canonical examples include David B. Truman, The Con-
gressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959); John C. Wahlke, Heinz
Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative
System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: Wiley,
1962).

of political actions themselves is unnecessary.[3]

Another group of approaches defines itself, in various ways, by a concern with the structural context in which political activity takes place, rather than with the activity itself. The "traditional approach" focuses largely on authority structures as objects, rather than on the events taking place through them. Models of decision making and policy implementation are primarily concerned with the outcomes, rather than the activity, of politics. "Policy studies" tend to concentrate on particular issue contexts, and "public affairs" on practical training for positions in existing institutions; neither addresses itself systematically to the understanding of political activity in general.

Specific sequences of political events have usually been studied through historical, biographical, or journalistic methods; within political science, the main application of such methods has been through case studies. While such approaches address concrete political events, they tend not to attempt general, analytical understanding, or, if they do, do so only in terms of unique and ad hoc theoretical constructs.

Because the methods of case studies are primarily descriptive, their usefulness for systematic analysis is limited; because each typically deals with a single issue or policy struggle, they provide no basis for theoretical generalization. In ad-

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[3]Wahlke, et al., chapter 18.

dition, no common analytical framework informs existing case studies; each emphasizes different aspects of political activity, uses its own terminology, and offers interpretation in its own terms. For all these reasons, one cannot derive a general understanding of politics from such works, except as one's intuitive "feel" develops through familiarity with example.[4]

There is some recent work in political science that attempts to treat political activity more analytically, in ways responsive to my concerns. I draw on some of this work in the development of my own ideas in subsequent chapters. However, those engaged in such areas of inquiry have scarcely yet noted the mutual relevance of each other's work; much less have their contributions merged into a single field or approach.

I find, accordingly, that political scientists do not generally address themselves directly to political events, but retreat instead into the analysis of some associated phenomena. Alternatively, if they do deal with events, they do so in a way that does not address the aspects that seem to me crucial. I

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[4]Some good examples of case studies of legislative politics are: Stephen K. Bailey, Congress Makes a Law: The Story Behind the Employment Act of 1946 (New York: Random, 1950); Robert Bendiner, Obstacle Course on Capitol Hill (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964); Daniel M. Berman, A Bill Becomes a Law: The Civil Rights Act of 1960 (New York: MacMillan, 1962); Eugene Eidenberg and Roy D. Morey, An Act of Congress: The Legislative Process and the Making of Education Policy (New York: Norton, 1969); Eric Redman, The Dance of Legislation (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1973).

will briefly survey in more detail some features of the approaches in each category, for the purpose of showing how they fail to do what I am interested in seeing done.

c. Approaches not focussing on events.

One approach to the study of politics is to concentrate on the attitudes, ideas, beliefs, and other mental states of political actors, rather than on their actions. The attitudes investigated may concern political values and ideologies, opinions about other actors or about events, and habits of perception and action, among others. This approach is defended with the argument that, since political events are surely motivated and shaped by the mental structures investigated, what one would need to know about the former will in any case be embodied in the latter.

Another approach is to focus, rather than on any particular political events, on how political actors perceive those events. Thus, instead of investigating the extent to which someone's political action achieves its goals, one asks how much efficacy people perceive themselves to have. Rather than asking what demands the acts of legislators respond to, or what interests they promote, one asks them which they conceive themselves to represent. Rather than examining how much influence someone exerts in a given context, one asks others how much influence they perceive him or

her as possessing.[4a]

A third is to discuss formally prescribed structures of action, or institutions, rather than patterns of events actually obtaining. This approach includes that which I referred to in the previous section as the "traditional." Discussions of the intent of constitutional provisions, as well as many proposals for structural reform, tend to manifest this approach. Since it is participants' normative expectations that define institutions, and that make such institutions real parts of political situations, this approach, like the two above, also amounts to an inquiry into ideas held by members of a polity rather than into the events that those ideas are about.

All three of these approaches, therefore, deal chiefly with attitudes or beliefs of some kind, rather than with the acts, events, or structures of events, that are the subjects of those attitudes and beliefs. As the argument given above in defense of the first approach stated, actual political events are clearly motivated and shaped by such attitudes and beliefs. Such things will therefore undoubtedly be relevant to any explanation of those events themselves, and their study is accordingly valuable for the understanding of those events. However, I cannot agree that attitudes, perceptions, and expectations embody everything that one

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[4a]These examples are influenced, respectively, by the following works: Gabriel A. Almond and Sideny Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Pr., 1963); Wahlke et al.; Nelson W. Polsby, Community Power and Political Theory (New Haven: Yale U. Pr., 1963).

might need to know about the corresponding events, or that their study can substitute for that of the events.

When the study of mental processes is pursued as a surrogate for, rather than a contribution to, the analysis of political events, it not only distracts attention from, but also distorts, that analysis. In particular, it encourages confusion between events themselves, and beliefs about events. While it is not my intention to develop a systematic intellectual critique of these methods at this point, I would like to indicate briefly the difficulties associated with such confusion.

When the analysis of events is replaced by the analysis of beliefs about events, the danger is that description of the beliefs will not be clearly distinguished from description of the events. Two possible motivations may foster this confusion. The first is methodological and has to to with the principle of objectivity. Analysts attempting to adhere to the canons of objectivity may feel that for them to assert their own beliefs about political realities as adequate descriptions of those realities would violate those canons. If, however, they take the beliefs of others as the basis for a description of reality, they appear not to violate those canons, because such a description makes no reference to the observer, who is objectively observing the existence of the beliefs.

This argument is clearly fallacious, for such analysts are not only observing and reporting such beliefs, but implicitly asserting them to describe reality adequately. Rather than removing subjective views from the picture, they simply substitute the

subjective views of the actors for their own, and implicitly affirm them by taking them for an adequate description of reality. I would argue that the substitution of the actors' views about reality for the analysts' may well represent a step away from objective adequacy, since one presumes that the analysts' beliefs develop through observation, empirical testing, and critical reasoning, and are therefore less subject to unaware biases and assumptions than those of the individuals observed, who perhaps do not discipline their perceptions by any such methodological canons.

The confusion to which such analysts are subject may briefly be stated as that of confusing the reality that certain beliefs are held with the reality of what those beliefs assert. That this confusion does take place is in no way shown more clearly than in the common use of the term "descriptive" to refer to the approach that concentrates on the analysis of institutions, defined in terms of normative expectations.

Such confusion may not only arise from methodological causes, but be fostered by unacknowledged ideological motivations. The analysts may themselves be members of the polity they study, and accordingly share its conventional wisdom. They will then tend to think the beliefs of the actors about political events correct. It will then be easier for them to fail to distinguish the state of belief from the thing believed, so that they will tend to present the beliefs as demonstrating the thing. At this point the striving for objectivity undermines its own original purpose, which was to prevent beliefs of the analyst from biasing the findings.

There are also other consequences of replacing inquiry about how things are in fact with inquiry into people's perceptions of how things are, in the second case cited at the beginning of this section, or into their expectations about how things are supposed to be, in the third. One is that, when practicioners of such approaches do address actual sequences of events, they will tend to do so in terms of the deviations of those events from perceptions or expectations, rather than taking the events as objects of study in themselves. Another is that such analysts will face difficulty in understanding aspects of political events that are not well reflected in their conventional descriptions. Because this form of analysis accepts the beliefs and attitudes of actors as adequate accounts of the things referred to, it tends to treat things as corresponding if their avowed purposes, or even if their names, are similar. It cannot easily ask whether events occurring in nominally similar ways, or nominally similar institutional contexts, actually correspond, because it has no language beyond that of the participants themselves in which such questions could be formulated.

In fact, however, most of the terms of ordinary political discourse represent abstractions of a very high order. For example, the authority or power of an official, so far from being a simple entity, is described only by some combination of the expectations and other attitudes of an indefinite collection of people, and by the official's other political resources. Again, a political

party's being, in any given case, is defined by some combination of recognized formal structures, role holders within those structures, their actions, and beliefs held both by them and their less active supporters. Similarly, to say that a legislature is in session requires a great array of assumptions defining the legislative body, who its members and officials are, and when it is properly convened.

I contend, therefore, that an adequate framework for the analysis of politics requires a set of concepts that direct inquiry beyond these abstract terms of common political discourse to the observable, empirical events by which they are defined. It cannot arise from a method that does no more than accept those terms. For all the reasons discussed in this section, an adequate approach to politics must be aware of, and allow systematic distinction among a) political events, b) political actors' beliefs about those events, c) political analysts' beliefs about those events, and d) political analysts' beliefs about the actors' beliefs about those events. It must explicitly address the question of the relation of the observer to the observed, which, in the case of political science, is, as the discussion of this section shows, a particularly complex one.

d. Approaches focussing on events.

Among the approaches to politics that deal with events, but in my view not adequately, that of the case study, in which a single complex of events is described and examined at length, is of particular interest. Reliance on this method no doubt proceeds from the sense, certainly correct, that if the explanation (in the relevant sense of the term) of political events lies in their relation to other events and phenomena, as I proposed at the beginning of this chapter, then, to find such explanations, it is necessary to study political events in their context. To this extent I consider the theoretical justification of case studies correct.

However, case studies have not given rise to any significant body of general concepts, propositions, or theory. The terms in which they describe events tend to be particular to the individual events and not to lend themselves to systematic treatment through comparison or generalization. In other words, case studies suffer from the same lack of theoretically useful explications of the ordinary political language in use in the contexts they study as do the approaches described in the previous section.

Another approach concentrates on the discovery of relations among various kinds of acts through the inspection of statistical associations among them. The study of voting behavior, both in mass electorates and in decision-making bodies, is the canonical example, though attempts are made to treat decisions, acts of influence, and other phenomena, variously defined, in this

way.[5]

In order to apply sophisticated quantitative techniques to political events, classes of events must be defined in such a way that large numbers of similar events can be treated as equivalent. Each kind of event is therefore very precisely defined by such analysis, but at a high level of abstraction that rigorously excludes detail. In a study of legislative processes, bills would implicitly be treated as equally important, aye votes as representing equally intense preferences, liberals as possessing equally well-articulated ideologies. Further, statistical associations can only demonstrate relationships between one kind of event and another; they can tell nothing about the particular dynamics by which two events may be related in a specific instance. Therefore, when this approach replaces the analysis of complexes of political events, it interferes with the possibility of such analysis, by eliminating information that would illuminate the actual patterns manifested by such complexes.

Further, I suspect that, in general, the dynamics by which political events are related to each other depend on characteristics of events that are neglected when the events are defined in the necessary uniform, abstract way. In other words, I think that the categories by which political events must be conceptualized in order to apply statistical techniques to them are often

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[5]Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, Elections and the Political Order (New York: Wiley, 1966) may be taken as a prominent recent exemplar of this genre.

too crude to capture their politically important aspects. Such
definitions are in any case usually arrived at by simply abstract-
ing, from phenomena described by a term in ordinary political
language, what seems to the analyst to be their essential common
feature. This abstraction is usually done in an _ad hoc_ way,
without any sustained investigation of whether the aspect selected
is in fact the relevant one by which to discover the ways in which
the phenomena are related to others, or whether the excluded
aspects might not contribute to the explanation of such relations.
Such definitions, while precise, are therefore often no more than
explicit versions of the conventional understanding of such phe-
nomena, and may accordingly hinder the understanding of those
events in any more profound way. Therefore, when this approach
replaces the analysis of complexes of political events, it also
interferes with the possibility of such analysis.

A third approach to political activity itself has been
more theoretically oriented, consisting in the investigation of
some previously specified theoretical question within particular
political milieus. Such questions may be formulated in the form
of hypotheses, and the milieus may be regarded as sources of data,
so that such work conforms easily to well accepted methodological
canons.[6] Nevertheless, this approach has been less fruitful than

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[6]Two good examples of this approach, in the field of
legislative politics, are Randall B. Ripley, _Party Leaders in the
House of Representatives_ (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1967); and
David Price, _Who Makes the Laws? Creativity and Power in Senate
Committees_ (Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman, 1972).

it seems promising. One reason is that the events are often defined, and the data correspondingly treated, in the manner of the previous method, so that the complex patterns relating individual events are lost. Another is that the data often refer to patterns generally present in the milieu, rather than to any individual processes. For instance, the data may consist of interview responses to questions like, "how partisan is this Committee?" or "how does the leadership maintain control on the floor?" The answers to such questions are likely to express the informants' generalizations from observation rather than to describe specific cases, in which case generalizations are already present in the data rather than being developed by the analyst from individual cases. Since all generalization is a product of mental activity, such treatment again presents the danger of confusing someone else's beliefs with the analyst's own conclusions.

A more important shortcoming of this method as it is practiced, however, concerns the language in which the hypotheses and conclusions are stated. As with the approaches cited previously, the terms chosen for such exposition are likely to be essentially those of everyday discourse about politics, since there exists no set of theoretically systematic ideas in terms of which ordinary statements about political events could fruitfully and precisely be reformulated, or that would allow the dynamics of such events to be described in ways that would yield new insight.

However, as I argued in the previous section, most terms used in ordinary discourse about politics represent abstrac-

tions of a high order. In order to render such abstractions testable by observational evidence, they require to be operationalized. This operationalization tends to be accomplished, in the approach I am speaking of, by identifying each term with a particular kind of simple empirical event, considered as an "indicator" of the presence of the state referred to by the term. Sometimes several different indicators are used jointly to define a single concept, but the principle remains the same. These indicators are generally chosen not on the basis of any systematic analysis of the chief dimensions of significance of the concept they are taken to represent, but simply on the basis of the analyst's unexamined intuitive ideas about what the abstract concept involves. As a consequence, just as with the examples cited above, each such operationalization represents little more than an acceptance of the conventional understanding of politics which is embodied in those everyday abstractions.

Further, when concepts are operationalized in this way, no criteria are available by which the adequacy of the operationalizations could be judged. Such criteria could be provided only by a uniform and consistent theoretical focus or orientation that would give an account of the nature, and identify the features most significant for understanding, of political phenomena. When indicators are chosen on an impressionistic or ad hoc basis, each study tends to define its theoretical concerns and operational indicators in a way relevant to its own particular problems, and without reference to the possible relation of those concerns and problems to

others. Conclusions formulated in such terms cannot, in general,
even be translated into terms relevant to any other questions; in-
deed, it is unlikely that even the data gathered relative to one
set of hypotheses can be meaningfully adapted for use relative to
another. Such studies accordingly do not tend to cumulate into a
connected picture of the dynamics of political events.

For any operational definitions to be theoretically
useful, they should direct attention to those aspects of a phenom-
enon that attract one's interest in them, and that are central to the
role they play in the context in which one is interested in them.
In other words, a good operational definition should contain an
implicit answer to the question, "why is this phenomenon important
to an understanding of this context?" Only in such case can an-
alysts have reason to believe that what they are measuring is what
they are interested in. To be theoretically useful, therefore,
operational definitions are to be justified in terms of a sound
theoretical account of what one is interested in; in this case,
of what is meant by politics, what the nature of political phenom-
ena is, and what sorts of things one wishes to know about them.
The formulation and testing of hypotheses either must be done with
reference to such a theoretical context, or will be done in a
vacuum.

e. Toward an account of politics.

To summarize the discussion of the last three sections, I will enumerate the requirements for an adequate approach to the analysis of politics which have emerged in that discussion, beginning with those which I stated at its outset.

1. Such an approach must provide a systematic account of what makes an event, or other phenomenon, political.

2. It must explicate the concept of group acts, by showing the ways in which such acts may be composed of individual acts in specified relations.

3. It must explicate the kinds of relations that may obtain between political events, linking them together into political processes.

4. Its data must refer to individual political acts, as do the data of case studies.

5. Those data must be treated in a way that preserves information about the context in which the acts referred to are political; that is, about their relations to other political acts, including both behavior and mental states.

6. The approach must treat information about political acts themselves, and information about ideas concerning political acts, both as data, but not as equivalent, nor as data about the same thing. In other words, it must preserve the distinctions among events, actors' ideas about events, observers' ideas about events, and observers' ideas about actors' ideas.

7. It must provide concepts that allow the analysis of the high abstractions of ordinary political discourse in terms of those among the empirical characteristics of political events that most usefully illuminate the significance of those events as political acts, and the relations obtaining among those political acts. In other words, an adequate account of politics must begin with, and be guided by, some theoretical organizing principles.

Such principles would identify the important central aspects of political action; they would therefore help to identify the nature of the political in the way required by the first requirement. They would replace <u>ad hoc</u> operationalization by means of unexamined "indicators" with a systematic language whose terms identified, and referred to, those aspects of the corresponding phenomena which were central to their character as political phenomena. In addition, they would allow any specific analytical political concern within political science to be addressed and investigated in terms, and with data, compatible with those used in other such concerns, so that a coherent and perhaps cumulative body of knowledge might develop. Finally, they would help the scientific analysis of political events to transcend the rough and largely impressionistic conceptualizations of conventional discourse.

Another observation derivable from the previous discussion, however, is that the understanding of political behavior appears to require reference not only to events themselves, but to attitudes and other mental states of the enactors and observers of

that behavior. An adequate account of politics, therefore, must include an account of what specific kinds of relations obtain between political behavior and political attitudes.

Now it seems to me implicit in any empirical account of attitudes and of behavior that each affects the other. One calls an event "behavior" to indicate that among its antecedents are prior conditions which may be formulated as states "internal" to the behaver; that is, as attitudes, opinions, beliefs, and other "states of mind." Attitudes and other mental states may, in other words, be defined in behavioral terms as predispositions to behavior. On the other hand, to say that given behavior constitutes human interaction is to say that it has effects on other individuals. Such effects must be on the mental states of those individuals, and

through them on their subsequent behavior.

These observations may be formulated as a premise that each political event may affect some political states of mind, and each political state of mind some political events. It should therefore be possible to decompose any given complex of political acts into complex chains in which overt acts and mental states alternate. I propose to take this premise as a conjecture to organize observations of political events.

Mental states, however, as section c asserts, are also related to processes of political interaction in another way. Political actors not only participate in political events, but also observe them. They possess attitudes defining a framework of ideas about the actions they engage in or perceive. These ideas assign to those acts the significance they have for the actors; conversely, they specify the characteristics that each event must have for those actors to regard it as of a given kind.

These ideas are attitudes that structure political actors' perceptions of events, and, like other attitudes, they constitute predispositions to action. They are not identifiable with the ways in which analysts look at a political process or the patterns such analysts see in it. Insofar as actors are also observers, they may organize their experiences by the latter's concepts; similarly, analysts may adopt concepts similar to those used by actors, if they find that those ideas adequately describe what really goes on. However, analysts must treat the concepts by

which actors organize their understanding of political events, in the first instance, as phenomena in their own right, and not simply as empirical accounts of other phenomena. Analysts may even use such concepts in both ways, but must distinguish the sense in which they are using them at a given time: whether they are accepting an actor's account as empirically correct, or whether they are giving their own empirical description of an actor's state of mind.

The account of politics with which I begin, therefore, includes assertions that politics is made up of human social behavior, and about the relation to that behavior of corresponding attitudes. However, neither of those principles gives any indication of what specific characteristics of such behavior and mental states makes them political. On this point a family of accepted accounts is available to be drawn on. One of these holds, in essence, that political acts are acts of influence, or acts by which power is exercised. Another holds that political acts are those which contribute to the authoritative allocation of values,[7] or to the formation of policy by which a society (or other social group) is regulated. I will develop this aspect of my account of politics more rigorously in chapter six. Here it suffices to note that these proposals share enough to indicate that they are, in fact, addressing the same phenomena. They agree, at least implicitly, that

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[7]The phrase is that of David Easton. See his *Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965), p. 350.

politics is 1) a form of social interaction, 2) relative to some specific social group, 3) by which that group is controlled or ordered.

f. Organizing concepts.

Clearly, the kinds of structure one perceives in data will depend not only on the nature of the data themselves, nor on prior concepts of the specific phenomena in question, but on the character of the analytical concepts one uses as tools for the interpretation and organization of those phenomena. I approached my analysis with a particular set of such presumptions consciously in mind, with the deliberate intention of investigating how successful they might be made to be at organizing and illuminating political observations. Essentially, this work represents a test of their effectiveness in that regard, and they constitute its basic argument.

My basic premise is that political interactions, as I have described them so far, appear to have all the characteristics of communication processes in the exact sense of the term. They involve the sending and receiving of, and response to, signals. In fact, the communicative aspect of political interactions seems fundamental to their political character; in a sense, it is because they are communicative acts that they are political acts. This

statement obviously needs refinement, which I will offer in subsequent chapters, since, at least, not all communication is _ipso facto_ political. However, the appearance of such terms as "interaction," "influence," "regulation," and "affecting predispositions to subsequent acts," which have already appeared in my discussion, indicate the plausibility of the assertion.

Now, much work has been done recently, in this century and especially since World War II, to develop a powerful and analytically precise account of the nature and characteristics of communication. I argued, therefore, that the organizing concepts of that account might organize observations of political acts in a way that focussed attention on the politically significant aspects of such acts. In other words, I considered Deutsch's suggestion insightful that cybernetics, or communication theory, might provide a fruitful interpretive language for politics.[8]

The body of this work is an attempt to show how such concepts may in fact be used to organize observations in a way useful to the political analyst. I do not, however, proceed along the lines established by previous use of the term "communication" in political analysis, of which there are two main variants.

The first of these, which follows largely from Deutsch's own work, is allied to "systems theory" through its connection with

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[8]Karl W. Deutsch, _The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control_, with a new introduction (New York: Free Press, 1966).

cybernetic communication theory. The aim of most such analysts is not to interpret political interactions themselves in terms of patterns and forms of communication specific thereto, but to delineate the systems and subsystems that exist among the governmental, political, and social structures in which such interactions take place. It therefore deals more often with macroscopic, statistical data than with concrete interactions, and typically takes the form of the analysis of message flows among governments, societies, and subsystems of either.

As with behavioral analysis, the reason for this emphasis appears to lie in an affinity of intellectual roots between the theory and the method. Those who are interested in using cybernetic devices as models of political systems tend to be the same people interested in cybernetic devices as tools of analysis; therefore, the cybernetic models that have developed have been connected with quantitative analysis carried out by computer.

The second line of political analysis to use the concept of communication is allied with functionalism in the social sciences. This strand of thought takes "communication" to refer essentially to the influence of elites on a society's political culture. Almond, for instance, lists communication as one of the seven functions of political systems. He begins his discussion of the communication function by saying that of course, each of the seven functions involves, indeed is carried out by means of, communication. He then neglects this sense of the term and uses

"communication" only to refer to the process of influencing mass ideas indicated above.[9]

Almond argues that "communication" is the proper name for this process of influence because such influence must primarily take place through communication. Since he has previously noted that the stated condition holds for all seven functions, the reason seems inadequate. It seems rather that "communication," in this sense, is short for "mass communication," on which the work carried out in this vein tends in fact to concentrate.[10] Thus the term "communication" has come to designate a focus, not generally on the communicative phenomena of which political interaction consists, but specifically on large-scale, indirect communication that affects the political ideas current in a culture. It accordingly directs attention away from the activity which I wish to address.

In short, the way in which usage of "communication theory" and of "communication" has developed is similar to that noted in section b for "behavior" and "process." Each term represents, on the one hand, a broad assertion that politics can properly and usefully be viewed as a kind of behavior, process, or communication. Because of the intellectual and methodological connotations of each

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[9] Gabriel A. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in The Politics of the Developing Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), pp. 45-52.

[10] For a survey of work along these lines, see Richard R. Fagen, Politics and Communication (Boston: Little Brown, 1966).

term, however, it is also taken to indicate certain aspects of
political phenomena as those most central to political analysis.
The terms take on special senses defined by those phenomena. In
each case, the phenomena distinguished are not those patterns of
interaction among political actors that I intuitively think are
the central meaning of "politics," but involve the relation to
governmental structures of the mass of members of a society, taken
as largely outside those structures. Therefore, although nominally
included, the concerns I advance are not effectively addressed in
any of the approaches in question.

The systems and functional strands of political analysis
are intellectual kin, and, in their focus on communication, both
have made use of content analysis as a method. Content analysis
allied to a systems approach tends to consider governments as cyber-
netic entities and to analyze their documents to illuminate their
response patterns and communication flows; that allied to function-
al approaches tends to analyze mass media to illuminate political
cultures and socialization thereto. Content analysis in either
case has largely meant counting occurrences of words, or other
symbols, on a previously established list.[11] Some of the tech-
niques I will propose might be considered forms of content analysis,

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[11]See, for example, Ithiel de Sola Pool, The Prestige
Press: A Comparative Study of Political Symbols (Cambridge, Mass.:
M.I.T. Press, 1970).

but vary from this canonical pattern.

Two objections are often raised to the interpretation
of political phenomena in terms of communication. The first is
that there is no reason to believe a communication model more likely
to illuminate politics than any of the other metaphors that have
been proposed for the purpose.[12] The second is Eulau's objection
to Milbrath's definition of lobbying as a communication process,
that "Just because lobbying, like everything else human beings do,
involves communication . . . it does not follow that a model of
communication is the best tool to explain lobbying . . ."[13] If
all social acts are communication processes, then communication
cannot specially explain any one of them in particular.

I consider that the second objection helps to answer
the first. If all social acts are communication processes, then to
interpret social action as communication is not to introduce a
model or metaphor, but to point to an actual characteristic of
social actions themselves; in other words, to propose an empirical
account of those actions. Further, that communication is charac-
teristic of other social processes than the political is an argu-
ment for, not against, its use as an interpretive principle, be-
cause to cast political analysis in such terms would then render

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[12]Joseph LaPalombara, private communication, New Haven,
Ct., Spring, 1968.

[13]Heinz Eulau, "Lobbyists: The Wasted Profession," Pub-
lic Opinion Quarterly, 28 (1964), 27-38, at p. 34 (Review of Les-
ter Milbrath, The Washington Lobbyists /Chicago: Rand McNally,
1963/).

it compatible with similar analyses in the other social sciences.[14]
An initial task of such an approach would then be to establish
that political interactions specifically, at least, can in fact
be regarded as communication processes. This question will be the
main concern of chapters two, three, and six.

g. Data.

The general prescription for addressing data in such
a way as to yield a more incisive and better illuminated account
of politics would no doubt be to observe a lot of political events
and consider them closely, in an inductive spirit, to see what
kinds of specific patterns they might manifest. I expect that,
given their nature, political phenomena can be studied empir-
ically, in a way appropriate to the concerns I raise, only
through such research methods as case studies have used, including
analysis of documents, interviews, observation, and participant ob-

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[14]As Eulau also recognizes; ibid., p. 35.

servation. Such methods have endemic limitations: the data gathered will always be incomplete, because important events take place at unpredictable times and places, are confidential, or are too complex to observe fully. Reliance must be placed on reports as well as observations, especially when research takes place after the event. Developing a theory of politics adequate to my concerns must therefore focus on seeking, not a research method that eliminates these inherent problems, but an analytic method that transcends the limitations of existing case studies.

Clearly, the data demanded by such an account of politics as I require are those concerning specific complexes of political action, such as are the basis of case studies. Such data may take several forms. The first is obviously the observation of political phenomena by analysts themselves. A second is reports of observed political phenomena by others; a third, accounts by political actors of their own attitudes and other ideas. In addition, analysts may derive observations from their own participation, and may discover mental states of actors by inference from behavior.

It follows that from any single observation of political activity, it may be possible to derive several kinds of information: 1) about events, or overt acts; 2) about the mental states conditioning the events; 3) about the mental states affected by the events; 4) about the mental states by which the observer interpreted the events, or understood them. If analysts formulate each observation, direct or indirect, as a statement by an appropriate observer

or actor, that statement can then be examined for the information it may yield on each count. No kind of information significant to political analysis need be neglected, and each may be kept analytically distinct from the others.

I accordingly consider that the data appropriate to the sort of analysis I propose should be cast in the form of statements about political events by appropriate observers or actors. The analysis of those data should address itself to determining what information about those events can be derived from those statements. The analytical methods I will propose will, accordingly, be intended to allow data in ordinary language, from interviews and other descriptive accounts, to be treated in a way that goes beyond description to systematic analysis. In particular, in chapters four and five I will investigate some of the implications and consequences of conceiving the data of political science in this way explicitly as statements.

The specific data I use for my analysis here comes from field work with the Committee on the Judiciary of the U.S. House of Representatives, carried out from February through August, 1969. During this period, I served as an intern in the offices of two members of the Committee: first with the late William St. Onge, Democrat of Connecticut, and then with Andrew Jacobs, Jr., Democrat of Indiana. I followed the deliberations of the Committee through attendance at its hearings, printed hearing records and other Committee documents, materials put out by the offices of

Committee members, newspaper and other published accounts, and interviews. I had a total of 95 interviews with 29 of the 35 members of the Committee, and a similar number with numerous Committee and individual staff members, interest group and executive branch lobbyists, journalists, Congressmen not on the Committee, and others. I also attended press conferences and other public talks given by several of the principal actors, both on and off the Committee. For purposes of this paper it is only the interview data which I have subjected to the analysis I describe; these amount to approximately 2000 separate statements.

The interviews varied from 10 to 90 minutes in length and were usually conducted in Congressmen's or Committee offices. Some were conducted on other House premises such as the cafeteria and the Capitol reception rooms, or in interest group or executive offices downtown. They were composed entirely of open-ended questions through which I attempted to find out about the current activities of the Committee, the development of sentiments, strategies, and prospects, and the Committee members' interactions with each other and with other interested parties. I recorded the interviews by taking notes rather than by taping, so that the statements as I have recorded them represent, in general, close paraphrases rather than transcribed quotations. In short, my research method was that of a journalist, contemporary historian, or case student, except that, instead of limiting myself to one issue and following it through various arenas, as in a case study, I

concentrated on a single arena and followed several issues as they passed through that arena. In this way, I hoped, I would be able ultimately to generalize about patterns of action characteristic of the Committee, and thus illustrate the methods by which my approach generated such generalizations.

I chose the Judiciary Committee as the object of my research for several reasons. First, I had prior experience as an intern on Capitol Hill and was interested, on grounds independent of my theoretical concerns, in Congressional politics. Second, a Congressional Committee provided a unit, within which significant political processes took place, small enough and coherent enough that I could hope to follow its activity with some completeness and understanding. Third, much research was beginning to be done on Congressional Committees in those years, and I wished to contribute to that effort. I chose the Judiciary Committee in particular because it had not yet been the object of any major study.[15]

h. Plan of the work.

In subsequent chapters I develop and apply the princi-

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[15] As I was informed at the time (Autumn, 1968) by correspondence from Richard F. Fenno, Jr., of the University of Rochester. Another study of the Judiciary Committee has since been undertaken, as a doctoral dissertation, by Lynette Perkins of the University of Pittsburgh.

ples I have indicated above, according to the following scheme. In chapter two, I give an account of some of the principles of the general theory of communication, as those have been developed in recent years and as they are relevant to the use I wish to make of them. This outline is for the most part consistent with, and drawn from, conceptions standard in the field, although my rendering of it is often more fully explicated than that of my sources, and I have introduced novel formulations at one or two points. These explications and minor innovations are required largely in order to render my account of that theory suitable for application to human social action, and in particular to render it consistent with methodological and epistemological premises appropriate to

empirical social science. In addition, the terminology of communication theory is less standardized than is the theory itself, so that, while the formulations I offer are consistent with that theory, the terms I use do not correspond completely to the usage of any other single writer.

Chapter two, in other words, does not rest on an empirical foundation, but describes concepts borrowed from an existing, more or less deductive, theoretical system. In chapter three, I carry out the application, alluded to above, of the concepts of chapter two to human social action. In other words, I demonstrate congruences between that deductive system and an empirical account of such action. The argument I propose there is that the interpretation of that action in terms of communication theory organizes it in such a way as to make possible, through further inductive examination, new insights into its structure and dynamics.

Chapter three may accordingly be seen as presenting an empirical argument, asserting that certain relations may be observed to obtain between two empirical entities. One of those entities is human social action, as interpreted by the empirical account given of that action in behavioral social science. The other is the theory presented in chapter two, considered as an empirical phenomenon, that is, a body of ideas held or at least conceived by some people, including me and those on whose work I draw. The relations of equivalence of structure that I hold to assert between the two are in this sense relations between empir-

ical phenomena, and are accordingly themselves empirical; that is, they are subject to test through observation of whether the relations asserted actually hold.

A rigorous and explicit test of assertions at such a high level of generality would, of course, be little practicable. The proper procedure for such a test would be to develop, from the general empirical assertions, operational formulations about observations that would be made in various specific contexts if the relations asserted were to obtain. Tests of those operational formulations would tend to support or cast doubt on the more abstract assertions from which they were derived.

It is one of my aims to provide and to test such formulations. However, the development of such formulations is a complex matter in itself; it cannot be accomplished simply by deduction from definitions. It requires the careful and systematic comparison of the initial account with specific data of observation and experience to generate conclusions about what possible operationalizations are the most appropriate; about, for example, exactly what phenomena are to be comprehended under a general term. It is, in other words, a process of empirical induction. To carry out that process in one set of specific, namely political, contexts, and in particular those of legislative policy making, is one main objective of my current work. This paper can offer, not the conclusions of that work, but only the progress I have made so far.

One of my conclusions in chapter three is that the

application of communication theory to data about specific human actions, and to an account of politics itself, requires the introduction of further theoretical principles. These in particular are principles, drawn from recent analytic and semiotic work in philosophy, and parallel work in psychology, concerning the interpretation of statements. Their introduction is necessary because, as I indicated above, the data on events of the sort I am interested in may normally be considered as statements.

The introduction of appropriate principles for the interpretation of statements is the objective of chapter four. The work on which I draw in that chapter is largely empirical work, in that it embodies an empirical account of the nature and characteristics of statements. My treatment of it contributes no explicit empirical elements; as in chapter two, it represents essentially an explication and consistent formulation of that account. However, the formulations I propose are, in part, grounded in my own examination of the statements constituting my own data; I would not be introducing them if I did not find them to organize and interpret that data usefully. In that sense the account in chapter four implicitly embodies empirical results, inductively arrived at, and inductively corresponding to the empirical account presented in that chapter.

Chapter five extends the proposals of chapter four, but in a somewhat different way. Several of its theoretical formulations do not find originals in previous work. While most still

represent reconceptualizations of concepts to be found in the relevant literature, one is completely new. It arises from my attempts of the past several years to develop a coherent interpretation for statements appearing in my data about norms, roles, and institutions, and at the same time a coherent account, in communication terms, of norms, roles, and institutions themselves, as phenomena. An account of such phenomena appeared to me to be central to an account of political action. Although I do not explicitly refer to my data in this discussion, it, too, arises from a process of empirical induction whose result is a proposed empirical account.

In chapter six, I am able to use the formulations previously introduced, and in particular those of chapter five, to state my proposed account of politics more explicitly and systematically. That formulation, inductively arrived at through the continuing dialectical confrontation of formulations from earlier stages of my work with observational data, constitutes an empirical result and is essentially the central point of the present paper.

The task that must follow the formulation of such an account is of course its testing. In general, the form of such tests will be attempts to apply the account to concrete cases, and their criterion will be the account's success at illuminating the structure and dynamics of such instances. The comprehensive testing of an entire theoretical framework, of course, has the scope more nearly of a long range program of research than of a dissertation. Rather than present a fragment of a systematic account in

this paper, therefore, I conclude instead with some examples of the kinds of conclusions which my formulations make it possible to reach, and of the kind of empirical uses to which they may be put.

I focus specifically on the empirical aspects of my work in chapter seven. First, I summarize the chief assertions implicit in my account of politics as I have developed it in the previous chapters. I state these assertions in empirical form; that is, in a form that makes clear their source in the data of my field research, and in a form in which they could be evaluated against data of further field research. I hope that such a summary will both illuminate the thrust of the theoretical arguments I wish to advance, and draw attention to the empirical characteristics of those assertions, both of which may tend to be obscured by the exigencies of theoretical argumentation in the earlier chapters.

The second way in which I address the empirical aspect of my work in chapter seven is with respect to hypotheses drawn from the previous literature on American legislative processes. For this purpose the chief work which I consider systematically is Richard F. Fenno's Congressmen in Committees.[16] I show, by means of examples drawn from Fenno, how hypotheses of the kind common in such analyses might be formulated in terms consistent with my account; how such reformulation represents an operationalization of the concepts implied in those hypotheses, and how the

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[16]Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).

data contemplated by, and organized in terms of, my account provides the means of testing those hypotheses.

Given the existing state of development of my account, any such tests can hardly be regarded as rigorous or conclusive; indeed, they tend to approximate the impressionistic investigation which might be undertaken in the absence of explicit organizing principles. To raise my tests further above that level than I have, I would be required to continue the systematic inductive analysis of my data to develop more highly explicated conclusions about just how various political phenomena might best be characterized, in relation to each other. In other words, I would have to develop empirical accounts of specific kinds of political action that would describe their nature and relations in mutually compatible and jointly systematic ways. To develop such accounts on the basis of data is the next step in the program of theoretical work I envision.

However, for purposes of this work I have thought it advisable, instead of proceeding strictly in a rigorous inductive fashion, to provide some accessible conception, even if a relatively impressionistic one, of the results to which my line of inquiry may be expected to lead. The reader may properly regard the discussion in chapter seven as representing a preliminary, still largely intuitive and impressionistic, account of results which, although informed by the explicit account of politics developed in this paper, are subject to reformulation, refinement, and even alteration under the impact of systematic inductive explication.

Because of the way in which I have proceeded in this work, less of the empirical appears on its surface than is in fact embodied in it. Not much of the process by which my ideas have developed from consideration of my data appears in the text of this paper; in general, only my conclusions are stated. Accordingly, while most of the formulations I introduce are inductively developed in the way I consider appropriate for political theory, they are stated in the form of settled theoretical principles; that is, in a form appropriate to a deductive framework. Their empirical aspect is therefore not always explicit in my writing about them. In part, this circumstance arises because the lack of a widely shared conventional language for describing inductive inquiry, and for formulating conclusions in inductive terms, has forced my articulation of my own thinking in other directions.

Chiefly, however, I have formulated my proposals in the way indicated because my original objective in this paper was not the development of an empirical account of politics in itself, but its application to the understanding of specific political phenomena. I expected my explication of assumptions and principles to serve only as the background to their concrete application to my data on concrete political events. I still hope they will do so, but, as I have argued, to carry out such applications meaningfully requires an adequate, well-structured theoretical account of the phenomena addressed. To pursue empirical results by applying an essentially impressionistic understanding on the basis of ad hoc

intuitive operationalizations is to pursue them in a way that adds little validity or rigor to the impressionistic account. The proper development of such understanding requires a process of empirical induction, through which those intuitive impressions can be given an articulate and systematic form, one that is adequate to allow the pursuit of concrete applications in more rigorous and meaningful ways. I have accordingly thought the careful pursuit of such inductive formulations more useful, in the long run, to the development of a genuine science of political events than the testing of hypotheses whose appropriate operationalization the theoretical framework would not yet support. Ironically, therefore, my attempt to go beyond the theoretical and address empirical results has resulted in a first paper that is largely conceptual explication, even though that explication is developed through induction from empirical data.

The point I wish to re-emphasize in conclusion is therefore that the discussion that follows is not simply a matter of spinning out abstract concepts in a fashion bound only by the scope of the imagination, as occasionally tempered by the strictures of logic. What I am doing is to develop theory inductively, as an empirical science properly should. My results can be tested by their ability to support accounts of various concepts that illuminate features of each that have in the past been unclear and have led to conceptual confusion. Among the concepts for which I believe I can provide accounts more adequate in this sense than previous ones

are politics, institutions, observers, the relation of attitudes
and behavior, and the significance of statements.

CHAPTER TWO.

THE NATURE OF COMMUNICATION.

·Analytical understanding of this process need not
diminish its sublimity.   —Deutsch. (1)

1.0. INTRODUCTION. Soon after World War II, Wiener's

Cybernetics[2]-and Shannon and Weaver's Mathematical Theory of Commu-·

nication[3] marked the emergence of information theory as a distinc-

·tive field of study, concerned with the mathematical analysis of

the processing and transmission of information. Since then, the

[1]Karl W. Deutsch, ·The Nerves of Government: Models of
Political Communication and Control, with a new introduction (New
York: Free Press, 1966), p. 276.

[2]Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (New York: Wiley, 1948),
cited in John R2 — ·· ··· ·· · · · · · ·
Sept. 1972, p. Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics (New York: Wiley, 1948)

[3]C.E. Shannon and W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of
Communication (Urbana, Ill.: U. of Ill. Press, 1949), cited in
Pierce, loc. cit.

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practice of electronic technology and the conceptual apparatus of the field have advanced in the usual dialectical relation. The systematic development of that conceptual apparatus in its broader implications has become a field of study in its own right, which may be called communication theory.[4]

    1.1. Communication theory developed as a distinct interpretive language because the mathematical formulations of information theory could not be adequately interpreted by reduction to older concepts. By means of that distinctive interpretive language, communication theory can interpret phenomena in ways that are in some important respects novel; it illuminates aspects that other orienting frameworks can not easily address. Further, communication theory is able to give its terms a highly general range of application and, simultaneously, to explicate them with great precision. It therefore possesses an interpretive power that enables it to give accounts, even of more familiar aspects of phenomena, that are more exact, and also more fruitful for understanding, than was previously possible. Among the questions to whose illumination it contributes are those associated with such words as evolution, teleology, perception, significance, autonomy, structure, and freedom.[5]

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[4]See Deutsch, pp. viii, 82, 149; Colin Cherry, On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 6, 41f., 62f., 94, 169f., 227, 243, 276.

[5]Deutsch, chaps. 1, 2, 6, 8.

1.2. In this paper I do not deal with such fundamental questions directly, although my attraction to communication theory arises partly from my judgment of its ability to explicate them. The object of this chapter is to set forth the central ideas offered by communication theory that can serve as organizing principles for an account of human social action, and of political action in particular. I do not mean that, from these ideas, the particular psychological and social laws governing such action may be derived; the derivation of such laws must be from experimental evidence, not from a framework of analytical principles. I mean, instead, to demonstrate the possibility of formulating such findings in terms of concepts provided by communication theory.

1.3. If such an account of political events in communication terms is possible, I can then subsequently consider whether its use in this field, as has been the case in others, is likely to facilitate inquiry, and further understanding, in ways that would otherwise be harder to bring about. I also contend that, if a cogent account of human social action in communication theory terms does emerge, its plausibility will itself strongly suggest its value for the advancement of understanding in this field. If such action can be adequately described in communication theory terms, then those terms are likely to be relevant and useful to its explication. The comparison between prior empirical understanding and the formulations I will propose, in other words, itself constitutes a kind of test of the viability of those formulations.

1.4. To support an account of human social action, communication theory must be able to explicate several concepts, including perception, or the recognition of phenomena; concept formation and significance; behavior and its motivation; attitudes and other mental structures and states; interaction among individuals; and the empirical observation of each of the above. The discussion in this chapter bears on each of these questions, although it is more convenient to take them up in a different sequence.

a. Pattern.

2.0. RECEPTION. It is convenient to begin by considering the phenomenon of recognition, because communication theory's account of that act is central to its entire structure. Recognition may be said to take place when some entity identifies anything as being that thing rather than any other.[6] Consistently with communication theory, let an entity capable of recognizing anything be called a receiver, and anything capable of being recognized, a signal; the act of recognizing a thing may then be called reception. In communication theory terms, therefore, recognition is equivalent to the reception of a signal.

I will accordingly begin by developing a communication

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[6]Deutsch, pp. 81-5, 87, 109, 175; Cherry, p. 258f..

theoretic account of the reception of signals. If communication
theory can be applied to human action in the way I propose, then
I should be able to use this account subsequently to explicate the
nature of human perception, considering people as receivers, things
perceived as signals, and therefore perception as a kind of recep-
tion.

2.1. Now, fundamental to communication theory is the
principle that a signal and its reception can each be described or
explained only with reference to the other. Neither is itself
fundamental; the relation between the two is fundamental. Further,
that relation cannot itself be reduced to some other single thing;
it can be adequately explicated only as a relation. Communication
theory explicates that relation through the concept of pattern. I
will first consider how the concept of pattern explicates that of
signal, and then how it explicates that of reception.

2.2. I begin by stipulating, consistently with communi-
cation theory, that pattern is that about a thing that allows a re-
ceiver to recognize it.[7] For something to be recognizable, it must
have characteristics that allow it to be distinguished as that
thing. A thing's distinguishing characteristics, then, define its

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[7]Deutsch, pp. 83-4, 79, 148, 276; Norbert Wiener, The Hu-
man Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Garden City, N.Y.:
Doubleday Anchor, 1950), p. 96; cf. Vincent E. Giuliano, "How We
Find Patterns," International Science and Technology, Feb., 1967,
pp. 40-51; and Ray Hyman and Barry Anderson, "Solving Problems,"
ibid., Sept., 1965, pp. 36-41.

pattern, and anything that may be said to have a distinguishing

pattern may, therefore, be a signal.[8] A signal may therefore be

defined as anything patterned.

2.3. A receiver, then, receives a signal by evaluat-

ing it as having a certain pattern. It can only do so if a

specification of that pattern is in some sense embodied in, or

available to, it. Such a specification stored in a receiver may

be called a code.[9] A code may accordingly be regarded as a pattern

stored in a receiver. Recognition may then be said to take place

when a receiver evaluates the pattern of a signal against that of

a stored code and determines that the two correspond; communication

theory's account of the term thus confirms the term's etymological

implications.[10]

2.4. Now it is only meaningful to say that a receiver

"distinguishes" a signal as having a certain pattern if it was pos-

sible, a priori, that the signal might have had some other pattern.

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[8]Deutsch, pp. 146-8, 276; Cherry, pp. 171, 308-9, and
"sign" at p. 7; W. Ross Ashby, An Introduction to Cybernetics
(London: Chapman & Hall, 1956), section 7/5; Charles Morris, Signs,
Language and Behavior (New York: Braziller, 1946), pp. 354-5, and
see also "sign" at pp. 10-17, 20. 23-7; C.K. Ogden and I.A. Rich-
ards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language
upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism, 8th ed. (1946; New
York: Harcourt Brace, 1923), pp. 9-12.

[9]Deutsch, p. 85; Cherry, p. 7 and sections 2.1-2.2, 7.3;
Morris on "interpretant," pp. 17, 30, 303, 349; Umberto Eco, Ein-
fuehrung in die Semiotik, trans. from the Italian by Juergen Tra-
bant (Munich: Fink, 1972), p. 57, n452.

[10]Cherry, p. 258; see note 12 below.

Any receiver must therefore necessarily be capable of recognizing more than one pattern; that is, of receiving more than one kind of signal. To be a receiver, therefore, an entity must possess a plurality of stored codes. All the codes stored in a given receiver, taken together, may be called its _coding_, or ensemble of codes.[11]

2.5. When a signal is received, therefore, it may be said to _select_ a particular alternative from among those stored in a receiver.[12] Information, in the term's technical sense, is a measure of the capacity of a signal to select a unique code from a given coding, or of the degree of correspondence between signal and code.[13] Information is, of course, measured in bits, where a bit is the amount of information necessary to make one binary step toward a selection, that is, toward a determination of correspondence.[14]

2.6. To say that a receiver evaluates a signal as corresponding to a stored code is, accordingly, also to say that the signal selects the code. The process by which such evaluation

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[11]Deutsch, loc. cit.; Cherry, sections 2.1-2.2, 3.3, 7.3; Morris, "language" at pp. 32-6, 350; Ashby, sections 8/1-8/4; Wiener, pp. 74-5, 81.

[12]Deutsch, pp. 148, 175; Cherry, sections 5.1-5.2, esp. pp. 172-8, and pp. 9, 39, 244, 308; Morris, section 1.3.

[13]Deutsch, pp. 84, 146, 150; Cherry, p. 9 and sections 2.2, 3.5, 5.1-5.4 (esp. pp. 172-180), and 5.8, and pp. 220-1; Wiener, chap. 1 and pp. 77-8; Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Com- munication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry (New York: Norton, 1951), pp. 197-203.

[14]Ashby, p. 126; Cherry, pp. 50, 173, 305, cf. pp. 14, 107, 268; Wiener, p. 21.

or selection takes place may be called the _critical process_ of the receiver.[15] The further explication of reception requires some discussion of the critical process.

2.7. For a signal to correspond with a code, it must in some sense be equivalent to, or match, or be identifiable with the code. However, the form in which the code is stored will in general be entirely different from that of the signal. As Bateson observes in the case of human receivers:

> interpersonal processes are distinctly different from the events in the external world, and the concept of codification refers to this difference. . . . /T/he substitution of one type of event for another, such that the event substituted shall in some sense stand for the other, is _codification_. (16)

Any correspondence between code and signal can therefore not depend on any empirical similarity; it is, indeed, defined to exist by the receiver's critical process. It is possible to speak of equivalence between signals of different form, including between a signal and a code, only when such equivalence is stipulated by some receiver's critical process.

2.8. A receiver's critical process may therefore be regarded as embodying a specification of the form of the receiver's coding, a specification of the forms of signal that the receiver is capable of receiving, and a stipulation of the criteria of corre-

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[15] Deutsch, pp. 11, 86-7.

[16] Ruesch and Bateson, p. 169. Emphasis in original.

spondence between them. In short, a receiver's critical process determines the way in which it receives signals, while its coding determines what particular signals it can receive.

3.0. PATTERN. In order to summarize the concepts introduced in the last group of paragraphs neatly, it will be useful first to make some implications of the preceding discussion more explicit. In particular, the sense in which the concept of pattern rests fundamentally on a relation rather than on a phenomenon may now be explicated. That explication may be used as the basis for formalizing the concept of form, which in turn may be used to reformulate several of the concepts introduced above.

3.1. According to the discussion above, a phenomenon can never be said to possess any particular pattern simply because it has some specifiable characteristics. It can be called patterned only if it possesses characteristics that are specified by the coding of some particular receiver to constitute that pattern. The pattern of any signal is undefined except with respect to the coding of a given receiver; it is defined by the relation between characteristics of the signal and characteristics of the receiver. Even to specify what counts as a signal requires reference to the particular receiver; similarly, the amount of information in a given signal can only be defined relative to a given receiver's cod-

ing.[17] I will say that the coding with reference to which any given signal is patterned is that in terms of which, or by which, the signal is <u>described</u>.

3.2. It may seem that, since pattern is defined by a receiver's coding, the receiver rather than the pattern, and thus an entity rather than a relation, could be taken as fundamental. However, as I will show below, a receiver may itself be defined in terms of its coding and its critical process. Both of these are described by their patterns; therefore, to take receivers as fundamental does not avoid basing the account on pattern and therefore on relation. Anything can be called a signal only if some receiver has the capacity to receive it by identifying its pattern; anything can be called a receiver only if it possesses stored patterns, and a form of critical process, allowing it to identify signals.

3.3. In other words, pattern is in no case an empirical quality of signals themselves, but is imputed to signals by their receiver.[18] The pattern of a signal is not, therefore, simply an observable empirical characteristic of a phenomenon. Though a pattern must always be embodied in some concrete thing, it is not identifiable with that thing; it can only be specified in terms of

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[17]Cherry, p. 227; see notes 11 and 13 above and 22 below.

[18]For this formulation I am indebted to my brother-in-law, Robert B. Sauer, who read an earlier draft of this passage.

a relation between a signal and its receiver. It is in this sense that a relation, rather than a simple entity, is fundamental to communication theory (2.1). It is, further, because communication theory deals essentially with relation that the intepretations it offers are irreducible to, or not equivalent with, previous formulations.[19]

3.4. It follows from this account of pattern that a given phenomenon may be regarded as possessing any one of numerous patterns, depending on which of its characteristics are those by which a given receiver would recognize it as a signal. Similarly, phenomena that are empirically quite different may be considered as equivalent in pattern, as long as the relation of each to a corresponding receiver is equivalent. Deutsch illustrates this point with the following example:

> Power engineering transfers amounts of . . . energy; communications engineering transfers information. It does not transfer events; it transfers a patterned relationship between events. When a spoken message is transferred through a sequence of mechanical vibrations of the air and of a membrane; thence through electric processes in a broadcasting station and through radio waves; thence through electric and mechanical processes in a receiver and recorder to a set of grooves on the surface of a disk; and finally played and made audible to a listener—what has been transferred through this chain of processes, or channel of communication, is not matter, nor any one of the particular processes, nor any significant amount of energy, since relays and electronic tubes make the quali-

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[19]See Gregory Bateson, Steps to an Ecology of Mind. (New York: Ballantine, 1972).

ties of the signal independent from a considerable
range of energy inputs. Rather it is something
that has remained unchanged, invariant, over this
whole sequence of processes. (20)

It is this "something" that communication theory calls "pattern."

4.0. FORM. The terms in which a receiver carries out

evaluations of signals, or the kinds of characteristics in terms of

which the pattern is defined, may be said to define the form of

the signal. For instance, a broadcast of rock music and one of a

basketball game both have the form of electromagnetic waves; 0001

and 0010 both have the form of four-digit binary numbers. Accord-

ingly, while the coding of a receiver defines what signals it can

receive, its critical process defines the forms of signal it can

receive. A receiver's critical process may enable it to receive

four-digit binary numbers as signals, and its coding will allow it

to distinguish one such number from another. Similarly, a radio's

critical process specifies electromagnetic radiation of a certain

range of frequency to be the form of signals which it can receive;

among the particular signals distinguished by its coding are those

for rock music and for sports announcing. In this latter case,

finer discriminations between individual signals could of course

be made, corresponding, for example, to the pronunciation of dif-

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[20]Deutsch, p. 82 (emphasis in original); cf. Wiener,
pp. 97-98.

ferent words, or to different notes; the ensemble of codes of a radio at such a level of analysis is very large.

4.1. I will now say that each kind of characteristic by which a given signal's form is defined is an **element** of that form, and that a form of signal is <u>characterized</u> by its elements taken together in their appropriate relations. Thus I will say that, while the pattern of any given signal is described by its receiver's coding, the form of such signals is characterized by its receiver's critical process.

4.2. The elements of a signal's form are characteristics of kinds of phenomena, and therefore may be taken to constitute a pattern in the sense of 3.1. A form of signal accordingly constitutes a pattern of signals, or, in other words, a pattern of patterning. Forms are, accordingly, themselves patterns, and may be so treated. What is in one sense a form shared by various specific signals is in another sense a pattern defining that form as a specific signal. In particular, as with other patterns (3.4), the form of a given signal may be defined by different kinds of characteristics in connection with different aspects of its analysis; that is, with evaluations according to different codings.

4.3. On the basis of this account of form, some further implications of the previous discussion may be made explicit. First, note that, if anything patterned may be a signal, then objects may be signals as well as events. In these terms, an object is simply any phenomenon whose form is characterized by a pattern

that tends to persist over time; such a pattern may be called a
structure. Whether a signal is an object or an event, structured
or patterned, depends for communication theory simply on the time
frame of the analysis; the terms are otherwise synonymous.[21]

4.4. Similarly, inferentially constructed entities may
be treated as signals as well as may directly observable phenomena,
as long as the receiver in question has the capacity to recognize
them by carrying out the appropriate inferences from evidence.
This principle will become useful in section b of this chapter,
in which I propose an account of observation and observers con-
sistent with communication theory.[22]

4.5. Signals may also be distinguished according to
whether they are being considered as characterized by one element,
or several. The latter is the case if the signal's pattern is
described in terms of several phenomena, each of which may itself
be regarded as a patterned signal, and which are related according

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[21]Deutsch, p. 83; Wiener, p. 95; Ashby, section 7/16.
In a graduate seminar in political science, Yale, Spring, 1967,
Dr. Deutsch advanced the idea that whether a thing was regarded as
a verb or a noun depended on the temporal frame of reference: with
a sufficiently long viewpoint, it was easy to regard a mountain as
a process.

[22]Deutsch, pp. 83-7, 133, 146-47, 149; Cherry, pp. 227,
258-62 ("invariants"), 291-300, and section 7.3, also pp. 308-9,
on "sign," "sign-token," "sign-type," "symbol;" cf. Ashby, sections
6/8, 7/5-7/6; cf. also Morris, pp. 8, 20, and "sign-family" and
"sign-vehicle" at p. 354. On "form" see Deutsch, pp. 83-84, and
cf. Cherry, pp. 73, 103-06.

to a specified pattern. This pattern of patterns may be called a second-order pattern; a signal recognized by a receiver as possessing a second-order pattern may also, consistently with the usage of that term, be called a _gestalt_. For a receiver to receive a signal as a gestalt means that it recognizes the signal as a complexly patterned whole. That is, the receiver recognizes the signal by its pattern as a whole, and recognizes that pattern as relating the elements of which the signal is made up, which it also recognizes, individually, as patterned.

4.6. On this basis I can rigorize a concept I have already used, by saying that I will call a transient signal composed of several elements an _event_. An event is then a gestalt, characterized by its elements and the pattern of their relations. By contrast, where a signal is considered as characterized by its pattern only, I will, where necessary for clarity, refer to it as a _simple signal_. A simple signal is then characterized by having a pattern that is not being considered as a gestalt, that is, not being considered as relating further patterned elements.

5.0. REFORMULATION. Each concept introduced in this section may now be reformulated in terms of the forms by which its referents are in general characterized and the patterns by which any specific referent is described. The distinction between characterization and description should be kept clear: description, as

I am using the term here, specifies an individual phenomenon; characterization specifies its type, or the general concept that it exemplifies. I am saying that a given signal is _described_ by a pattern that is defined as equivalent to it; that is, to which it may be evaluated as corresponding (3.1). On the other hand, a given signal is _characterized_ by the elements that constitute its form; that is, that specify the characteristics in terms of which it may be evaluated (4.1).

5.1. A signal is any phenomenon that may be characterized by its pattern. The pattern of any given signal is described by an element of the coding of its receiver; the form of any given signal is described by the receiver's critical process. Stated another way, the pattern of a signal can only be defined, in any specific case, by the coding of a receiver. Similarly, a pattern that may be embodied equivalently in a variety of forms may be identified as invariant only with respect to the receiver's critical process.

5.2. The form of a given signal may also be conceived as the signal's _channel_.[23] In other words, the channel of a signal is described by what kinds of characteristic the signal has, or, equivalently, what form it has. Since those characteristics are in turn described by the receiver's critical process, the channel

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[23]Deutsch, pp. 82-83, 94-96, 149, 204, 276; cf. Cherry, pp. 177-78, 217; and Ashby, section 8/13.

of a signal is described by the critical process of its receiver.
On this basis, a _message_ may be defined as a phenomenon whose form
is characterized by two elements: the pattern and the form (or
channel) of a signal.[24]

5.3. Similarly, a _receiver_ may be defined as a struc-
ture characterized by two elements, a coding and a critical pro-
cess. A given coding is described by the patterns it contains.
A given critical process is described by the form of the coding,
the form of the signals, and the criteria of correspondence be-
tween them. In other words, a critical process is described by
what kinds of characteristics the signals have, what kinds of
characteristics the stored codes have, and on what basis the re-
ceiver determines their equivalence.

5.4. _Reception_ may then be characterized as an event
with two elements: a message and a receiver. A receiver is, in
turn, characterized by a coding and a critical process; a message,
by a pattern and a channel. (The pattern of a given message is,
of course, described by the receiver's coding; its form, by the
receiver's critical process.) Reception might therefore be alter-
natively characterized as an event with four elements: a signal, a
channel, a coding, and a critical process. It will be more useful,
however, to adopt a third formulation, and say that reception is

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[24]See Deutsch, pp. 82-85, 146-47, 200, 276 and passim;
Cherry, pp. 171, 307; Wiener, pp. 16, 21, 95-96. These illuminate
the concept; my terminology, however, is not standard.

characterized by a signal, a channel, and a receiver.

6.0. SUMMARY. On the basis of these formulations, it will be possible to describe communication events in general in terms of the elements introduced in this section; that is, in terms of signals, channels, and receivers. I will subsequently, in chapter three, apply that description to human social events and demonstrate the sense in which the two are equivalent. In order to develop that account of communication events, however, it is first necessary to consider the relation of an observer of such events to the events observed. Besides supporting the account of communication events, the account of the observer also clarifies questions, with which a social science must deal, about the relation of the analyst to the processes investigated.

6.1. The next section accordingly develops, first, the account of the position of the observer, in communication terms, and second, the account of communication events in the terms introduced in this section. Before proceeding to that discussion, I will summarize the concepts of this section by applying them to the example of a radio.

6.2. The act of tuning a radio selects what frequency of broadcast waves it will receive; broadcast waves are a form of signal characterized by their frequency. The frequency selected is a code; the ensemble of possible frequencies receivable by that

radio is its coding; the act of turning the dial is a signal whose pattern is defined by the point to which the dial is turned. The apparatus linking the dial to the radio's circuitry defines a critical process by which the radio evaluates the given signal as corresponding to the code.

6.3. Broadcast waves of a given frequency may also be taken as a form of signal, characterized by their modulation. The particular modulations received by the radio are signals, because they are patterned in a way that the radio can evaluate, through a critical process defined by its circuitry, as corresponding to certain vibration patterns of its speaker, which are a code selected from its ensemble of possible vibration patterns. Arrangements of colored lights, on the other hand, cannot be a signal to a radio, inasmuch as the radio possesses no coding or critical process by which to interpret them.

b. Observers and communication events.

7.0. OBSERVER. In order to apply the formulations of section a to empirical inquiry, an account is necessary of how the occurrence of reception could be observed, as an empirical phenomenon. In communication terms, this account would amount to an explication of the relation between message and receiver characteristic of reception, that is, by which reception can be recognized. That explication is given by 8.0-8.6. The implications of that

discussion, and application of the account it develops, will make possible an account of the characteristics of other communication events, such as the transmission of signals. The purpose of developing such an account is to provide a basis for dealing with, and classifying, the events that may take place in a political process.

7.1. This explication, however, cannot proceed without an account, in communication terms, of what it is to be an observer, and of the nature of observation. This account will also provide a basis for explicating the relation of investigators to political events they observe. To begin the development of this account, note that the observation of any phenomenon exemplifies the reception of a signal, as those terms were defined in section a. When a phenomenon is observed, it is recognized as possessing a certain pattern (namely, that by which the observer recognizes it as that phenomenon), and the observer interprets or evaluates it according to his or her own coding (that is, prior ideas). An observer is therefore, in communication terms, a kind of receiver.

7.2. To observe the occurrence of reception is therefore to receive a reception as a signal. Now, according to 5.4, reception is an event, and therefore a gestalt. In order to observe reception, therefore, a receiver must be capable of receiving gestalts. In particular, it must be able to regard a signal's pattern as composed of, and relating, a simple signal, its channel, and a receiver receiving it through that channel. Further, in order to identify the receiver as a receiver, the observer must in some

sense be capable of describing it by its coding and critical process.

7.3. All of the above means that the observer must possess codes corresponding to the simple signal, its channel, the receiver's coding, its critical process, and the second-order pattern relating them as a reception. The receiver itself, on the other hand, need only possess codes for recognizing various simple signals. It need not be able to recognize its own receptions as events, or even the other elements of those receptions as signals. It may, for example, be incapable of observing itself, or events in which it participates.

7.4. In other words, concepts like "coding," "channel," and "critical process" need not themselves be parts of the receiver's coding, but only of the "meta-language,"[25] or coding of the observer. For example, that an observer makes a dictionary of the receiver's coding does not mean that the receiver's critical process actually makes use of any such dictionary. An observer's concept of a coding is a systematization of its observations; the actual processes of the receiver need not reproduce it. All this is parallel with the situation in physical science, where

> a scientific law does not "explain" any part of
> Nature; a cricket ball does not execute a para-
> bolic flight "because" of Newton's law of mo-
> tion. (26)

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[25]Cherry, pp. 12, 220f., 243, 307, and sections 3.2.3 and 3.3.

[26]Ibid., p. 255.

8.0. PROCESSING. I may now consider how the nature of the relation between message and receiver in a reception may be empirically described. I contend that, empirically speaking, an observer could not assert that a receiver had in fact received a message unless it could observe some change in the receiver which could be attributed to the message's reception. Such a change can be called the receiver's <u>response</u> to the signal.[27] But from the standpoint of the observer, such a change in a receiver would be a patterned phenomenon, recognized by the observer; it would, therefore, constitute a signal, received by the observer, whose source was the original receiver. In other words, for any phenomenon to be empirically identifiable as a reception, it must involve a response, which an observer can identify as a signal, by the receiver.

8.1. Consistently with communication theory, I will call a receiver that is a source of signals an <u>emitter</u>. It then follows that, empirically speaking, every receiver must also be an emitter. Consistently with communication theory, I will call such an entity a <u>terminal</u>,[28] though I will continue to say "receiver" and "emitter" when speaking of its respective capacities.

8.2. In the simplest case, a terminal's response to a

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[27]Deutsch, p. 91; Morris, pp. 8-13, 353; Ashby, chap. 6.

[28]Deutsch, chaps. 6-8, pp. 150 f.; Cherry, section 2.2 and chap. 5; Morris, sections 1.2, 1.3, 1.9, 2.1; Ashby, chaps. 3-4, 6-9, and cf. "transducer" at sections 4/1-4/2 f. and 3/5.

signal will be its emission of a single corresponding signal. But
according to 2.3, it is a terminal's coding that describes such
correspondences. The signal emitted by a terminal as the result of
a reception is thus in some sense equivalent to the code selected
by a received signal. Empirically, therefore, a receiver's coding
may be regarded as defining correspondences between received and
emitted signals. Similarly, the critical process must be regarded
as including the entire process by which the terminal converts
received signals into corresponding emitted signals. An <u>emission</u>
may then be characterized as an event, correspondingly with a re-
ception (5.4), by the emitted message and the emitter, both ulti-
mately defined by the emitter's coding and critical process. Emis-
sion accordingly involves the same elements as reception, but in
different relations: simple signal, its channel, and a terminal,
this time the emitter.

8.3. In such a case as that of 8.2, an observer's con-
clusion that reception had occurred would rest on observations of
the received and emitted signals, and also on an inference that
the two did in fact correspsond, that is, that the emission was in
fact a response. Such an inference would amount to an assertion
that the structure of the terminal embodied a predisposition for
it to respond in the observed way to the observed signal. A code
may accordingly be interpreted as a predisposition to respond in a
stipulated way to a given signal, and a coding consists of a set of
predispositions to respond in stipulated ways to each possible sig-

nal.

8.4. It follows that a terminal's coding and critical process amount to inferential constructs, imputed to the terminal as internal characteristics by an observer. Like any other patterned phenomena, such inferential constructs constitute potential signals, in accordance with 4.4. The justification for admitting such constructs in empirical discourse is that the observer does not impute a unique non-observable construct to "explain" each event tautologously. The empirical basis for such inference is repeated observations of temporal association between signal and response. Because each inference rests on many observations, an observer can account for broad categories of events by a limited number of such assertions about a terminal's internal structure. Such imputations do not involve assertions about a terminal's alleged meta-empirical "inner nature;" "internal" may be taken exactly to mean that what it refers to is not directly observable, but inferentially posited.[29]

8.5. Any entity whose emissions are conditioned by its

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[29]Ashby, chap. 6; Deutsch, chaps. 6, 8; cf. Cherry, sections 6.3.1, 7.3-7.4; cf. also Morris, chap. I, sections 1-5, chap. II, sections 7-9. Ruesch and Bateson, pp. 197-203, provide a fuller account of the requirements for such inference. See also Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale U. Pr., 1950), p. 3; David Hume, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 8, part I, at paragraph 10 (p. 96 in On Human Nature And the Understanding, ed. Antony Flew /New York: Collier, 1962/, based on the edition of 1777).

receptions may accordingly be treated as a terminal. However, it is only from the recurrence of specifiable patterns of events over time that the existence of such relations between signals and responses can be asserted. Therefore, it may be assumed that terminals, and their codings and critical processes, tend to persist over time; it is for this reason that they may be taken as structures.

8.6. Consistently with communication theory, the event described in 8.2-8.3 may be called processing.[30] Processing is characterized by the pattern and channel of both the received and the emitted signal, and by the correspondence between the two, which is in turn defined by the terminal's structure. Specifically, the correspondence between the two patterns is defined by the terminal's coding, and the correspondence between the two channels is defined by its critical process. Like reception and emission, therefore, a processing is characterized as a form of signal by three elements, simple signals, their channels, and the terminal, each of which is in turn defined by the terminal's coding and critical process.

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[30]Deutsch, p. 85, chap. 6, pp. 133 f., 147-50, 161-65, 175; Cherry, chap. 2; Morris, chap. I; Ashby, chaps. 4, 6.

9.0. TRANSMISSION. Processing involves one terminal's reception of one signal and its emission of another. I will now consider events involving one signal that is both emitted by one terminal and received by another, which I will call a transmitted signal. As with other messages, a transmitted message will be characterized by its pattern and its channel. These will in turn be specified, not necessarily in the same way, by the codings and critical processes of the emitting and of the receiving terminal.. Correspondingly, the occurrence of a transmitted message, including both an emission and a reception, may be called a transmission.[31] Transmission is accordingly characterized as a form of signal by the message transmitted and its two terminals, all of which are in turn specified by the appropriate coding(s) and critical processs(es).

9.1. In any given transmission, therefore, two terminals are related by a message. The relation between the two terminals is to be generalized from the messages that pass between them. In constructing such generalizations, the variations among the patterns of the signals transmitted drop out, and what remains is the form of the signals, the kind of signals they are (4.0). But the form of signals defines their channel (5.2). Therefore, the channel of a transmitted signal, or transmission channel,

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[31]Cherry, chaps. 4, 5, esp. p. 210; Morris, chap. II, esp. sections 4-9, and chaps. IV-VII; Ashby, chaps. 8, 9, esp. sections 8/10 f..

must be taken to include a definition of the relation of the terminals it relates, that is, of the way in which they are related.

9.2. This account of transmission supports further explication of the concept of channel. In 5.2 I asserted that a signal's channel was described by the form of the signal; that is, according to the kinds of characteristics by which the receiver recognized it. I further asserted that which characteristics those were, was specified by the critical process of the receiver. I am now saying that a transmission's channel describes the relation between the terminals of that transmission. These formulations may be combined into a statement that the kind of relation existing between two terminals is described by the kinds of characteristics by which the receiver recognizes signals in that channel as transmissions from the emitter. Channel, as a description of the form of signals, is equivalent to channel, as a description of the relation between terminals obtaining in a given transmission.

10.0. EVENTS. I will now say, in general, that any gestalt characterized in terms of messages and terminals is a communication event. All the elements characterizing any communication event are then specified by some appropriate selection and relation of codings and critical processes. In most contexts below, it will be convenient to formulate the characterization of communication events, as a form of signal, in terms of three ele-

Fig. 2.1. Definition of Simple Communication Events.

EMISSION

EMITTER

EMITTED MESSAGE

CRITICAL PROCESS

CODING

SIGNAL

CHANNEL

Fig. 2.1b. Emission.

RECEPTION

RECEIVED MESSAGE

RECEIVER

CHANNEL

SIGNAL

CODING

CRITI-CAL PRO-CESS

Fig. 2.1a. Reception.

Fig. 2.1. continued.

PROCESSING

RECEIVED MESSAGE

TERMINAL

EMITTED MESSAGE

CHANNEL

SIGNAL

CRITICAL PROCESS

CODING

SIGNAL

CHANNEL

Fig. 2.1c. Processing.

Fig 2.1. continued.

Fig. 2.1d Transmission.

ments: terminals, simple signals, and channels. This concept of events may be taken as an explication of my usage of the term in chapters one and two. If my formulations in this chapter are validly applicable to the study of politics, then these remarks should help to clarify what I mean by political events. Corresponding arguments apply to the remarks in subsequent paragraphs about processes and structures.

10.1. According to my argument so far, a communication event is a patterned phenomenon, and accordingly may be viewed as a signal. To the extent that it is viewed simply as a patterned whole, it is a simple signal like any other, and its receiver a simple receiver. However, if a receiver interprets a signal's pattern as representing a patterned relation among elements that are themselves patterned, then that receiver is behaving as an observer. When the elements into which the observer analyzes such a signal are equivalent to simple signals, terminals, and channels, the observer is recognizing the signal as a communication event, or as made up of communication events. In that case, the observer will also be able, under appropriate circumstances, to recognize any of the elements singly, or any combination of the elements, or the event as a patterned whole, as a simple signal in its own right. Whether an observer is to be regarded as receiving an event as a simple signal or a gestalt depends on the analytical context. Appropriate kinds of reception may be imputed as required, once one knows that the receiver has the capaci-

ty to be an observer.

10.2. So far, I have introduced four kinds of communication event: reception, emission, processing, and transmission; I will call these simple communication events. The ways in which the definitions of these events are built up from codings and critical processes are shown in Figures 2.1 a through d; codings and critical processes are of course constructs from observed recurrences (8.4-8.5).

10.3. If each reception may lead to an emission, and each emission may be a transmission and lead to a further reception, then, whenever a number of terminals receive each other's signals, indefinitely long series of communication events may arise.[32] Such a series I will call a communication process. In such a process, the pattern of each signal corresponds to a code in a receiver, which corresponds to a further emitted signal; similarly, the channel of each signal corresponds to a critical process in a receiver, which corresponds to a further channel of emission. These relations are depicted in Figure 2.2. A communication process could also involve more complex concatenations of events, such as would be generated by two or more received signals selecting a single response, or by a single transmission received by two or more terminals.

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[32]Deutsch, chaps. 6, 7, 9, 11; Cherry, section 1.2, chap. 5, pp. 9, 214, 222; Morris, chap. VII, sections 7-10; Ashby, chaps. 4, 5, 9, esp. sections 4/6 f..

Fig. 2.2.
Communication Process.

10.4. As with a single communication event, a given communication process is described by the patterns and channels of the signals involved and by the terminals involved, or, ulti- mately, by the terminals' codings and critical processes. Any communication process may accordingly be analyzed into simple communication events either as a pattern of emissions and re- ceptions, or as a pattern of processings and transmissions.

10.5. The relation of a given terminal to the com- munication processes of which it is an element may be said to define its communication environment. The patterns and channels that define the communicated signals in such an environment cor- respond, in the way shown in 10.2, to the codings and critical processes of the terminal involved; a given terminal's coding and critical process thus describe its environment. Since coding and critical process describe a terminal (5.3), it follows that a terminal may equivalently be described by its communication environment (see Figure 2.3).

10.6. Finally, when, in a given communication process, certain patterns of communication events are found to recur over time, such patterns may be said to define a communication struc- ture, just as the recurrence of simple processing allows the ob- server to define a receiver as a structure (8.5). Such structures may be found to be characterized by patterns relating all, or only some, of the elements that define communication events. For exam- ple, it may be the case that signals from given terminals are found

Fig. 2.3.
Communication Environment

always to bring responses in specified channels, or vice versa.

11.0. SUMMARY. In this section I have introduced three kinds of communication event, emission, processing, and transmission, which, together with reception, constitute the four simple communication events. Each is characterized by a particular kind of relation among simple signals, signal channels, and terminals. Simple communication events may be linked to one another over time, forming a communication process; when patterns of communication events recur over time, they may be regarded as a communication structure. With respect to any given terminal, the patterns of communication events in which it participates defines its communication environment. To say that a terminal's communication environment is stable over time is to say that the terminal is part of a communication structure.

11.1. An observer builds up an empirical description of a communication environment in the following way. It first receives signals, which are initially to be regarded as defined only relative to its own coding, in channels defined by its own critical process. It then imputes, from certain kinds of recurrent patterns among those signals, the existence of terminals with specified codings and critical processes. On that basis it can specify certain other patterns as constituting messages, specified in terms of their forms and channels, to and from those terminals. It can then ident-

ify patterns of messages and terminals as communication events.
Finally, it can construct, from recurring patterns of communica-
tion events, a description of the communication structure that it
is observing.

c. State and reflexivity.

12.0. STATE. In section a, I considered the reception
of simple signals by a receiver; in section b, the reception of
communication events by an observer. In the discussion in section
b, I remarked that a terminal need not be able to observe patterns
of which it is itself an element; that is, need not be able to ob-
serve communication events in which it participates. Throughout
that discussion, it was unnecessary to assume terminals with that
capacity. However, the analysis of human action will reveal that
human actors can, in the sense of section b, observe events in
which they participate, and that that capacity has profound conse-
quences for the forms such actions take. In this section, there-
fore, I will develop concepts that allow the analysis of communica-
tion processes involving terminals with such capacities.

12.1. The capacity of a terminal to observe events in
which it participates may be regarded as compounded of two simpler
capacities. One is a terminal's capacity to observe communication
events; I have explored the implications of this capacity in the

previous section. The other is a terminal's capacity to receive signals which it itself transmits. This capacity I have not previously discussed; therefore, I will begin by discussing it in its simple form, and develop the subsequent discussion on that foundation.

12.2. To begin this discussion, consider the case in which a received signal, rather than bringing about the terminal's emission of an immediate overt response, instead predisposes the terminal to respond to a subsequent received signal otherwise than it would if the initial signal had not been received. Morris gives the example of a driver who is told of a blockage further along a highway. (S)he continues driving, but later turns down a side road.[33] His (her) subsequent behavior shows that (s)he received a signal, but the reception may clearly be said to take place well before any emission is observable. Such processes are not adequately interpretable in terms of the simple communication events defined in section b, because the received signal does not select a single corresponding response. The interpretation of such processes requires the introduction of concepts embodying complexer forms of imputation.

12.3. Such a signal may be regarded as allowing its receiver to make several binary steps toward a selection which is then completed by a subsequent reception. The emission selected

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[33]Morris, p. 6.

can thus be regarded as selected jointly by the two received signals. In such a case, the change in the terminal caused by the reception of the first signal, required by the empirical account of reception (8.0), may be described as an imputed internal response. The basis for such an imputation would be the terminal's observed responses to the subsequent signals in cases in which the initial signal had and had not been received. Thus the principle remains that any reception necessarily affects at least some potential future emission of the terminal.

12.4. Since it is a coding that defines responses to signals, that of such a terminal must make possible both the response to the subsequent signal that it exhibits when it has received the initial signal and that it exhibits when not. The internal response to the initial signal must, therefore, function as a part of a coding, in that it defines what the actual response to the subsequent signal will be in a given case. Yet it is unlike the coding in that it is transient, or does not persist over time, while a coding is necessarily enduring (8.5). Such signals, that function like part of a coding but are transient, may be said to define the state of a terminal.[34]

12.5. State is then like structure in that both describe potential responses of the terminal, but unlike structure in representing relatively transient, rather than relatively en-

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[34]Deutsch, pp. 82-85, 98-99, 147, 276; Cherry, p. 309; Ashby, pp. 25, 30, 92; cf. Morris, chap. I.

during, aspects of the terminal's patterning. As in 4.3, which patterns in a terminal constitute state, and which structure, depends on the time frame of the analysis. The state of a terminal may be conceived either as selecting a subset of codes as the terminal's effective coding at a given time, or as a temporary modification of the terminal's coding. However, inasmuch as a : state is an aspect of the terminal's patterning, and accordingly represents a patterned phenomenon, it may also be treated as a signal. On this view, a state is an internal signal from the terminal to itself, received when it contributes to a jointly conditioned further response.

12.6. The concept of state allows the generalization of several formulations already advanced. First, no special difficulties arise in using the concept of state to deal with situations in which an emission is conditioned by more than two receptions. Second, processing may in general be taken to refer either to an entire process connecting a received with an emitted signal, or to any segment of such a process beginning with any signal, whether observable or internal, and ending with any response, whether observable or internal. Similarly, a coding may be formulated equivalently in terms of correspondences between received signals and responses, where both may be either observable or internal, or as correspondences between complex patterns of reception and observable emissions. Again, a critical process can be defined in terms of the whole process between reception and emission or of

any segment thereof.

13.0. FEEDBACK. A state, considered as an internal signal from a terminal, received by the same terminal, constitutes the simplest form of feedback. Feedback is the communication theory concept most often adduced in social science, and deservedly so, because its use is necessary to give an account, in communication terms, of the complexer forms of human action alluded to in 12.0. In general, _feedback_ may be said to exist whenever an emission from a given terminal is selected at least partly as a result of signals previously emitted by the same terminal.

13.2. Feedback may be partial or complete, simple or complex, positive or negative, and internal or external. Feedback is complete when all the signals selecting the given signal are ultimately selected by corresponding signals in previous recurrences of a process; partial when other signals contribute to the given signal's selection. It is simple when the given signal is selected directly by a corresponding previous signal; complex when the previous signal selects other signals which in turn ultimately select the given signal. It is positive when the signal selected is similar in pattern to the earlier signal of that terminal; negative otherwise. It is internal to the extent that the signals are states; external to the extent that they include transmitted signals.

13.2. For example, in the case discussed in 12.2, the terminal's initial response, its state, together with the subsequent received signal, directly selects the terminal's subsequent response; the emitted signal. If responses of the terminal are the unit of analysis, this case constitutes partial simple internal feedback. Similarly, simple external feedback is possible whenever a terminal is capable of receiving its own transmitted signals, if the reception of each selects the next.

13.3. Indirect external feedback would exist if a terminal's transmitted signal, received and processed by a second terminal, selected a transmitted signal whose reception by the first terminal caused it to transmit a further signal. Indirect internal feedback would exist if a terminal responded to its own transmissions with a state which in turn contributed to the selection of a subsequent transmission.

13.4. When any form of feedback exists, a terminal can affect its own state and signals through its own state (in the case of internal feedback) and signals (in that of external feedback). If, for example, a terminal can receive its own emitted signals, its emissions will be affected by its previous emissions; if states are admitted, a terminal can affect its own responses generally through its own responses.

14.0. REFLEXIVITY. Now consider a terminal possessing feedback that is also an observer in the sense of 7.2. Such a terminal will be able to observe communication events of which it is itself an element. I will say that this capacity defines second-order feedback. A terminal with second-order feedback will, for example, be able to recognize as communication events transmissions in which it is the receiving terminal. In accordance with 7.2, such a terminal will be able to recognize not only the received signal's pattern, but its channel, its transmitting terminal, and its receiving terminal, which is the terminal in question itself. It will also be able to recognize the pattern relating signal and channel as a message, the pattern relating message and receiver as a reception, the pattern relating message and emitter as an emission, the pattern relating message and terminals as a transmission, and so on.

14.1. Since every reception must work some effect on the subsequent transmissions (8.0) or potential transmissions (12.3) of the receiving terminal, it follows that the states and signals of a terminal with second-order feedback may be affected by any element of a communication event it participates in, or any combination of them, instead of by the pattern of a received signal alone. Further, since one of the elements of such a pattern is the terminal itself, and since a terminal is characterized by its coding and critical process (5.3), it follows that a terminal with second-order feedback must, unlike those discussed in 7.3, possess

codes corresponding to its own coding and critical process.

14.2. A terminal with second-order feedback will also be able to recognize as communication events transmissions of which it is the transmitter. This capacity raises the possibility of second-order simple external feedback, through which a terminal's transmissions, considered as events and not as simple signals, directly affect the signals it subsequently transmits. Further, such a terminal will also recognize its own processings as events; that is, it will recognize the relations between receptions and transmissions established by its own coding. Therefore, its responses will depend not only on the transmissions received, but on states reflecting its own identification of what those responses will be.

14.3. Finally, if the terminal can recognize complex as well as simple communication events, it can recognize patterns of complex external feedback in which it participates. Its responses will therefore depend not only on the transmissions it transmits, the transmissions it receives, and its own processing, but also on the processing of the other terminal(s), and on the pattern relating all of these in a feedback loop. Forms of second-order feedback are illustrated in Figure 2.4 a through d.

14.4. Up to this point, I have been considering terminals that can recognize, but not necessarily select, all elements of communication events. Now, however, consider a terminal whose coding also allows it to select, not only the pattern of the simple

Fig. 2.4. Second-Order Feedback of Communication Events

a. of Received Transmission

b. of Emitted Transmission

c. of Processing

Fig 2.4. continued.

Second-Order Feedback of Communication Events

TERMINAL

TERMINAL

MESSAGE

MESSAGE

d. of a complex communication event

signals it transmits, but the patterns of the transmissions of which
it is the transmitter. Its received signals and states will then
select not only the simple signals, but also the channels and re-
ceiving terminals, of its responses. I will call such a coding a
second-order coding.

14.5. Note that while such a coding defines selections
among critical processes and receivers, those critical processes
and receivers are defined as patterns not by the selecting coding,
but by the coding of an observer. This is so even if the observer
and the selecting terminal are the same, for the definition of a
pattern and its selection are still separate, concerned respectively
with received and emitted signals. It is for this reason that sec-
ond-order coding must be distinguished from second-order feedback.

14.6. This distinction may be seen to correspond to
that adduced in section 1e. between the two ways in which attitudes
may play a role in social action. Attitudes as mental structures
according to which social actors understand and interpret events
and structures in the communication environment correspond to the
role of the coding in second-order feedback, by which a terminal
recognizes events in which it participates. Attitudes as predispo-
sitions to respond to received signals with communication events of
specified pattern correspond to the second-order coding, in ac-
cordance with which a terminal selects each element of a trans-
mission.

14.7. It is also worth noting, again, in accordance with

7.4, that a terminal's observation of itself by second-order feed-back does not define its own functioning. Such a terminal, like any other, makes imputations about its structure from observed evidence, even though it may have access to certain special types of ("internal") data through reception of its own states.[35] Whether observations are empirical or introspective (i.e., external or internal), they serve as the basis for the same kinds of imputations of structure, or definitions of pattern, just as the capacity to select a channel or receiver does not define the channel or receiver.

14.8. If a terminal possesses both second-order feed-back and second-order coding, it follows that any element, or combination of elements, of a received transmission may select any element, or combination, of a response. Further, a terminal's second-order feedback of its own processing makes the process through which a response is selected itself a part of the information on the basis of which a response is selected. Such a terminal can send transmissions to itself through either internal or external channels, and can respond to its own processing and responses with further processing and responses. In other words, such a terminal becomes part of its own communication environment;

[35]Deutsch, pp. 88-91, 98, 101, 130, 157, chaps. 6, 11; Cherry, section 7.5.4, pp. 57, 302; Ashby, sections 4/8-4/11, 5/9-5/15, 8/16, chaps. 10, 12 (esp. sections 12/19-12/20), 14; Wiener, pp. 24-33, 58-59; cf. Morris, chap. VI.

its own states and responses are influenced by its own state and responses. I will accordingly say that such a terminal possesses reflexivity, or that it is a reflexive terminal.

14.9. I will develop the implications of reflexivity for political action further in subsequent chapters. I will, however, conclude this discussion with the following example by way of illustration. If feedback is positive, signals will tend to repeat themselves over time. If terminals possess reflexivity, positive feedback of gestalts, including communication events, may arise. Such events would tend to recur, therefore to define persistent patterns; such patterns would in turn define communication structures. If I can show that political institutions can be treated as communication structures, this mechanism would help to account for their stability over time.

15.0. PROBABILITY. The concepts of state and of reflexivity allow the analysis of many processes that cannot adequately be treated by dividing them up into simple communication events. There is, however, one other such kind of process whose analysis requires the introduction of further principles. It may be the case that a given reception alters not some one subsequent signal of the terminal, either observable or internal, but the structure of the terminal itself, which defines the correspondence between received signals and terminals, in an enduring way. Here also an observer

may impute a change in the terminal, but the process of inference
is more complex than above. The change must not be immediately
observable as a signal, or the case could be described by the con-
cept of response, as in 8.0; similarly, it cannot be subsequently
observable as a simple signal, or the case could be described by
the concept of state, as in 12.3. Further, the effect cannot be
an ordered relation among a number of emitted signals, for any such
pattern could itself be reformulated as a single signal.

15.1. The evidence required for the inference in
question must, instead, lie in the difference, from the period
before to that after the reception, in the distribution of char-
acteristics of transmissions from the terminal. Such character-
istics include the patterns and channels of the transmitted sig-
nals, and the terminals of the transmissions, defined in turn by
codings and critical processes. Accordingly, such distributions
are defined by the same elements as individual communication
events, and a communication process may alternatively be described
as a series of (10.3), or by a distribution over kinds of, com-
munication events. Like a communication event, a distribution de-
fines a pattern among elements that are themselves patterned;
therefore, the required inferences can only be made by a terminal
with the capacity to be an observer (7.3), that is, to recognize
gestalts.

15.2. Communication theory explicates such inferences
through probabilistic formulations. From information about the

distribution of signals a terminal receives, an observer can assign probabilities for the reception of each type. Similarly, from information about the distribution of emissions, the observer can assign a probability that each type will be emitted. On the basis of these probabilities, the observer imputes probabilities of selection for the codes in the terminal's coding, so that the terminal's structure is described by a set of probabilities.[36]

15.3. Since the empirical basis for the assignment of such probabilities is the events observed by the observer, it follows that each further event observed will alter the observed cumulative frequencies and therefore alter the probabilities assigned. Over time, such probabilities may or may not remain essentially stable, or statistically stationary.[37] If they do, the information contained in the new observations will increase the predictive precision of the probability assignments. If, however, either the signals emitted or those received are not statistically stationary, the probabilities assigned to various emissions will continually change over time, and therefore will not allow of increasing predictive precision.

15.4. The most effective predictions in such a case will require additional assumptions about how much weight to give

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[36]Deutsch, pp. 82-83; Cherry, chaps. 2, 5; Ashby, chaps. 3, 4, 7.

[37]Cherry, sections 5.3, 5.5 (esp. pp. 197-98), and pp. 107, 231; Ashby, pp. 30, 169.

to recent observations as against older ones. Just as the observer can make inferences from past observations to probabilities of future observations, it can make second-order inferences from the distribution of past observations to whether, and how, the probabilities of future observations are changing. The inference that observed signals are statistically stationary is the special case for which the greatest predictive precision is obtained by assigning equal weights to all signals.

15.5. The inference that the structure of a terminal had changed would, then, rest on a finding that the probabilities assignable to types of emitted signals had changed in a way different from those of received signals; that is, that the distribution of emitted signals was not statistically stationary. Since these probabilities are the empirical grounds for imputing probabilities of selection for codes of the observed terminal, it follows that if those former probabilities change, the observer will infer a change in the latter. It is therefore the coding itself, which defines the correspondence between received signals and responses, to which the change must be imputed. The term _learning_ may be applied to such changes in structure.[38]

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[38]Deutsch, pp. 34, 57, 80 f., 92-97, 104, 109, 133-42, 246, 248, and chap. 10, esp. at p. 165; Cherry, p. 16, 179, 197-98, 221, 234; Ashby, sections 7/21 f., 14/7; Wiener, pp. 58-59; James G. March. "The Theory of Organizational Decision-Making," in _Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction_, rev. ed., ed. A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 185-91; cf. Morris, chap. I.

15.6. A terminal capable of second-order feedback may be capable of observing the distribution of its own responses, which then becomes part of the received information selecting further responses. Correspondingly, a terminal with second-order coding may transmit signals, either internal or observable, that have the effect of changing its own predispositions to respond in an enduring way, as described above. In other words, a reflexive terminal is capable of affecting its own predispositions to respond, its own structure, as well as its states and signals; the remarks in 14.8 and previously are to be generalized accordingly.

15.7. Since every reception changes the probabilities of reception, and therefore of emission, at least in the short run, it follows that receptions that select a single response, either an emission or an internal signal, must also change the terminal, at least marginally and temporarily; that is, must at least change its state. In the short run, therefore, no terminal can be statistically stationary; every reception by definition works some change on the receiver. This principle corresponds to that implied in 8.0-8.3, that whatever changes a terminal may be treated as a signal.

15.8. These considerations indicate another, in some respects more satisfactory, way of identifying a given terminal. Previously I have proposed that a terminal can be defined by its coding and critical process (5.3), or, equivalently, by its communication environment (10.5). However, if a terminal's coding is

not statistically stationary, its definition under either of these criteria will be continually changing. In such a case a pattern may be found that describes what elements of what kinds of receptions characteristically cause what kinds of change in what elements of what kinds of responses of that terminal. Such a pattern would be inferred from weighted observations of the changes in distributions of the signals in the terminal's communication environment, as described in 15.5, and could be said to define the terminal's second-order structure. Then, following a suggestion of Deutsch,[39] the terminal may be defined by its second-order structure, which may in turn be imputed from the characteristic processes through which its structure changes.

16.0. CONCLUSION. In the next chapter, I will proceed to demonstrate the ability of the principles introduced in this chapter to support an account of human social action that is not only adequate to my analytical purposes, but illuminating of aspects of such action not otherwise as easily clarified. The main points at which the concepts introduced in this chapter will support such an account include the following. First, communication theory provides an account of how, in principle, the recognition of events takes place, making clear that how events are perceived depends on

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[39]Deutsch, pp. 101, 240-2.

the existing structure of the perceiver, and that every time an event is recognized, some change must be ascribable in the perceiver.

16.1. Second, communication theory provides a way of identifying the essential characteristics of communication events as the terminals involved as transmitters and receivers, the channel of the signal transmitted, or its form or kind, and the pattern of the signal transmitted. It makes clear that what form a signal has, or in what channel it is transmitted, is to be defined with reference to the critical processes of the terminals involved. Similarly, what pattern a signal possesses, or what information it conveys, depends on the codings of its receivers (or, for certain analytical purposes, on those of its emitters).

16.2. Third, communication theory provides a way of accounting for changes taking place in a terminal not as the result of any single reception by adducing the concept of internal messages, or states. Fourth, through the concept of second-order feedback, it allows analysis to deal with the ability of a terminal to perceive, and respond to, communication events in which it itself takes part.

16.3. Fifth, and similarly, through the concept of second-order coding, it allows analysis to deal with the ability of a terminal to shape the pattern of the communication events in which it participates, so that such a terminal can convey information not only through the simple signals it sends, but also through

its selection of channels and receivers. Sixth, communication theory's account, based on statistical premises, of the ways in which a terminal's structure can change over time, supports an account of the nature of learning, and provides a means of identifying as a continuing entity a terminal whose structure continually changes in the course of events.

CHAPTER THREE.

COMMUNICATION AND HUMAN ACTION.

> Society can only be understood through a study
> of the messages and the communication facilities
> which belong to it.   —Wiener. (1)

I will now indicate how communication theory can be used
as an intepretive language for human behavior. No such interpreta-
tion can be demonstrated to be "true" or "false;" its validity is
tested by its fruitfulness, organizing power, and analytical use-
fulness, and is accordingly to be induced from its ability to ident-
ify important considerations, state significant relations economic-
ally, and maintain both logical and empirical consistency, all of
these with clarity. In doing so, it may be expected, if it is an
adequate theoretical interpretation of phenomena, to untangle old

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[1]Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cyber-
netics and Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1950),
p. 16.

puzzles, draw awareness to neglected questions, and generate new lines of inquiry. It will, therefore, tend to modify previous conceptual formulations; it will change what it addresses by ordering it in new gestalts.

My thesis, accordingly, is rather that communication theory supports an account of human action highly adequate in the sense indicated than that it provides "the true explanation" of such action. However, I do not mean that the correspondence between the formulations of communication theory and patterns of human action is merely that of a "theoretical model" or suggestive metaphor. I argue that human action may itself properly be viewed as a case of the phenomena literally described by communication theory. I claim also that questions about human action that communication theory illuminates include those of central concern not just to the theorist of communication, but to the social scientist, and to the political scientist in particular.

a. Persons.

I propose that a person constitutes a terminal in the sense of chapter two. On such an account, a stimulus or sensation is to be interpreted as a received signal, since both can be defined as phenomena recognizable to their receivers by their characteristic patterns. Human perception corresponds to reception,

in that both may be defined as acts of recognition, or of identification of phenomena. It follows that every perception, or every recognition of a phenomenon, by a person can be taken to involve some change in the person's state, structure, or potential acts.

Similarly, human acts are equivalent, on this account, to responses. In particular, overt acts may be interpreted as emissions, in that they constitute acts that are themselves observable. Internal, or "subjective," acts are to be interpreted as states of the person, in that they are to be inferred from stimuli and overt acts, and imputed to the person.

Finally, attitudes are equivalent to codes, and the two aspects of attitudes which I have discussed are respectively equivalent to the two aspects of codes introduced in chapter two. In one sense, as codes specify a terminal's selection of responses to given signals, so attitudes describe predispositions to respond in particular ways to specified kinds of circumstances, received as signals. In the other sense, as codes specify how a terminal interprets signals, people's attitudes describe how they understand events in their environment, what patterns they see in them, and what significance they assign to them. Correspondingly, a person's attitude structure may be interpreted as the person's coding.

I summarize these equivalencies in Table 3.1, and illustrate them in Figure 3.1. Several of them bear further explication. Consider first the concepts of action and of behavior. There seems some confusion about these terms in the literature. Social

TABLE 3.1.

CORRESPONDENCE OF BEHAVIORAL AND COMMUNICATION THEORY TERMS.

	BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE LANGUAGE	COMMUNICATION THEORY LANGUAGE	KEY CORRESPONDENCE ESTABLISHING EQUIVALENCE OF DEFINITIONS
1.	Person	Terminal	(proposed stipulation)
2.	Stimulus or sensation	Received signal	Identifiable by 1, through the pattern of 2's characteristics.
3.	Perception	Reception	Act of recognition of 2.
4.	Act	Response	Response to 2 and to 4b.
4a.	Behavior or overt act	Emission	Observable 4.
4b.	Internal or subjective act	State	Inferred from 2 and 4a, and imputed to 1.
5.	Attitude	Code	Describes predispositions to 4.
6.	Attitude structure	Coding	Complex of 5.

Fig. 3.1. Illustration of Table 3.1.

science usage generally agrees that "behavior" refers to acts that can in some sense be observed, and "act" to events involving internal, or not directly observable, states of the actor.[2] However, one school of thought apparently takes both "act" and "behavior" to refer to overt events, "act" to those that may be considered as conditioned by internal states, and "behavior" to those that can be interpreted as simple responses to stimuli. Another appears to use "act" to refer to any event, whether or not directly observable, and "behavior" only to those that are directly observable, but to all such overt acts, whether or not conditioned by complex internal processes. A third usage applies the term "behavior" to both overt and internal acts.[3]

I have not systematically investigated these usages, and have come across no evidence that adherents of any of them recognize its difference from the others. For the development of my argument, however, I find the second the most cogent. I will use "act" to refer to either an internal or an overt event. I will

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[2]See Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale U. Pr., 1950), pp. 3-4, esp. 4n.; Charles Morris, Signs, Language and Behavior (New York: Braziller, 1946), Appendix 3; Noam Chomsky, "The Case Against B.F. Skinner," review of Beyond Freedom and Dignity, by B.F. Skinner, New York Review of Books, Dec. 30, 1971, pp. 18-24.

[3]See Bernard Berelson and Gary Steiner, Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964); and Berelson's "Behavioral Science," in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, ed. David L. Sills (np: MacMillan, 1968), II, 41 f..

also say that what makes an act overt is that it is directly observable, and that an overt act constitutes behavior.

In accordance with 7.1, therefore, behavior may always be considered as a signal. While all behavior constitutes signals, however, not all signals constitute behavior. To call an event behavior implies that it is conditioned by circumstances internal to the behaver as well as by external events.[4] If Pauline falls over a cliff, we do not call her descent "behavior;" the analysis of such a phenomenon falls within the province of the natural rather than the social sciences. But this proviso renders the definition of behavior equivalent to the communication theoretic explication of emission elaborated in chapter two: it may be said that any manifestation of a terminal that is observable (7.1) and that depends on the state (12.4) and structure of the terminal as well as on received signals (8.0), is an emission. An overt act, or behavior, can then be correspondingly defined as any observable manifestation of a person that depends on the person's internal acts and attitudes as well as on external stimuli. Behavior is therefore an emission, characterized by the pattern and channel of the signal and the identity of the emitter.

Similarly, the concept of state will support behaviorally consistent accounts of concepts like memory, intention, and

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[4]Cf. Renato Taguiri, "Relational Analysis: An Extension of Sociometric Methods with Emphasis on Perception," in Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction, rev. ed., ed. A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 217-22.

learning. To say that someone remembers something will then mean that the person receives an internal signal transmitted as part of the person's response to the original stimulus. To say that someone intends a given behavior will be to say that the person sends an internal signal affecting the person's own predispositions to behavior in a particular case. To say that a person learns is to say that the person's structure of beliefs and attitudes changes over time in accordance with the principles outlined in 15.0-15.8. The occurrence of self-transformation over time is comprehended by the possibility of learning derived from internal signals.

The grounds for imputing these and other mental acts will on such an account formally correspond to those outlined for states of communication terminals in 12.0-12.5. The necessity of introducing such forms of imputation into the interpretation of human action is then evidence in favor of the empirical assertion that humans do possess internal states, which entails a capacity for feedback. I will consider below whether it is necessary to assert of humans the capacity for reflexivity.

Finally, the concept of code will support a behaviorally consistent account of the concept of attitude. To be admissible in empirical discourse, attitudes must be formulated in ways that allow them to be referred back to the evidence of possible observable behavior; they are therefore explicated as predispositions to behave

in specified ways in particular circumstances.[5] But when formulat-
ed in this way they meet the terms of the definition given for
codes in 8.3. Further, the behavioral justification for using
attitudes as empirical constructs, and the observational grounds
for imputing attitudes in given cases, formally correspond to the
arguments with respect to codes adumbrated in 8.1-8.3, 12.2-12.4,
and 15.0-15.5.

Attitudes may be regarded as equivalent to codes also
in the sense of stored patterns by which a receiver interprets
events it observes, according to the following argument. Suppose
one wishes to know whether or not a given overt act constitutes
behavior in accordance with some specified pattern. According to
the argument above, behavior may always be regarded as a signal;
but according to 3.3, it is only with respect to some coding that
a signal may be regarded as patterned. To answer a question about
whether a given act is patterned, therefore, one must specify
what individual possesses the attitudes with respect to which the
behavior can be called patterned. If such attitudes are imputed to
a receiver of the behavior, that receiver must be taken as an ob-
server in the sense of 7.3; in this case, the observer is inter-
preting events in terms of his or her own ideas about its pattern-
ing and significance. On the other hand, to impute such attitudes

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[5]Cf. Lasswell and Kaplan, p. 3; George Gerbner, "Communi-
cation and Social Environment," *Scientific American*, Sept., 1972,
pp. 153-60.

to the behaver, or emitting terminal, on the basis of the behavior, is to assert that the terminal's selection of that behavior is accounted for by the interpretation that the terminal places on such behavior. In this case, the terminal must be capable of observing its own behavior; that is, it must possess a capacity for feedback.

Finally, if attitudes are equivalent to codes, then a person's attitude structure as a whole may correspondingly be regarded as equivalent to a terminal's coding. The definitional correspondence between persons and terminals is then complete, and the implications of the latter concept may properly be used in the analysis of the former.

In particular, if persons are terminals, they may also be regarded as themselves being patterned, and as potential signals to an observer, by the argument of 5.3 and 7.2. I will subsequently develop the significance of this correspondence for the observation and analysis of political events. The correspondence will have additional significance if it can be shown that human actors possess reflexivity, for then they would be able to identify each other and themselves by their patterns, which would add significant dimensions to their potential patterns of processing.

In this section, however, I have not considered whether reflexivity may be imputed to human terminals. The further development of my argument, and of these considerations in particular, requires that I next investigate whether events linking persons into groups, as well as the relevant characteristics of persons

themselves, can be interpreted in communication terms. I therefore address that question in the next section.

b. Groups.

The social sciences, including political science, are concerned not only with the action of individuals, but with acts involving relations among individuals, or _social_ action.[6] Like the terms discussed in the previous section, the concept of social action lends itself to communication theoretic explication. To describe any action involving relations among individuals, one would say what the action itself was, what individuals it related, and the way in which they were thereby related. If individuals are definable as terminals, and actions as signals, as I argued in section a, then the way in which action relates individuals would constitute a channel in the sense of 5.2 and 9.2. Social action is therefore characterized by the same elements as a communication event, that is, by terminals, channels, and signals. It may accordingly be

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[6]See Lasswell and Kaplan, p. 47; Morris, pp. 139, 252; Gerbner, p. 152 f.; Peter C. Goldmark, "Communication and the Community," _Scientific American_, Sept., 1972, pp. 142-50; George C. Homans, _The Human Group_ (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950), pp. 87, 128-9; Colin Cherry, _On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism_, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), section 1.6 and p. 309; Karl W. Deutsch, _The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control_, with a new introduction (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 51-2, 99 f., 177.

considered as made up of communication events.

This account of social action may be clarified by considering further the ways in which an event may relate individuals, and therefore constitute social action. The simplest way in which an event may relate individuals is that two or more individuals be directly involved in it. If such an act is considered as a communication event, therefore, it must be an event involving more than one terminal. The only kind of simple communication event that involves more than one terminal is transmission, which involves a transmitter and a receiver. Now, transmission also involves a transmitted signal, which is an overt act; therefore, any event in which two or more individuals are directly involved must constitute behavior.

Accordingly, any social action that itself involves two or more individuals must constitute social behavior, and may be regarded as transmission. Social behavior may therefore be characterized by the same elements as transmission: the pattern defining the behavior itself, the people involved, and the channel of the behavior, that is, the specific relations obtaining between or among the people.

Now consider, on the other hand, events involving relations among individuals, but in which only one is immediately present. The social aspect of such events must reside in the terminal's internal states and structures, because for it to be connected with overt events would imply the presence of a second ter-

minal. In other words, if only one terminal is involved in an event, the event can involve relations among terminals if elements of that terminal's coding refer either to other terminals per se, or to transmission channels that specify the given terminal's relation to other terminals. Such codes would have to affect the terminal's receptions, emissions, processings, or some combination thereof. In the case of reception, the terminal's responses will be affected not only by the simple signals involved, but also by their transmitters and channels; such a terminal would therefore possess second-order feedback of the receptions it participates in, as events. Similarly, in the case of emissions, the terminal's coding will select not only the simple signals emitted, but their channels and receivers; such a terminal would therefore possess a second-order coding.

In other words, a terminal's attitudes may be described as social, and its states as social acts, if and only if it possesses at least one of the capacities defining reflexivity. If a terminal does possess such a coding, it can engage in social acts including all forms of communication event. An internal act is a social act, in this sense, if it involves mental states referring to other terminals, or to the channels relating the terminal to other terminals.

Where terminals with such codings do exist, communication processes consisting of linked series of social events may arise, in which the social behavior of one terminal, received by

another, affects the social attitudes and mental states of that other, which in turn affects its social behavior, and so on. Such series may be called social processes.

Further, such social processes may tend to persist over time. Now, when the patterns characterizing a communication process persist over time, they constitute a communication structure (10.6). In the case of human social action, a social process that has persisted over time would be described by specified individuals related by stable patterns of social action. In social science, such individuals are said to constitute, and such patterns to define, a social group.[7] A group is accordingly characterized by the elements that would define a communication structure, and can accordingly be defined, in terms of communication theory, by its structure. The existence of a group is defined by the persistence of a structure of social action; its identity as a particular group is defined by the content of the particular patterns of social action that define it.

Individuals related by stable patterns of social action such as these are members of the group so defined. Members may, of course, be specified not only by an exhaustive listing, but by specifying the patterns by exhibiting which any individual would be a member; that is, by specifying characteristic aspects of their codings and critical processes, or of their communication

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[7]Homans, pp. 1, 82-86; Berelson and Steiner, pp. 325-6.

environments, or of their characteristic processes of change.

These three ways of identifying terminals as members of a group correspond to three ways of identifying terminals in general, each of which amounts to describing the terminal in terms of one of the three kinds of elements of which a communication process is composed. First, a terminal may be described by what simple signals it sends and receives, or in terms of simple signals. Second, it may be described by the pattern of the relations in which it participates, which specify its position in a communication environment, and which may be stated in the form of channels. Third, it may be described by its own identity as a terminal, that is, by its enduring structure and characteristic processes of change.

Now, as I argued in 8.5, the basis on which an observer can ascribe structure to a terminal is the observation of stable patterns in the terminal's communication environment. Conversely, when stable patterns exist in a terminal's communication environment, an observer may ascribe them to the structure of the terminal. Specifically, if stable patterns characterize a given element of the communication environment, the observer is to impute to the terminal a capacity to recognize and select for that element. Therefore, an observer may assign an identity to a terminal in any of the ways mentioned in the previous paragraph, provided that stable patterns exist in the corresponding element of the terminal's communication environment.

Further, it seems to me empirically evident that stable patterns of individuals, of channels, of signals, and of relations among these elements, all exist, describing groups. On the basis of such empirical observations, and by the argument of the previous paragraph, the capacity may be imputed to human social actors to select for, and to recognize, each element of communication events, and their relations. Human beings may therefore be interpreted, in communication terms, on the principle that they are reflexive terminals. An account of human social action must therefore comprehend the possibility that people will ascribe pattern, and assign significance, to events in which they participate, and that those actions will be shaped by the predispositions of the actors about channels and terminals as well as signals.

In accordance with this argument, to say that a social act in a given situation is patterned is to say that it corresponds to codes of some terminals that are parts of it (cf. 14.5 and 14.8). Similarly, the structure of a group is to be accounted for in terms of codes of members of the group. The way in which I propose to apply communication theory to social analysis, in other words, takes social structures to be constructs, whose empirical foundation is in the attitude structures of individuals. The empirical foundation of these, in turn, is particular communication events in which the individuals participate.

It would also be possible to treat groups themselves as terminals, whose coding would be embodied in the structure that

they by definition possess, and capable of emission, reception, processing, and transmission. In such a case, communication events relating individuals would be treated as simple signals from the group itself, and their observer could be treated as a simple receiver with respect to such signals. The state of a social group would be defined by the communication events being enacted within it at a given time. As in 12.5, what is structure and what is state depends on the time frame of the analysis. This analysis is consistent with the discussion of the reception of communication events, as patterned wholes rather than simple entities, in 10.1.

For certain purposes of political analysis, it will be convenient to treat groups in this way. The analysis I propose both allows the systematic use of such simplifications and guards against their degeneration into reifications, because it requires of statements about group acts and structures that, and only that, they be translatable into statements about individual acts and structures. A group's reception of a message, for example, might be interpretable in terms of the perception of some events by some among the group's members. Similarly, an act of a group might be intepretable in terms of acts by some among the group's members. In such cases, the events attributed to the group members will not need to be the same, or even of the same kinds, as those attributed to the group itself; it is only necessary that some analysis from group to individual acts be specified and consistently carried out. The approach I propose is intended to support the work of formulat-

ing appropriate translation rules.

On the other hand, an analysis more reductive than the one I propose would also be possible, in which persons were analyzed into component terminals, such as organs of the nervous system, related by channels of communication external to themselves but internal to the individual. The possibility of such an analysis does not render incoherent the interpretation that remains at the level of persons as terminals, any more than the possibility of speaking in terms of individuals invalidates discussion that takes groups (e.g., nations) as actors. The appropriate level of analysis depends on the questions addressed; for the purposes outlined in chapter one, I judge that of interactions among individuals to be basic. Empirical validity requires only that statements at any level of analysis be translatable into corresponding events at other levels.

I consider that the appropriate units to take as basic for the analysis of political events are individual persons and messages. More complex events are to be regarded, for purposes of empirical analysis, as composed of individual acts of individual actors, related to each other in appropriate ways. In particular, the abstractions of ordinary political discourse are to be given empirical interpretation in terms of the characteristic patterns of individual events of which they are composed; those terms will then be taken as abstractions from, and summary descriptions of, such complexes of observable events. The assertion, in ordinary

political language, that such an event has occurred will then allow of interpretation as an assertion that some appropriate complex of observable events has occurred. Developing appropriate definitions for political terms, and appropriate explications of political concepts, will then require investigating the complexes of events to which such terms are applied and reformulating their definitions in ways that meaningfully identify their central features.

As far as I am able to conceive, the only alternatives to such a program are as follows. First, to assert the real existence, as unanalyzable entities, of the things political abstractions refer to. This course leads either to the reification of entities like the state, which mystifies rather than enlightens both analytic and practical thinking, or to such woolly absurdities as the attribution of consciousness to political documents. Second, to continue with ad hoc impressionistic operationalization, a course to which I have already set forth my objections. Third, to assert that analysis of the kind I propose is unnecessary because we already know what political language means. To assert this is to assert that we already understand politics. This proposition therefore seems to me not only dubious, but to argue against all empirical inquiry into politics, and in particular, that political science is not worth doing.

The arguments I have so far set forth in this chapter embody, in my view, the most basic principles on which an analysis

of the sort I propose can proceed. They may be summarized as follows.

1. **Elements of a social event.** A simple social event is described by an actor, the person toward whom the act is directed or who perceives the act, the way in which those people are related, and the pattern of the act itself. These correspond respectively to the emitter, the receiver, the channel, and the signal pattern of a communication event.

2. **Description of an actor.** The actor and the recipient may be identified, as individuals, in any of the following ways.

a. In terms of their attitudes, beliefs, and habits of interpretation, including characteristic ways in which participation in events changes them or makes a difference to them.

b. In terms of the ways in which they are related to other persons with whom they act.

c. In terms of what acts they may engage in, perceive, or have directed at them.
These correspond respectively to the description of a terminal by its own structure, the channels that link it to other terminals, and the simple signals it emits and receives.

3. **Description of a relation between actors.** The way in which people are related may be described by general characteristics of the various acts in which they engage and of patterns among those acts. Which such characteristics are relevant to such

e description will depend on the kind of relation one is interested in. This proposition corresponds to the principle that a channel is defined by the form of the signals transmitted through it.

4. __Description of an act's pattern.__ What kind of act a given act is is determined by the attitudes, beliefs, and habits of interpretation of the act's actor and its recipient. This is to say that the pattern by which a given signal is described is specified by the codings of the terminals involved in the act, or that are observers of the act.

5. __All elements defined with respect to some terminals' attitudes.__ Acts, actors, and action channels are therefore all defined by their patterns. In this sense they constitute signals; that is, they may all be recognized by, and have an effect on, terminals capable of recognizing them. Humans are capable of recognizing patterns of each of these kinds. Therefore, the patterns that describe relations between actors, and the internal structures of terminals, may be specified by the codings, or attitudes, of people involved in action in connection with those channels and terminals, including a given terminal with itself.

6. __Humans recognize and act on events as wholes, too.__ Humans are capable of recognizing not only patterns describing acts, relations, and individuals, but also events in which all of these are related in a given way. Further, they have the capacity not only to enact acts with specified patterns, but to enact events with specified individuals and relations among the individu-

als. They therefore correspond to reflexive terminals.

7. <u>Enduring patterns of events and their elements define groups.</u> Because people are reflexive terminals, they recognize patterns in communication events and may act in accordance with, and so as to preserve, those patterns. An enduring pattern of communication events can relate specifiable individuals through the performance of specifiable acts. Such an enduring pattern defines a social group; the group is described by the patterns which it exhibits. The persistence of those patterns may be attributed to mental states of the individuals so related, who are the group's members.

8. <u>When groups may be considered as actors.</u> The mental states whose persistence maintains a group need not be the beliefs consciously maintained about the group by its members. However, individuals may recognize a group as a structured entity by its pattern; in other words, their attitudes allow them to recognize a certain pattern of individuals, relations, and acts as constituting that particular group. They are then capable of responding to, and of acting on, that group. Where such attitudes exist, the observer may speak of acts of a group, and acts directed at a group. These acts will be defined in terms of the patterns by which the individuals recognize the group, and may for the analyst be decomposed into the observable simple events or patterns of which they are made up.

c. Limitations.

In this chapter I argue that social action is of the nature of communication, and that the theory of communication can therefore be a useful aid to its analysis. However, the principles so far introduced do not suffice as a guide to carrying out that analysis in practice. One reason is that the general theory of communication cannot in itself give information about the specific parameters that characterize human communication, and human information processing. They can only provide a means of expressing systematically what those parameters are. To discover those para-meters, it is necessary to look at human communication and discover what forms it takes and what structure it has; it is necessary to investigate the nature of the data in the form of which an observer gets information about human social action.

As I argued in the introductory chapter, such data may in general be conceived of as coming in the form of statements, or as capable of being cast in the form of statements. Much of our information about social events is indirect; it comes in the form of reports, and those reports take the form of statements. When we look at social events directly, we find that many of them con-sist of the transmission of statements; also, our own observations of what happens in those events will be cast in the form of state-ments.

In order to analyze human social action, therefore, it is necessary to know something about the structure of human state-

ments. The kinds of statements that people can make depends on the general form of their codings; that is, the kinds of patterns that they can recognize, the kinds of recognition they are capable of, and the kinds of responses they can enact. To study human social action, therefore, it is necessary to understand something about the nature of human significance. Communication theory, however, deals with the general concept of structure and of significance; it does not address itself to particular kinds of patterns or the ways in which they have their significance. Therefore, to be applicable to social action, communication theory requires to be supplemented by analytical principles drawn from other sources. I introduce some of these in the next two chapters; the remainder of this one is devoted to an elaboration of the argument stated in this section so far.

For the mathematics of information theory (1.0) to be applicable to the analysis of human social action, it would be necessary to give a precise definition, and to assign a numerical probability, to each relevant code in social actors' codings, and to each signal selecting and selected by those codes. In the complex case of human social action, and given that much of that action involves and is described by formulations in language, the requisite precision may be unattainable, for the following reasons.

Even ordinary language is commonly used not in accordance with a coding that allows an alternative to be unambiguously

selected by a finite number of binary choices;[8] instead, words are used in approximate and suggestive ways, in accordance with un-articulated and ambiguous senses of their meaning.[9] Under such conditions, for any given signal in the form of language, 1) the selected alternative will vary over individuals; 2) for a given individual, it will vary over time; and 3) for a given individual at a given time, its unequivocal specification will be impossible. Such processes of selection must therefore necessarily be un-certain, and the alternative selected indefinite to a degree. Therefore the amount of information carried by such a signal can-not be assigned in bits, the assignment of a meaningful quantita-tive probability is impossible, and the mathematics of information theory cannot be applied.

Similar arguments apply _a fortiori_ to forms of action not equivalent to words, such as styles of action, gesture,[10] cul-

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[8]See Cherry, pp. 10, 114, 220-21, 228, 231, 254, and sections 7.1-7.2, esp. p. 268; cf. John R. Pierce, "Communication," _Scientific American_, Sept., 1972, p. 34.

[9]A common point, but nowhere is more emphasis laid on it, or more implications drawn from it, than in S.I. Hayakawa, _Language in Thought and Action_ (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939), esp. chaps. 2, 4, 6, 11, 13; and Alfred Korzybski, _Science and Sanity_ (Lan-caster, Pa.: Science Press, 1933).

[10]For example, see Richard P. Blackmur, _Language as Gesture_ (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1952).

turally standardized images,[11] and the metacommunicative content of messages,[12] for their significance is in general even more ambiguous and unarticulated than that of language. While rigorous analyses of language have been attempted throughout history, to address non-linguistic phenomena in corresponding ways has become a serious possibility only in recent years, particularly through developments in the field of semiotic.[13]

A second reason for the inapplicability of the techniques of information theory to human communication is that such communication takes place not in a logically closed system but in a self-transforming one. The reflexivity which human capacities bring to social processes involves both second-order feedback and second-order codings, of both simple and complex forms. These in turn imply the continual transformation and self-transformation of the codings of the terminals involved, and therefore of the patterns of their interactions, in accordance with 15.0-15.8. Through

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[11]Gerbner, op. cit.; cf. E.H. Gombrich, "The Visual Image," Scientific American, Sept., 1974, pp. 84-96; Andrew Sarris, "Where I Stand on the New Film-Crit," Village Voice, Aug. 11, 1975, pp. 95 f..

[12]This idea is elaborated in Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don D. Jackson, Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes (New York: Norton, 1967), esp. at sections 1.5, 3.3-3.4, 5.43, 6.42; see also Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry.(New York: Norton, 1951), pp. 23-24, 43, 158, 209.

[13]See Umberto Eco, Einfuehrung in die Semiotik, trans. from the Italian by Juergen Trabant (Munich: Fink, 1972), esp. parts B and C.

learning (15.5) in such conditions, the coding as a whole shifts over time, and even whole new ranges of meaning may appear. Human action must therefore be regarded as fundamentally indeterminate in nature.

If a determinate account of human action is at all possible, it would at a minimum require non-stationary models.(15.3). It would also have to be capable of encompassing all relevant reformulations of individuals' codings that could take place through the reflexive learning processes described above. It would therefore depend on the formulation of principles of uncertainty under which all attitudes, and consequently all effects of signals, could be described by probability distributions.

Such an account would amount not to a description of the codings of the participants in all possible social processes, but of a coding of a possible observer, abstracting relevant aspects of those processes, categorizing events and interactions in appropriate general ways. The value to any specific inquiry of such an attempt at a determinate analytical framework would therefore depend on how well the questions it took as relevant corresponded to the interests of a given inquirer. The adequacy of a proposed general account would therefore be relative to a general theoretical identification of what were the important and interesting questions for such an account to illuminate.

The place of such general comprehension cannot be supplied by fiat; it can only develop in a dialectic with an appropri-

ate analytical framework, each serving suggestively and inductively to develop the other. In my case, the discussions in chapters one and two indicate my respective starting points. For this kind of use, the important aspect of communication theory is not the inapplicability of its mathematics, but the fruitfulness and organizing power of its conceptual apparatus.

Beyond a certain point, however, even the general conceptual apparatus of communication theory is of no aid in developing a systematic analytical approach to communication processes. To use that theory in the analysis of phenomena, the relation between theory and phenomena must be further specified. To go from a general account of communication to a specific account of human action as communication requires an account not only of the correspondences between the two, as sketched in this chapter, but of the characteristics that define the latter as a special case.

A full specification of human beings in communication theoretic terms would include an account of their characteristic ways of receiving and responding to signals, such as spoken and written language; that is, of their critical processes. It would also include an account of their characteristic modes of change (15.8); that is, the psychological laws governing the effects of perceptions and experiences on attitudes. Much is now known in these areas, which could easily be formulated in terms of communication theory; however, I conceive that the issues such a discussion would raise would be peripheral to my present undertaking.

I therefore do not attempt to derive such an account in this work, and rely, where necessary, on existing formulations in social science and on unexplicated common sense concepts.

To deal specifically with human beings in communication terms also requires an account of the distinctive ways in which human attitude structures are coded. Such an account must explicate the fashion in which humans invest their perceptions and actions with significance, and the kinds of meaningful wholes in which they relate them. I outline such an account in the next two chapters.

However, the power of communication theory lies in its ability to conceive of coding in general terms, independently of the characteristics of any given coding and of the significance attached to particular signals by their emitters and receivers. Communication theory says nothing about the specific characteristics of any given codings, such as human codings, or even about the general principles by which such codings are structured. Its propositions are independent of the concept of "significance," that is, of the specific interpretations given to signals in a concrete communication process. Its analysis of the "information" carried by signals is explicitly divorced from questions of the particular meanings that such signals may convey.[14] It therefore offers no guidance in determining the meanings assigned to signals by human terminals, or in the description and classification of such signals.

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[14]Pierce, p. 35; Cherry, pp. 39, 43-44, 169-71, 231-34, cf. p. 307, "meaning;" W. Ross Ashby, _An Introduction to Cybernetics_, (London: Chapman and Hall, 1956), pp. 143-44.

Questions of interest to social science, however, involve the particular forms taken by structures of social action, and the content of signals dealt with through those structures. Politics, in particular, is concerned with such things as values, intentions, norms, institutions, and authority, all of which involve significance attributed to signals or embodied in attitudes. To understand political action, one must therefore understand how human codings are patterned and how they change. Such an account might be given in terms of communication theory, but would involve assertions not derivable from communication theory's propositions alone. A communication theoretic interpretation of political action must therefore transcend not only the mathematical formulations of information theory, but the content of communication theory itself.

The general theory of communication allows social action, and in particular political action, to be treated as structured by the codings of attitudinal predispositions of social and political actors. A theory of what sorts of principles and predispositions structure those actions in what ways must be drawn from empirical generalizations about human action, induced from the observed structure of human communication. The role of communication theory in such an account is to provide a consistent theoretical framework to which such empirical generalizations could be referred.

CHAPTER FOUR.

BEHAVIORAL MODES OF COMMUNICATION.

> Our words are tags which signify our interests:
> chairs, bears, sunshine, sex; each is seen in re-
> lation to our impulses, instincts, aims, in the
> light of our passions, and our thought about
> these things is governed entirely by what we
> consider their utility to be. —Gass.   (1)

In this chapter I begin by considering proposals by

various writers for dealing with the issues of the kinds of sig-

nificance expressed in human communication. Insofar as these

proposals are based on empirical study of human language and human

behavior, they fall within the realm of psychology; insofar as

they derive from the theoretical study of the idea of significance,

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[1] William Gass, "Gertrude Stein, Geographer," part II,
New York Review of Books, May 17, 1973, pp.27-28.

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they represent a branch of philosophy usually called semiotic.[2]
After presenting these suggestions I will offer an interpretation
of their common intent that also renders their content commensur-
able with the language of communication theory, as I have intro-
duced it above.

a. Survey of the idea of modes.

Behavioral political science has generally adopted an
empiricist method of analyzing the kinds of meaning that can be
expressed in statements. According to this position, "empirical"
statements can be distinguished from others in that only they can
be verified or falsified by observation. The others constitute a
residual category, resting on subjective grounds such as emotion,
will, and socialization. They are called "normative," implying
that they arise from the sender's socialization to socially shared
expectations.

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[2]The term was coined by Locke and revived by C.S.
Peirce; it is derived from the Greek sēma, sign. See C. Hartshorne
and P. Weiss, eds., Collected Papers of C.S. Peirce (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard U. Pr., 1931-5); Colin Cherry, On Human Communica-
tion: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism, 2nd ed. (Cambridge,
Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 8, 221n, 221 f., 308; Charles Mor-
ris, Signs, Language and Behavior (New York: Braziller, 1946),
passim; C.K.Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A
Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science
of Symbolism, 8th ed. (1946; New York: Harcourt Brace, 1923), pp.
281-82.

Thus empirical statements express judgments of fact; normative ones express value judgments. Empirical interpretations evaluate signals according to their factual content; normative ones according to their emotional, value, or other subjective content. According to empiricism, therefore, "empirical" and "normative" indicate two different kinds of criteria in terms of which humans may interpret signals, and therefore in terms of which the structure of their codings may be viewed.

Such a position is implicit in Lasswell and Kaplan's discussion of "the act of valuation," about which they say that

> /t/he phase of expression is of particular import-
> ance; intentions are significant only in terms of
> the patterns of completed action which they de-
> termine.   (3)

By such an account the importance of intentions is bound up with that of normative evaluation. Lasswell and Kaplan, however, do not address this question explicitly or in detail.

Vernon Van Dyke takes a similar position, holding that "the descriptive" is to be distinguished from "the evaluative" according to the grounds for belief in each:

> /E/mpirical statements are . . . verifiable through
> observation. . . . Values . . . stem . . . from
> will and emotion, and are thus volitional rather
> than being directed by empiricism or logic. . . .

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[3]Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry (New Haven: Yale U. Pr., 1950), section 2.1, p. 16n.

/U/ltimate values . . . are simply postulated. (4)

Thus Van Dyke treats emotion and volition as essentially similar.
At another point, however, he offers a discussion of "prescriptive"
statements, which express judgments about courses of action orient-
ed to the attainment of goals. Nevertheless, he rejects the sug-
gestion that these be treated as a separate type, because

> /p/rescriptive statements . . . reflect a combina-
> tion of a normative postulate with a descriptive
> finding. Once identified, the two elements can
> be classed differently and treated accordingly. (5)

Positions derived from psychology, on the other hand,
tend to distinguish at least three entirely separate kinds of
statements. In social psychology, for example, Robert Bales and
his followers distinguish statements made in group interaction
into three categories; according to the way they are related to
the group's performance of its task.[6] Statements of orientation
express judgments about matters of fact, statements of evaluation
express judgments about preferences or goals, and statements of

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[4]Vernon Van Dyke, Political Science: A Philosophical
Analysis (Stanford, Cal.: Stanford U. Pr., 1960)p. 9, cf. pp. 8-13.
He cites Ayer and Reichenbach.

[5]Ibid., pp. 11-12.

[6]Robert F. Bales, "The Equilibrium Problem in Small
Groups," in Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction, rev. ed.,
ed. A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales (New York:
Knopf, 1965), pp. 445-76, see esp. pp. 455, 459; Henry A. Lands-
berger, "Interaction Process Analysis of the Mediation of Labor-
Management Disputes," ibid., pp. 483-93, at p. 486.

control express judgments about what to do.[7] This scheme separates
preference, reflecting emotions or desires, from intentions, re-
flecting volition or choice.

Some similar considerations, derived from a psycho-
therapeutic perspective, emerge in remarks contained in some of
Fritz Perls' last writings. Perls holds that there are several
kinds of judgment that an individual can make of any phenomenon
or experience, and that these are distinguished by the way in
which the individual takes it to be related to him or herself.
Each of these relations is defined by a sense in which the phe-
nomenon or experience can be either accepted or rejected. Perls
conceived of things accepted as being "taken in" to one's "own"
side of a "contact boundary," and those rejected as being excluded,
placed on the "other" side of the boundary. He calls these acts
respectively "identification" and "alienation."[8]

According to Perls, the several senses in which one can
identify or alienate correspond to various aspects of one's rela-
tion to the world. The first of these is orientation:

> I identify the sensoric system with the system of
> orientation, and orientation is built upon the
> ability to identify something as X. . . . Per-

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[7]See Bales, op. cit., and also Robert F. Bales, Inter-
action Process Analysis (Cambridge, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1950).

[8]Fritz Perls, The Gestalt Approach and Eyewitness to
Therapy (New York: Bantam, 1973), pp. 16 f.; Perls, In and Out
the Garbage Pail (New York: Bantam, 1969), where the discussion
is fragmentary and unsystematic, but see pp. 260-78.

> ception and cognition seem to melt together as
> the identification process.   (9)

A person orients him or herself in the world through acts by which he or she accepts things as real, as belonging to his or her world, and through acts by which he or she rejects things he or she judges unreal. Similarly, in the realm of action:

> "Identification" reaches the two systems, the orientation (sensoric) system and the coping (motoric) system. . . . /A person/ identifies "with" the friend and admits him /sic/ through the boundary.
> . . . He /sic/ rejects or destroys the enemy. (10)

A person's actions consist of those by which he or she moves closer to things, admits them into contact, and those by which he or she moves away from them, shuts them out. In the case of normative evaluation:

> The contact boundary is also a separation boundary. Inside the boundary things and people take on a positive connotation, outside a negative one. I use "positive" and "negative" in a judgemental sense . . . (11)

One makes judgments of things as good, desirable, or preferable, which are identifications in Perls' sense, and as bad, wrong, undesirable, or to be avoided, which are alienations.

Finally, Perls also mentions two further kinds of identification:

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9 Perls, Garbage Pail, p. 278; emphasis in original.

10 Ibid., p. 278-9.

11 Ibid., p. 279.

> The account of the function of the boundary is
> nearly complete, but we have to add two more
> phenomena: esthetics and ownership.
>> The poles of esthetic behavior are simi-
> larly fated as the moral issues: everything
> beautiful belongs inside the boundary, and every-
> thing ugly, outside. . . .
>> Perhaps the easiest to understand is the
> feeling of ownership inside the boundary. Every-
> thing within the boundary is "mine," belonging,
> properly esteemed. Everything outside is yours,
> not mine, be it things or attitudes. (12)

Thus the kinds of identification indicated by Perls are five: the

first three, which correspond to Bales' categories, plus those of

esthetics and ownership.

Recent empirical work by Gerbner, influenced by modern

thinking about communication, offers another classification which

seems to deal with the same concepts. The subject of his scheme

is "modes of expression," which he defines as means through which

the significance of signals is socially communicated.[13] His modes

are respectively represented in "messages bearing man's /sic/ no-

tions of existence, priorities, values, and relations," which he

associates respectively with "consciousness of what is, what is

important, what is right, and what is related to what else."[14]

Two of these modes, importance and relation, are not considered by

the other writers I survey; the other two correspond to the empir-

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[12]Ibid., pp. 291-2.

[13]George Gerbner, "Communication and Social Environment,"
Scientific American, Sept., 1972, pp. 152-60, esp. at p. 154.

[14]Ibid., p. 156.

ical and the normative. Gerbner does not explicitly distinguish a mode of prescription.

Among works within the tradition of analytic philosophy, that of Ogden and Richards distinguishes "functions of language"[15] which are five in number, but which do not correspond to Perls's five. These functions of language, which represent different kinds of significance that language can have, and which "appear to be exhaustive,"[16] consist of: symbolization of reference, expression of attitude to listener, expression of attitude to referent, promotion of effects intended, and support of reference.[17] The last of these appears to be concerned with the grounds to which the speaker appeals to validate his reference, or to convince the listener of its truth, adequacy, and so forth. The second seems not to correspond to any category proposed by the other writers I consider, and in a sense to be incommensurable with the classifications they adopt. The remaining three, however, again seem equivalent respectively to description, evaluation, and prescription.

In the empiricist tradition, however, Ogden and Richards recombine what they have distinguished, identifying the first function of language with "the symbolic use of words" to communicate a reference, and all the other four with "the emotive use of words"

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[15] Ogden and Richards, p. 224.

[16] Ibid., p. 227.

[17] Ibid., p. 223-27.

to express a feeling, evaluation, or attitude.[18] Thus their scheme,
like that of Lasswell and Kaplan and that of Van Dyke, tends to
identify the evaluative with the prescriptive.

Another philosopher who deals with similar questions is
Charles Morris. He defines a signal's "mode of signification" by
the kind of "response tendency" in terms of which it is interpreted;
that is, the kind of effect which it may have on subsequent behav-
ior. He distinguishes five modes in which signs can signify:
identificative, formative, descriptive, appraisive, and prescrip-
tive.[19] Identificative signs locate in time and space; formative
signs specify logical relations among other signs. Morris's other
three modes are explicitly drawn from behavioral psychological re-
search,[20] and parallel Bales' classification.

Clearly the formulations discussed here are all related
in subject, conceptualization, and classification, even though they
present themselves in superficially different ways. Bales defines
his subject of discourse as statements, Ogden and Richards as
language, Gerbner as messages, and Lasswell and Kaplan as acts.
Neither Van Dyke nor Perls defines the entity with which he is con-
cerned, but the former seems to be speaking of propositions and the
latter of attitudes. Morris defines the object of his discussion

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[18] Ibid., pp. 223-24, 226, 149; Morris, pp. 69-72.

[19] Morris, chap. III.

[20] See ibid., chap. I.

as signs, which he treats as received signals, but defines their modes by behavioral tendencies to response, that is, by predispositions to emit signals.

Similar differences exist in how these writers formulate the ways in which they address their subject. Van Dyke is concerned with the grounds for belief in propositions, Perls with kinds of identification and alienation, Ogden and Richards with functions of language, or ways in which language conveys significance. Bales, not unlike Morris, is concerned with the relation of statements to action. Only Gerbner and Morris use the term "modes," and Gerbner speaks of modes of expression while Morris of modes of signification.

Finally, while Bales, Morris, Ogden and Richards, and Perls agree on three of the categories they identify, corresponding to the cognitive, evaluative, and volitional, all but Bales also suggest other categories: ownership and esthetics for Perls, attitude to listener and support of reference for Ogden and Richards; space-time identification and logical relations for Morris. Some discussion in Van Dyke and in Lasswell and Kaplan supports the three categories common to the four writers mentioned above, but both, with some support in Ogden and Richards' scheme, finally affirm only two separate categories, empirical and normative. Gerbner also omits the volitional, but offers two other categories unique to him, importance and relation.

b. The Concept of Mode.

The diverse accounts summarized in the last section may
be reconciled and systematized by reformulating them in terms con-
sistent with communication theory. Among these accounts, that of
Morris is the clearest, fullest, and most amenable to such treat-
ment; to develop such a reformulation, therefore, I will begin
from a further discussion of his propositions.

Morris introduces the concept of "interpretant," which
he defines as

> the disposition in an interpreter to respond, be-
> cause of a sign, by response-sequences of some
> behavior-family.   (21)

Morris's account of the terms of this definition reveals its
equivalence to communication theoretic formulations I have al-
ready advanced. Morris's "interpreter" corresponds to "terminal,"
and his "sign" is a special case of "received signal."[22] A "be-
havior-family" that identifies a "response-sequence" is equivalent
to a signal pattern that identifies an emitted response.[23] An
interpretant is then a predisposition, or code, connecting a re-
ceived to an emitted signal in the way that a processing connects
them.

Using these concepts, Morris argues that, to give a

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[21]Ibid., p. 349.

[22]Ibid., p. 354; see also chap. I, pp. 7, 10.

[23]Ibid., p. 346; see also chap. I, p. 10 f.

cogent account of modes of signification, it is necessary

> to give criteria for the differentiation of modes
> of signifying in terms of the differences in in-
> terpretants and hence in terms of what is signi-
> fied. .... /O/ur . . . formulation permits of
> this differentiation in terms of differences in
> tendencies to response . . .   (23)

In other words, a sign's mode of signifying is defined by the way
in which it selects responses, which in turn corresponds to the
kind of response predisposition that the sign selects. The kind
of significance that a received signal has is, then, defined by
the kind of interpretation that the receiver's coding makes of the
signal; this last is in turn defined by the way in which the se-
lected code predisposes the terminal to a behavioral response.

Using this formulation as a starting point, the corre-
spondence between the received signals that Morris deals with, the
attitudes that Perls and perhaps Van Dyke have in mind, and the
emitted signals that Ogden and Richards, Lasswell and Kaplan,
Gerbner, and Bales discuss, can be made explicit. The mode of
signifying of a sign, in Morris' terms, is defined by the rela-
tion to behavior of the code that it selects. In a corresponding
way, what Perls might call the form of identification embodied in
an attitude may be defined by the way in which the attitude links
received and emitted signals, and may be taken to define the mode
of a code. It is then a code's relation to behavior that defines

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23Ibid., p. 62; cf. chap. III, section 1.

the mode both of the code and of the received signal that selects it.

The behavior selected by a code could also be said to have a mode, defined by the relation between the code and that behavior itself, so that its mode would correspond to that of the corresponding code. Such a system of definitions links the three elements (received signal, code, and emitted response) that define a processing; therefore, a mode may be ascribed to a processing as a whole according to the relation to behavior of the code involved in that processing. In short, a mode, either of a processing or of any of its elements, could be defined by the relation to behavior of the code involved in the processing. In particular, the mode of any signal, either emitted or received, would be determined by reference to the code that is related to it in the appropriate way within the processing.

This formulation is consistent with Morris's method of ascribing modes of signification to received signals. However, it does not explicate the way in which the writers named above deal with emitted signals. The modes with which these writers are concerned are those of statements (Bales), language (Ogden and Richards), or communication (Gerbner); that is, consistently with the formulations of each, of signals, emitted by human terminals, that express interpretations or evaluations of signals previously received by that terminal (2.3, 8.0). Now, not all responses express such interpretations, though all are generated through them. For

instance, if one sees someone eating, one does not necessarily know his or her motivations or what impelled him or her to eat; such motivations are not explicit in the act itself. Similarly, if someone merely utters the word "food," one does not necessarily know with what purpose, or on the basis of what experience, that person does so.

When an emitted response is considered, in this way, as expressing, rather than merely resulting from, an interpretation or evaluation of received signals, I will regard it as a statement (see Figure 4.1).[24] Since such interpretations are embodied in a terminal's coding, and are carried out by means of processing, it may be said that a statement is an emitted signal that expresses a code or processing. What is expressed in a statement, what is embodied in a corresponding code, and what is enacted by a corresponding processing, are equivalent in this sense. This account of the concept of statement may be taken to explicate and rigorize the way in which I have used the term previously.

Correspondingly, I will call an emitted response regarded as not an expression, but simply a result, of a processing a simple response. It may be that a statement is the only emitted response selected by a received signal; in such a case, the statement may be

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[24] Morris reserves the term for the descriptive mode. Morris, p. 355; see also Morris, pp. 70, 73, 79, 222; cf. p. 262 and "expression," p. 348. Cf. also Cherry, section 3.3, chap. 6, esp. pp. 231 and 238-40; and "proposition" in Ogden and Richards, pp. 49, 74, 102.

Fig. 4.1. Relation of Statement to Processing it expresses.

regarded as also itself constituting the simple response which is part of the processing it expresses.

What distinguishes a statement from a simple response is then that the statement explicitly refers to a received signal and explicitly expresses the receiver's interpretation of it, whereas the simple response, while it arises from both, does not express either. In other words, a statement embodies its emitter's assignment of a particular significance to signals it has received, which constitute the signal's referent.[25] Further, since every statement expresses an interpretation, and every interpretation possesses a mode, it follows that every statement will have a mode. Conversely, any signal that explicitly expresses an interpretation of a referent may be considered a statement; that is, any signal that signifies in a mode may be considered a statement.

A statement is then an emitted signal that possesses a referent, the received signal, and a mode of reference, the mode in which the interpreting code ("interpretant" in Morris'-terms) interprets it. Therefore, the reference of a statement gives direct evidence about the received signal, and its mode gives direct evidence about the interpretation made by the terminal. In the case of simple responses, on the other hand, the corresponding received signal and interpretation could be inferred only with the aid of other information about the received signal and about previous.

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[25] Ogden and Richards, pp. 9 f., 71, 105-06; Cherry, p. 308.

sequences exhibited by the terminal.

It would appear that the writers mentioned deal with emitted signals rather than attitudes on the empiricist grounds of wishing to deal with directly observable phenomena, and with statements rather than emitted signals in general because the former are explicit in the way just indicated. However, because of the correspondences among statements, codes, and processings, a concern for the modes of statements is equivalent to a concern for the attitudes whose mode is reflected in those statements, and for the processings whose mode is defined by those attitudes. One reason for analyzing statements rather than codes or processings, therefore, is simply to make use of such equivalences in order to avoid dealing with the latter two directly. The cogency of such an analysis depends on an implicit premise that statements can, because of the equivalences mentioned, validly be taken as evidence about attitudes and mental states.

The concern with statements seems, therefore, like Morris' concern with received signals, Perls' and Van Dyke's with attitudes, and a possible concern with emitted simple responses, to point toward a definition of modes by the kind of interpretation a corresponding code makes of a received signal. The only explicit formulation of how "kinds" of interpretation are to be distinguished is Morris', according to which a mode is defined by the relation of the code to the response selected by it. The mode of a received signal, or of an emitted signal considered

Fig. 4.2. Statements in various modes of signification.

as a simple response, will then be that of the code through which it is processed. The mode of a statement, considered as a statement, will be that of the processing or code that it expresses. These relations are sketched in Figure 4.2.

c. Behavioral modes.

The question now arises of which modes ought, consistently with the preceding discussion, to be distinguished. When I began my analysis of interview data from the House Judiciary Committee, I had no answer to that question, nor had even formulated the idea of modes. I argued, on the basis of communication theory, that regularities and significant differences in the forms of political processes would show up as patterns in the form taken by statements about those processes, and by the statements of which those processes themselves consisted. I had no theory that indicated what the relevant aspects of form might be, nor, as I argued above in section 3c, could communication theory provide such a theory.

I therefore began, in effect, by treating my interview data as a collection of statements, and examining them inductively, in line with my general concerns, to see what patterns they might be said to exhibit. I very soon found that they could be distinguished by the kind of relation that they indicated of the speaker to his

or her subject: whether he or she was reporting, predicting, offering his or her own views, and so on. For some time, in accordance with my training, I attempted to apply Van Dyke's suggestion, classifying statements as "descriptive" or "normative," and analyzing "prescriptive" statements into a descriptive and an evaluative component.

When I became aware of Morris' typology, I found it to fit the observed form of the data much more naturally. Without Morris, I was compelled to take each member of an apparently coherent class of statements, parallel in form to two other classes, and resolve it, in a way identical for each, into components belonging to the other two classes. Morris' theory avoids this complexity, and his arguments provide a coherent theoretical justification for doing so.

In the light of Morris' theory, in fact, Van Dyke's account of the "prescriptive" appears not as a definition, but as an empirical assertion that the grounds for selection of codes in that mode are usually internal states generated by the selection, by previously received signals, of a descriptive and an evaluative code. An empirical assertion such as this should not be elevated into a defining statement. The grounds for possessing a code or state, in any mode, must be distinguished conceptually from the

occurrence of the code or state itself.[27]

I found that most political statements I observed could be classified according to Bales' three modes, which he calls orientation, evaluation, and control. The empirical adequacy of this scheme can be ascertained with reference to data; its cogency as a theoretical suggestion, however, is supported by the following arguments. First, such a classification complements communication theory in the way I required in the previous chapter. Second, it is consistent with much of the work discussed at the beginning of this one.[28] Third, the relation to behavior of each indicated type of predisposition can be specified coherently, and can be defined by abstraction from a characteristic psychological process. Fourth, such definitions may easily and naturally be interpreted in terms of the discussion of communication theory in chapter two.

The first of these modes is that which abstracts from perception, in which cognitive judgments, interpretations, evaluations, or predispositions are expressed. Statements in this mode

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[27]Cf. Cherry, chap. 2; Ogden and Richards, pp. 124-5; Frederick S. Perls, Ralph E. Hefferline, and Paul Goodman, Gestalt Therapy: Excitement and Growth in the Human Personality (New York: Delta, 1951), esp. Volume II, chaps. 4-6 (largely by Goodman). See also Gustav Bergmann, "Logical Positivism, Language, and the Reconstruction of Metaphysics," in Richard Rorty, ed., The Linguistic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method (Chicago: U. of Chicago Pr., 1967), at p. 71; and Gilbert Ryle, "Systematically Misleading Expressions," in ibid., at p. 87.

[28]Bales in Hare, Borgatta, and Bales, eds., at pp. 466-72.

express interpretations of signals in terms of what obtains in the world, what can be sensed or known; that is, in terms of ontological criteria. Predispositions in this mode relate to behavior by defining what it is to which one might respond; that is, what phenomena it is appropriate to order behavior with respect to. To identify, in Perls' phrase, with a referent in this mode is to regard it as existing; things accepted in this mode are what one calls "real."

The attention focussed on such judgments by empiricism has caused terms for them to proliferate. Bales and Perls describe this mode as that which embodies a receiver's orientation of itself in the world; Morris calls it designative, Van Dyke descriptive, behavioralists empirical. I will usually refer to "description."

The second mode abstracts from emotions or desires; in it interpretations of signals in terms of possible preferences are expressed. These judgments may be prudential or ethical, may be of intrinsic qualities or of consequences, may present themselves as universal or as subjective; but predispositions in this mode all represent values in some sense of the word. Their relation to behavior is that they define its potential purposes, objects, or ends. To identify with a referent in this mode is to regard it as desirable, approved, or preferred; things accepted in this mode are what one calls "good."

Common language tends to conflate interpretation in

terms of desires with all interpretation, a confusion reflected in
Perls' use of "judgment" and Bateson's of "evaluation."[29] To call
this mode appraisive, as does Morris, or evaluative in Bales'
sense, still leaves implicit what kind of evaluation is taking
place. By behavioralists this mode is considered as the "norma-
tive," but this designation seems to embody a substantive theory
that individuals' ideas in this mode have their source in sociali-
zation to shared expectations. I will refer to "evaluation;" with
the stipulation that the evaluation in question is in terms of
possible desires or preferences.

In this connection, Perls' suggestion that esthetic
attitudes constitute a distinct mode of signification is relevant.
Such a proposal implies that to enjoy something or find it pleas-
ing is a form of identification or acceptance distinct from desir-
ing or preferring it. Clearly, the two criteria are not logically
equivalent; the esthetic is not to be conflated with the ethical.
Nevertheless, I think the two can be regarded as separate kinds of
abstraction from the same processes, those involving affect. Both
represent kinds of evaluative judgment, even if by different kinds
of criteria. Therefore, I propose to regard the esthetic and the
ethical as special cases of the evaluative mode.

The third mode abstracts from volitions or intentions;
it interprets signals in terms of possible decisions to behave in

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[29]Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, Communication: The
Social Matrix of Psychiatry (New York: Norton, 1951), pp. 176-83.

different ways, or to respond with distinct signals. Predisposi-
tions in this mode specify possible choices or prescriptions. To
identify with a referent in this mode is to regard it as chosen
or intended; things accepted in this mode are what one recognizes
as one's own actions.

Empiricist and behavioralist uneasiness at talking about
intention and will have perhaps contributed to the paucity of
terminology for this mode. Perls' "action" and Bales' "control"
seem not fully appropriate, since it is the volition to action, or
the intention to exercise control, that are really at issue. Van
Dyke's and Morris' "prescriptive" seems more appropriate for state-
ments made to influence another's behavior than for expressing one's
own predispositions. Perls also refers to "coping," and "conative"
has sometimes been used in social psychology.[30]   I will usually re-
fer to intention.

These three modes may be taken as related to each other
in a behavioral sequence, running from perception through evalua-
tion to response, that recalls formulations used in behavioral,
developmental, and social psychology, in models of rational decision

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[30]Landsberger in Hare, Borgatta, and Bales, eds., pas-
sim; Robert Lane, discussion, Autumn 1973, New Haven.

making, and elsewhere.[31] This sequence is easy to interpret in communication theoretic terms; its three components correspond respectively to the received signals, interpreting code, and emitted signal of a processing. The descriptive mode corresponds to codes in their aspect as identifiers of received signals; the evaluative, as the interpretive structure that defines the terminal; the volitional, as selectors of responses. These relations, in which communication theoretic and psychological formulations tend to converge, are diagrammed in Figure 4.3.

Of course, while the modes, conceived in this way, may be said to form a sequence in some formal sense, it is clear that

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[31]Other schemes that may reflect similar distinctions among modes of thought, and connect them with a developmental or behavioral process, are James David Barber's discussion of character, world view, and style in The Presidential Character (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1972); Lawrence Kohlberg's elaboration of Piaget's work, about reasoning developing from concepts of what feels good or bad, through an understanding of rules and roles, to action on the basis of general concepts, on which see his article with Carol Gilligan, "The Adolescent as Philosopher," Daedalus 100 (1971), 1051 f., and also his "Moral Education in the Schools, a Developmental View," The School Review, 74, No. 1 (1966), 1 f., and "The Child as Moral Philosopher," Psychology Today, Sept., 1968, pp. 25 f.; Kant's statement of three questions of philosophy as "What may I hope? What can I know? and What shall I do?" cited by Karl Jaspers, "On My Philosophy," in Walter Kaufman, ed., Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre (Cleveland: Meridian, 1956), p. 139; the work of Kenneth Burke, including A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1945) and A Rhetoric of Motives (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950); David Braybrooke and Charles E. Lindblom, A Strategy of Decision (New York: Free Press, 1963) and other decision-making models; and S.I. Hayakawa, Language in Thought and Action (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1939), esp. chaps. 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 14, whose headings reflect the scheme presented here with some completeness.

Fig. 43. Behavioral Sequence of Modes.

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
they need not form a temporal sequence in a given behavioral situation, or a logical sequence in human thinking. Internal feedback and reflexivity make possible, and human tendencies to reduce psychological dissonance impel, influences by every sort of predisposition on every other. Statements in the various modes represent more nearly three different ways of expressing any mental process than three different kinds of mental processes.

The crucial argument of this chapter can thus be formulated explicitly as an empirical assertion: that each statement whose referent is political events expresses either a description of, an evaluation of, or an intention with respect to, such events. That this assertion is in fact empirical is shown by its susceptibility to falsification on the basis of observation and experience. I tested the scheme presented in this chapter, in a way appropriate to my inductive method, by attempting to apply it in my analysis of the interview data from my observation of the House Judiciary Committee.

That analysis reveals two respects in which the formulations of this chapter are inadequate. First, a given remark may be ambiguous in mode, or may involve assertions in several modes or several assertions in the same mode. This observation indicates the complexity of human discourse and the difficulty of its adequate analysis; however, it does not represent a fundamental objection to the scheme I propose. I contend, on the contrary, that even if a statement's mode is ambiguous, the way in which it is ambiguous

can in general be coherently stated with respect to its mode, so that the theory of modes of significance can still usefully illuminate its analysis.

Second, however, my analysis also showed that not all statements in and concerning political processes were characterized entirely by one or more of the three modes proposed in this chapter. Most could, a result which I take as confirming the soundness of Bales' method of analysis, also inductively developed, and as supporting the plausibility of Morris' formulations, which take these three modes as fundamental. However, statements also occur that seem clearly to represent none of the modes discussed in this section. Just as prescriptive statements did not seem to me to fit into a simple dichotomous classification of descriptive and evaluative statements, so certain statements seem to me not to fit into the behavioral scheme presented here. These observed results are complemented by the theoretical consideration that, while the formulation of this chapter relates the three modes to an empirically describable behavioral sequence and to general concepts available in communication theory, and possesses a satisfying elegance, it does not take account of the other modes proposed by the writers cited in section a.

To advance a theoretical scheme that does take account of the other modes proposed by theorists, and that does account for the kinds of statement that actually occur in my data, it is first necessary to explicate further some issues raised by the discussion

of statements given above, and, in particular, to examine the consequences of introducing explicitly into the analysis the principle of reflexivity. I undertake this explication in the next chapter, with the aim of developing a scheme that will encompass the empirically observed variety.

CHAPTER FIVE.

REFLEXIVE MODES OF COMMUNICATION.

/T/o conceive of a society in which there is no
communication among individuals would seem to
be a contradiction in terms. —Waddington. (1)

The modes of signification introduced in the previous

chapter suffice to express the kinds of interpretation, evaluation,

or judgment that a person can make of a simple received signal;

that is, of a phenomenon that a person can identify by its pat-

tern. As I have already argued, however, people possess a capacity

for reflexivity. It follows that people must be able to recognize

not only simple signals, but also communication events in which

they participate. In other words, people must, where appropriate,

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[1]C.H. Waddington, "Mindless Societies," review of
Sociobiology: The New Synthesis, by Edward O. Wilson, and Bio-
genetic Structuralism, by Charles D. Laughlin, Jr., and Eugene
G. d'Aquili, New York Review of Books, Aug. 7, 1975, p. 31.

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be able to identify not only simple signals, but also gestalts, and, in particular, communication events. This is to say that people must, where appropriate, be able to identify a phenomenon not only as possessing a pattern, but as possessing a pattern that relates elements each of which itself they can identify as patterned.

The purpose of this chapter is to consider the modes in which human terminals can make judgments of events, considered in this way. Of course, such events, like other phenomena, can be interpreted according to any of the three behavioral modes introduced in the last chapter; however, to do so is to interpret them in the same way simple signals could be interpreted, rather than in their distinctive character as events. As I will show in this chapter, the kinds of modal judgments that can be made of events include some that are distinctive; in other words, consideration of such judgments will lead to the introduction of further modes. The distinctive kinds of modal judgments that can be made of events are both interesting in themselves and necessary for an adequate account of observed features of political action. I will introduce appropriate applications to an account of political events in chapter six.

It is appropriate to begin this discussion by considering processings as a special case of communication event. In the previous chapter, I said that a processing was equivalent to a modal judgment or interpretation of a signal. For people to interpret processings is for them to make a modal judgment of an

event that itself embodies a modal judgment of a signal. The
mode of such a judgment will be defined by abstraction from the
processes by which modal judgments are made of the processes by
which modal judgments are made. Such a judgment therefore pos-
sesses a reflexive element, and its mode may therefore be called
a reflexive mode.

Similarly, if a terminal judges other communication
events, and is a reflexive terminal, then it may itself be an
element of the event it judges; therefore, the distinctive modes
of such judgments may also be called reflexive modes.

Finally, I have so far defined a statement as expres-
sing a processing; in other words, expressing a modal judgment of
a signal. If people can intepret processings, they must also be
able to interpret the statements that express those processings.
Further, in this chapter I will generalize the concept of state-
ment to show how a statement can express, not only a processing,
but any communication event. Under that reformulation, since
people can interpret communication events, they can interpret
statements expressing communication events of each kind. Such
judgments of statements, like judgments of the events they express,
may exemplify the reflexive modes I am to introduce in this chapter.

The reader should be forewarned that, because of the re-
flexive aspects of the kinds of judgments with which this chapter
deals, the discussion is more than usually intricate and difficult
to follow. The discussion of reflexive phenomena requires a termi-

nology that keeps subject conceptually separate from object, when both are the same, or at least the same kind of, phenomenon. Not only does such terminology tend to be cumbersome, but there appear to be limits to the human mental capacity for considering several levels of reflexivity simultaneously.[2] However, I have tried with great care to formulate my remarks in such a way that the relations and distinctions drawn are correct and consistent throughout, and to provide as many cues for the disentanglement of those relations and distinctions as is compatible with that end. I believe that careful reading will reveal that my formulations are neither obscure, nor more arcane than the points advanced require.

That said, and so as not to compound the difficulties of this sort of exposition any further, I will omit further discussion of my discussion of reflexivity, and proceed to discuss reflexivity.

a. Second-order statements.

As I proposed in section 4b, a statement may be defined as an emitted signal expressing a terminal's interpretation of a re-

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[1]Cf. George A. Miller, The Psychology of Communication: Seven Essays (Baltimore: Penguin, 1967); cf. R.D. Laing, Knots (New York: Pantheon, 1970).

ceived signal, or referent. Such an interpretation involves the selection by the received signal, in accordance with the terminal's coding, of a simple response; therefore, it amounts to a processing. A statement may accordingly be said to express a processing of the emitting terminal.

However, a statement is also itself an emitted response of that terminal. It must, therefore, according to the definition of response in section 2b, have been selected by some received signal(s). If a statement is considered in this sense, the processing, which the statement expresses, may be taken as a received (internal) signal, which selects the statement as an emitted response (see Figure 5.1).

first-order processing; second-order received signal

statement expressing first-order processing; second-order response

Fig.5.1
Relation of processing to statement.

To clarify the relations involved, it is useful to dis-distinguish between a first-order and a second-order processing. The first-order processing is that which the statement expresses. With respect to the second-order processing, however, the statement is a simple response selected by a received signal, namely, the first-order processing. In short, a statement is a second-order response of a reflexive terminal to its own processing. A statement may, therefore, be analyzed either with respect to the first-order processing it expresses or with respect to the second-order processing in which it is the simple response.

The way in which the former kind of analysis proceeds is outlined in the last chapter. To develop the latter case, consider the way in which simple responses are ordinarily analyzed. Given enough information about the characteristic patterns of human processings, it may be possible to infer something about what processing has taken place from the simple response alone. In other words, the processing, including its mode, may be seen as implicit in some way in the simple response, even though not explicitly expressed.

The processing and mode implicit in this way in a simple response could be expressed by a corresponding statement. Therefore, to analyze a simple emitted signal for the information it contains about the processing of which it is part, is to treat it as an implicit statement. Potentially, all acts, including for example gestures, physical actions, and the creation of images,

could in this way be analyzed as implicit statements. The defining characteristic of such an analysis would be a concern for kinds of signals that do not themselves express a mode, or aspects of signals other than the mode they express. This approach is that taken by contemporary continental semiologists and others.[3] It is also that taken by Gerbner in his analysis of television images.[4]

Now consider how a statement is to be analyzed when it is taken, not as an expression of a first-order processing, but as the simple response in a second-order processing. In such an analysis, the statement would be treated, like any other simple response, as containing implicit evidence of the received signal and of the processes of interpretation that generated it. Concretely, such an analysis would amount to "reading between the lines" of a statement for the unspoken attitudes or predispositions that shaped it, rather than addressing the attitudes or predispositions literally or explicitly present in it. Such an analysis is said to treat the statement from the point of view of <u>metacommunication</u>.[5]

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[3]See, for example, Umberto Eco, <u>Einfuehrung in die Semiotik</u>, trans. from the Italian by Juergen Trabant (Munich: Fink, 1972); Richard P. Blackmur, <u>Language as Gesture</u> (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1952); Andrew Sarris, "Where I Stand on the New Film-Crit," <u>Village Voice</u>, Aug. 11, 1975, pp. 95 f.

[4]George Gerbner, "Communication and Social Environment," <u>Scientific American</u>, Sept., 1972, pp. 152-60.

[5]Paul Watzlawick, Janet Helmick Beavin, and Don D. Jackson, <u>Pragmatics of Human Communication: A Study of Interactional Patterns, Pathologies, and Paradoxes</u> (New York: Norton, 1967), section 1.5; for a different but not unrelated definition, see Jurgen Ruesch and Gregory Bateson, <u>Communication: The Social Matrix of Psychiatry</u> (New York: Norton, 1951), pp. 209 f.

Such an analysis of transmitted signals parallels Morris' analysis of received signals, or "signs." Morris assigns a mode of signification to a sign based not on a mode expressed in the sign, but on the kind of effect it has on the receiver. He holds that the mode may, however, be determinable not only by reference to the effect that the sign has in a particular processing, but from qualities implicit in the sign. Correspondingly, the metacommunicative analysis of responses, including statements, assigns modes to them based not on a mode they express, but on the kind of processing that selected the response itself, imputed to the emitter from qualities implicit in the response.

Morris himself hints at such a correspondence when he distinguishes between the form of a sign and its use, describing the former by what it expresses and the latter by its effects or intended effects.[6] The former might be taken as connected with the metacommunicative analysis of responses, the latter with Morris' analysis of received signals. Further elaboration of this formulation requires concepts introduced in section c, below.

Now note that, if a statement expresses a processing, and if the process that generates a statement is a second-order processing, then it follows that the processing expressed by a given statement might itself be a second-order processing (see Figure 5.2). Consider such a statement, which may be called a second-

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[6] Charles Morris, _Signs, Language, and Behavior_ (New York: Braziller, 1946) chap. IV, esp. section 1.

Fig.5.2. second-order processing and statement.

order statement. The referent of any statement is the received
signal that is part of the processing it expresses; in this case,
of the second-order processing. Therefore, the referent of a sec-
ond order statement is the first-order processing to which the
first-order statement is the simple response. In short, a second-
order statement would refer to a first-order processing, and ex-
press a second-order processing.

The relations discussed in this section may therefore
be built up in the following way. A received signal, interpreted
by a code, selects a response; this event constitutes a processing.
Any such processing may be considered a first-order processing. A
first-order processing is expressed by a statement; the referent
of such a statement is the received signal of the processing it

expresses. Such a statement is a first-order statement.

In other words, a first-order processing, interpreted by a code, selects a response; such a response is a first-order statement. Such an event meets the description just given for a processing, and may accordingly be considered as a processing. Since the received signal of such a processing is a first-order processing, this processing may be considered a second-order processing. A second-order processing, like a first-order processing, may be expressed by a statement; such a statement is a second-order statement.

As with a first-order statement, the referent of a second-order statement is the received signal of the processing it expresses. The received signal of a second-order processing is a first-order processing; therefore, the referent of a second-order statement is a first-order processing.

Once a terminal's own processings are admitted in this way as possible referents of statements, the way is opened for a further generalization of such referents. A statement may, for example, refer not only to a particular act of processing, but to the code that specifies the pattern of processing by the terminal; in other words, to an attitude of the emitting terminal. Similarly, a statement may refer to an internal state of the terminal, such as one that gives rise to or that arises from a processing. Such statements are often important sources of information about aspects of a terminal's operation that are not directly observable.

Further, the referent of a statement may be a pattern itself, considered in abstraction from any possible embodiments in any form of signal, whether overt or imputed. Such a referent might be considered equivalent to a proposition, in the philosophic sense of the term; in this way an intelligible account of this refractory concept might be derived from communication theory.

Finally, it may be worth noting that the account of referents contained in this section and the last chapter is consistent with the assertion of Peirce,[7] refined by Ogden and Richards[8] and by Cherry,[9] that all meaning involves a triadic relation, which Ogden and Richards speak of as relating referent, reference (or "thought"), and symbol. In the terms I have been using, the elements of this relation are the referent, the interpretant, and the statement; or, in purely communication terms, a received signal in a given processing, the interpreting code in that processing, and the second-order emitted signal that expresses that processing.[10]

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[7] Justus Buchler, ed., Philosophical Writings of Peirce, (New York: Dover, 1940), pp. 91-93; cf. Colin Cherry, On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism, 2nd ed., (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 112; Morris, p. 287 f..

[8] C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards, The Meaning of Meaning: A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism, 8th ed. (1946; New York: Harcourt Brace, 1923), pp. 9-12.

[9] Cherry, pp. 112 f.

[10] Ibid., p. 113; Ogden and Richards, p. 11.

b. The formative mode.

Now consider the mode expressed by a second-order state-
ment. The mode of a statement is the kind of judgment or interpre-
tation it expresses of its referent. The referent of a second-order
statement is a first-order processing. Therefore, a second-order
statement will express a modal judgment of a first-order processing.
The mode of such a judgment could be any of those mentioned in sec-
tion 4c, depending on whether the judgment made of the first-order
processing by the second-order processing was descriptive, evalua-
tional, or volitional. But the first-order processing could also
be judged, not in terms of any of these kinds of criteria, but
according to whether the pattern of the processing itself conformed
to some standard; that is, whether the elements of the processing
were related an an appropriate or acceptable way.

The criteria of judgment in such a case would concern
the way in which the processing was carried out, the relations
among its elements and the principles defining those relations.
They would, in other words, evaluate the critical process manifested
in the first-order processing. A modal evaluation of this kind
would judge a processing in its character as a communication event;
that is, in terms of the patterned relations obtaining among its
patterned elements.

A second-order statement of this kind would express a
judgment that to process in the way represented by the first-order
processing was consistent with some principles, such as logical or

rational principles. To judge a referent in this way would be to identify with it in a way different from those described in the previous chapter; such a judgment would accept the judged processing neither as real, nor as good, nor as chosen, but as legitimate, valid, or correct.

Acceptance of a referent in such terms, and the corresponding form of rejection, accordingly represent a mode different from those that make up the behavioral sequence proposed in section 4c (see Figure 5.3). To identify what this mode is, consider Morris' "formative" mode, Ogden and Richards' "support of reference" function of language, and Gerbner's "relation" mode. Morris defines formative discourse as that which expresses formal or logical

Fig.5.3. judgment of processing as correct.

relations among signs that signify in other modes.[11] "Support of
reference" refers to the difficulty the speaker has in making his
or her reference to his or her referent. Similarly, if the "rela-
tion Gerbner speaks of were one inherent in the characteristics of
the referent itself, it would not constitute a modal judgment by
the interpreter. Gerbner may therefore have in mind a kind of re-
lation that is established by the interpretation itself, one which
is inherent in the processing.

What these three suggestions seem to have in common is
that each refers to some kind of relation, internal to a terminal,
among elements or aspects of a processing. Morris restricts him-
self to relations defined by the canons of formal logic, but these
may surely be seen as arising by abstraction from the processes by
which people in fact reach conclusions through their own mental
processes, just as the concept of reality arises by abstraction
from perception. Ogden and Richards offer only one rather baffling
paragraph of explanation of their function of language,[12] of which
not even Morris seems able to make much,[13] but they seem to have in
mind another aspect of the way in which people make connections
among elements of a processing. Gerbner gives no elaboration at
all, but on the interpretation I suggest, his proposal also seems

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[11]Morris, chap. VI, esp. pp. 86-88; see also pp. 153-68,
348.

[12]Ogden and Richards, pp. 225-26, 149; Cherry, p. 75.

[13]Morris, pp. 70, 261.

to point to a concern with patterns of processing.

The relations with which all three proposed modes are concerned are then ones whose character, in any given case, depends on how the critical process of the terminal in question operates, the kinds of connections it makes. These relations may therefore be said to exist because they are posited, or affirmed, by the terminal through its critical process. The judgment made of such relations may therefore be other than that they are, or are desirable, or are intended, but simply that they are consistent with the interpreter's own standards for affirming such relations, which are an abstraction from its own critical process.

Therefore, a distinctive mode may be defined, which is the mode of statements expressing judgments of the ways in which received signals, interpreting codes, and responses are related in a processing. This mode may be regarded as abstracting from critical processes, or manners of processing. Once the mode is defined, its referents can be extended beyond the processings, judgments of which it may be seen as an abstraction from, to any signal; that is, any recognizable phenomenon. To identify with any referent in this mode is to consider it rational, adequate, or logically valid; things so accepted may be called "correct." The relation of predispositions in this mode to behavior is that they specify the rules by which the terminal draws implications for behavior from predispo-

sitions and interpretations in any mode.[14] For lack of an alternative, I will use Morris' term, "formative," to refer to this mode.

c. Communication.

In the previous sections of this chapter I held that a statement expressed a modal judgment of a signal, or referent, received by the terminal making the statement; it therefore expressed a processing of that terminal. That processing was the received signal in a second-order processing of the terminal, and was accordingly the referent of a second-order statement, by the terminal, expressing that second-order processing. According to this formulation, the referent of a terminal's second-order statement, or what was expressed by its first-order statement, was its own processing. From these formulations, I derived the concept of the formative mode, by means of which a terminal judges whether processings are correctly or validly structured.

In this section, I wish to extend these formulations by allowing the received signal of a second-order processing to be not only a second-order processing of the terminal itself, but any other communication event as well (see Figure 5.4). The response that is part of such a second-order processing would still be a

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[14]Ibid., chap. VI, esp. section 6 and p. 97.

Fig. 5.4. Second-order processing of external first-order event.

any communication event

statement

first-order statement, expressing a first-order event. Such a first-order statement, could, however, express any communication event, whether or not it involved the emitter as an element. To show how this situation is possible, and to indicate its implications, is the purpose of this section. I will subsequently show, in section e, that extending my formulations in the way indicated points to the possibility of another new mode, which can be defined in a way parallel with the formative mode introduced above.

I have already shown that a reflexive terminal possesses the capacity to recognize communication events including those in which it participates. The point of this section, therefore, is to show what it means for me to treat the recognition of such an

event as an element of a second-order processing rather than as a
simple processing; that is, to treat the process by which a termi-
nal inteprets such an event as a second-order processing.

That a terminal recognizes communication events in its
environment means that it possesses codes corresponding to their
patterns (Figure 5.4); codes, in other words, describing the par-
ticular patterned relation among patterned elements that consti-
tutes the event. Such codes will be associated with probabilities
imputed by the terminal to the respective events from its previous
observation of their occurrence. Consider first the case in which
the observed event is a processing of an observed terminal (see
Figure 5.5). In this case, codes of the observer will describe

Fig.5.5. Second-order processing of other terminal's
processing.

what messages the observed terminal is likely to receive in what channels, how it is likely to interpret them, and how it is likely to respond to them. In short, such codes in an observing terminal define the likely consequences of the reception, by observed terminals, of various transmissions.

To call such structures of the observing terminal codes is to say that they specify what signals the observer will transmit in various circumstances, because codes connect receptions with responses. In other words, in the circumstances just described it is possible for a transmission to be selected, in an observer, through a code that specifies the likely consequences of that transmission's reception by another terminal. To the extent that a transmission is selected in this way, it may consistently with section 4c be said to be selected because of, or in order to bring about, such consequences. In other words, to impute such a processing to an observer is to impute to it a code embodying an intention to bring about those consequences.

A transmission selected in such a way I will call a communication in the strict sense of the term.[15] A communication is, in other words, a message whose pattern is shaped, through codes specifying aspects of the communication environment, to have a particular effect on that environment. A receiver's reception of such a message would constitute such an effect on the transmitter's

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[15]For further discussion of this definition, see the works cited in section 5a, above.

communication environment. Accordingly, every statement may be considered a communication to the extent that it is emitted with the intention of conveying something to a receiver.

Communications, defined in this way, may be of two types. In the first case, the processing that is the probable consequence of a given transmission acts on the transmitter like a received simple signal, and selects a response appropriate to bring about in the receiver the intended consequences (see Figure 5.6). That response may be considered as a simple signal from the transmitter, or, where appropriate, as an ordinary statement expressing the processing in which it is itself the response, as described in section 5b. (see Figure 5.7).

If, on the other hand, the processing that is the probable consequence is taken as a gestalt rather than a simple signal, the code that interprets it plays a role parallel to that which interprets an internal processing, and selects, as a response, a statement expressing that processing (see Figure 5.8). In other words, the processing expressed by the communication will be that which the communication is intended to bring about in the other terminal.

A communication of this sort would satisfy the requirement, stated at the beginning of this section, that the processing it expresses be that of a terminal other than the emitter. A communication of the first sort can also be treated as implicitly constituting a communication of this sort, if a metacommunicative

Fig.5.6. *Consequence selected by simple response.*

receiver

transmitter

simple
response

pattern received
as simple signal.

Fig.5.7. *Intended consequence promoted by transmission.*

receiver

transmission
designed to
bring about
intended
consequences

trans-
mitter

statement expressing
processing in which it is itself the emitted response

analysis can be advanced to show that the processing of another
terminal, while not expressed in the communication, can neverthe-
less be regarded as the received signal that selected the communi-
cation as a response. Such an analysis would be parallel to that
proposed for metacommunication in ordinary statements in section a.

The referent and mode of a communication are definable in
a way corresponding to their definitions for ordinary statements.
A statement's referent is those signals which the transmitter in-
terprets in the way expressed by the statement. A communication's
referent will correspondingly be those signals which the receiver
is intended to interpret in the way expressed, by the transmitter,
in the communication. (A communication's referent may thus in-
clude, though it is not limited to, the communication itself, con-

Fig. 5.8. Intended consequence expressed in communication.

sidered as a signal being received by the receiving terminal.)
Similarly, the mode of a communication will be defined by the mode
of the predisposition by which the receiver is intended to in-
terpret that referent.[16]

At this point, the concept of communication can be
extended without difficulty to transmissions whose referents are
other than processings. Under the conditions already defined, a
reflexive terminal may clearly intend to bring about not only
specified processings by other terminals, but specified receptions,
emissions, or transmissions involving other terminals, and to
bring about more complex communication processes and structures as
well. It may transmit messages expressing those gestalts as means
of securing their enactment; these messages also would constitute
communications.

The receiving terminal, of course, need not interpret
any communication in terms of the mode it expresses. For example,
a receiver may take a prescription only descriptively, as informa-
tion about the wishes of the emitter, so that the communication
affects the receiver's probability of enacting the prescribed re-
sponse not directly, but, if at all, only through the effect of
its descriptive on its volitional states. Thus, a receiver's own
statement about its processing would express its own attitudes,
rather than those proposed for it by a received communication.

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[16]Morris, chap. V, section 1; see "modor," p. 351.

Accordingly, the distinction between the mode of a transmission when considered as a communication and when considered as a statement is that advanced by Morris between the use of a sign, defined by the mode a communication is intended to affect, and its form, defined by the mode of signification by which a received sign is in fact interpreted.[17]

In short, a communication and a statement are parallel in the following ways. A statement expresses a modal judgment of a referent by the terminal making the statement. A communication expresses a modal judgment of a referent which the terminal transmitting the communication proposed to be made by the terminal receiving it.

d. Communication environments.

The account of communication developed in the preceding section is consistent with the discussion of the phenomenon given by Bateson and Ruesch,[18] Morris,[19] Cherry,[20] and Ogden and Rich-

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[17]Ibid.; see note 6, above.

[18]Ruesch and Bateson, pp. 15, 5-6, 276, 279-80.

[19]Morris, pp. 346-47, 118-21.

[20]Cherry, p..305, section 1.2, esp. pp. 3-7.

ards.[21] All apply the term to transmissions of signals by means of which shared codings, and consequently a common context, are developed among several terminals. The concept of communication may therefore be expected to illuminate the question, alluded to in chapter three, of how stable communication environments arise and persist. I will develop such applications of my concept of communication in this section.

On the account I propose, communication does not necessarily bring about the development of shared codings in the way that the writers mentioned above propose. The change a given terminal seeks in a receiver need not be one that would make the receiver's coding more like its own. Similarly, while a terminal must, in order to affect the coding of another, recognize the coding of the other through its own coding, to do so is not to adopt the same coding. The distinction persists between a code describing a pattern of action, belonging to an observer and especially to a reflexive terminal, and one through which that pattern is enacted, belonging to the actor.

However, although communication among several terminals need not lead to the development of shared codings among them, the

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[21]Ogden and Richards, pp. 87, 205-06, 230. On the other hand, Ogden and Richards also say (p. 206): "A . . . communication may be defined as a use of symbols in such a way that acts of reference occur in a hearer which are similar . . . to those . . . symbolized by them in the speaker." Cf. Cherry, p. 309; Ogden and Richards, pp. 9-12; Morris, pp. 23-27, 355.

development of such codings must involve communication. To bring about shared codings in a number of terminals would be to bring about a species of common consequences. To bring about such consequences, a terminal would have to possess information about what transmissions would be likely to have the desired effects, and would have to pattern its transmissions to bring about those effects. It would, in other words, possess a coding describing communication events, and would transmit communications based in part on that coding. To the extent that such a terminal is reflexive, it can also address such communications to itself, and thus itself be among the terminals in which its communication develops a common coding.

Where several terminals share similar codes, they will respond in similar ways to similar signals defined by the codes. More generally, the communication events in which they participate will possess similar patterns to the extent to which they are governed by similar codes. Further, a corresponding similarity of pattern may also exist among more complex communication processes made up of several simple communication events. In such a case each terminal having a particular position in a given enactment of those processes must possess codes similar to those of other terminals having the same position in other enactments of the process. In such a case I will say that the codes of the several terminals involved in any given enactment of the process, or that may be so involved, are complementary with respect to that process.

Such complementary codings may be developed among several terminals by the same processes of communication as for similar codings. All that is necessary is that each of several subsets of terminals receive communications that increase the probability of their enacting the communication event that is the appropriate part of the larger process. It is, of course, possible that these subsets will partially or completely overlap, so that a given terminal may be capable of taking more than one position in a given process.

Now, according to 10.5, the pattern of communication events to which a terminal is related defines its communication environment. Further, according to 14.8, a reflexive terminal is part of its own communication environment; therefore, several interacting reflexive terminals may be said to share a common communication environment. It is the terminals' codes that determine the structure of that communication environment, which will be characterized by the channels, patterns, and terminals of the signals that exemplify those patterns. Those codes, in other words, render their holders differentially predisposed to receive messages from, and send them to, certain others, with certain contents and in certain forms.

Accordingly, to the extent that interacting terminals possess similar or complementary codings, the patterns of communication events enacted among them will be stable and recurring. Those patterns will then, according to section 2b, constitute a communication structure, which will be the shared context among terminals

referred to in the works cited above. In this case the terminals
in question will constitute a social group, as defined in section
3b. It is, accordingly, through communication that social groups
may develop.

e. The normative mode.

I can now show that the kind of reflexivity that gen-
erates communication, like that that generates ordinary statements,
gives rise to a distinctive mode of signification. In the case of
ordinary statements, that mode could be defined by considering the
second-order statements expressing the processing that generated
those statements. The second-order processing that led to an
ordinary statement involved a modal judgment of a referent that
was a first-order processing. Similarly, the second-order proces-
sing that leads to a communication involves a modal judgment of a
referent that is a first-order communication event. In the case of
ordinary statements, that modal judgment could, in general, be
expressed by a second-order statement about the second-order pro-
cessing. Similarly, consider now the second-order statement that
would express the second-order processing resulting in the emission
of a communication (see Figure 5.9).

The referent of such a statement would be the communica-
tion event the enactment of which the emitter intended to bring

Fig. 5.9. Second-order statement expressing processing resulting in communication.

about. The mode of such a second-order statement would be that of the judgment in accordance with which the emitter selected that communication as a response. That judgment, and therefore the grounds for that selection, could be that the referent was either real, good, intended, or logically valid; in other words, the mode of the second-order statement expressing the processing leading to a communication could be any of those previously considered. However, as the discussion in section d shows, the grounds for selection of a communication could be none of these, but simply that the expectable consequences corresponded to a pattern which the transmitter, through its own coding, recognized as ordering action in its environment. The second-order statement expressing such a judgment would simply express the attitude that the pattern of action expressed by the communication was one of those that defined the structure of the communication environment. But as I argued at the end of section d, a structured communication environment defines a social group. Therefore, to say that a terminal judges a pattern of action in this way is to say that it regards that pattern as part of the definition of a social group of which it is part.

Such a judgment constitutes a kind of identification distinct from any previously considered, and therefore defines a separate mode. The things a terminal identifies with in this mode are patterns of action that it regards as defining the structure of a group of which the terminal is a member. Codes in this mode

assert that the patterns of action they denote are (or are not) elements of the structure of such a group. They predispose their holder to accept referents simply on the grounds that those referents exemplify such patterns.

To identify with a referent in this mode is, accordingly, to judge that its enactment conforms with the patterns that define the group, or that it is conventional within the group, or that it is the behavior that is supposed to be enacted. Things accepted in this mode are expectable, in the sense not that their occurrence is predictable in any given instance, but that their occurrence would define the context as being that of the group: In other words, attitudes in this mode define the conventions of the group, or specify those patterns of behavior that group members recognize as corresponding to their own concepts of the group. Things accepted in this mode might be called "proper."

To clarify further what this mode represents, note that a terminal may recognize action as patterned, independent of whether it takes the pattern to be part of the definition of a group. Codes reflecting all the stable patterns of action observable among members of a group would represent the descriptive mode, not that which I now propose. The mode I propose would be exemplified by those codes through which a terminal accepts patterns of action as elements defining a given communication structure as a stable entity.

Conversely, it is possible that a terminal will accept a pattern of action as an element in the definition of a group, even

if it does not in fact observe actions exemplifying that pattern in its environment. The criteria of acceptance and rejection in this mode do not reflect the terminal's processes of recognizing stable patterns of action themselves, but are an abstraction from those processes of the idea of group structure. Such abstraction is similar to the development, from the observation of relations among elements of processings, of the idea of logic or sense, as a criterion of the formative mode.

Similar arguments distinguish the mode I am proposing from the other modes I recognize. For example, it is possible for a terminal to intend to bring about action in a given pattern on other grounds than that the pattern is one of those the terminal takes to define the group. On the other hand, a terminal may accept a pattern as defining the group without intending to foster its enactment. It follows that signals selected by codes that embody the emitter's concept of a group need not be communications.

Finally, it is possible for a terminal to value an existing pattern as good or desirable, or as logical or sensible, independent of whether it regards that pattern as part of the definition of a group; and possible for it to regard a pattern as defining the group, without therefore holding it to be good or desirable, or logical or sensible.

Up to now, I have shown how the concept of communication points to the possibility of second-order processings in the mode I am introducing. The mode of communication resulting from that

second-order processing, however, will still, as before, be that of the proposed first-order communication event which was the referent of that second-order processing, not that of the second-order processing itself. Now, however, consider the possibility of a communication in the mode I am proposing. Such a communication would express a proposed first-order processing, or other communication event, in which some referent was to be judged according to the mode I am introducing.

Such communication would attempt to bring about the receiver's acceptance of a pattern, expressed in the communication, as an element in the definition of a group. In the same way, an ordinary statement selected by a processing in this mode would metacommunicate the same message. Such communications would therefore exemplify the process of creating a common context that the writers cited in the previous section call characteristic of communication. They will, in other words, socialize terminals in a given environment to a common concept of the structure of that environment. Insofar as a terminal holding such codes is reflexive, its own communications, fed back to itself externally or internally, may also develop in it the same common context as they do in other terminals.

If a communication indicates that the response of terminals in a given environment will be consistent with a specified pattern of action, it will also tend to bring about the persistence and stability of those patterns. Such a communication would imply

that signals not consistent with that pattern would meet with inappropriate responses, and thus fail of achieving their intentions. Those inappropriate responses would either communicate or metacommunicate rejection of the behavior to which they responded, on the grounds that it was not a proper, expectable, or conventional pattern; they could in this sense be regarded as sanctions. Communications in this mode will, therefore, imply the possibility of such sanctions, and to the extent that transmissions of their receiver are conditioned by purposive intentions, they will foster the conformity of those transmissions to the patterns they set forth.

By this point, the close correspondence between the communication theory formulations I offer and the language of behavioral social science is patent. The codes I adduce to account for the development and persistence of a shared, stable communication environment correspond to norms, adduced in behavioral science for the same purpose. A group is said to possess a norm if its members regard a pattern of action as proper or expected under appropriate circumstances, and if they penalize deviation from that pattern. Norm theory asserts that because of these expectations, which are said to be reproduced in group members through socialization, and because of the sanctions associated with them,

the behavior of the group persists in an identifiable pattern.[22]

In referring to socialization, to sanctions, and to the stability of the group, therefore, the account I offer of the mode proposed in this section corresponds to and elucidates the standard definition of norms. Under my formulation, the role of sanctions seems peripheral; on the other hand, the reference of the standard definition to sanctions seems grounded in no theoretical consideration deeper than the desire for a behavioral indicator. My account, in fact, tightens this clause of the definition by allowing the inappropriate responses that follow signals not conformed to the defined patterns to be recognized as sanctions, and thus specifying precisely what kind of sanctions are likely to ensue upon the violation of normative expectations. This elucidation of the nature of normative sanctions seems the more adequate in that many writers on norms emphasize, as does my account, the possibility, rather than the actual enforcement, of such sanctions for their violation.[23]

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[22]Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, with a new introduction (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 84; cf. Cherry, section 2.2. See also Robin M. William, Jr., "The Concept of Norm," in David L. Sills, ed., International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (np: MacMillan, 1968), XI, 204 f.; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: Wiley, 1962), pp. 8-9, 141-43; George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950), esp. pp. 121-25.

[23]George Gerbner, "Communication and Social Environment," Scientific American, Sept., 1972, at p. 153; Bateson and Ruesch, p. 169; Homans, loc. cit.. William, op. cit., does not define norms with reference to possible sanctions at all.

A norm may accordingly be defined, in communication theoretic terms, as that species of attitude or code through which its holders accept or reject patterns of social action as defining and establishing a group they are members of. The relation of predispositions in this mode to behavior is that they establish a common concept of a common context of action, and promote the conformity of action within that context to that concept.

Accordingly, it is to this mode that I consider the term "normative" ought strictly to apply; the term ought not to be extended to cover judgments in other non-descriptive modes. The standard behavioralist position, as I suggested in section 4a, is that normative judgments arise from socialization to shared expectations, a suggestion clearly reflected in the account I give here. However, as I argued in section 4c, the grounds on which a terminal's attitudes in a given mode are based ought to be an empirical, not a definitional, question; the definition of a mode is provided by the particular form of identification and alienation taking place in that mode, or, correspondingly, by the relation of codes in that mode to behavior.

The normative mode, like the others I have suggested, resembles modes suggested in the writings reviewed in section 4a. In particular, Perls refers to "ownership" as one of his forms of identification and alienation. The ownership of any thing can be defined as a pattern of action by various individuals with respect to that thing, including and arising from their attitudes toward it.

The characteristic of such actions is that they arise from the actor's recognition of the existence of that pattern of action, and his acceptance of it. Ownership is, therefore, clearly a kind of normative action.

Once this mode is defined, its possible referents may be extended to all kinds of phenomena, just as was done for formative judgments in section b, and in particular to communication events other than processings. Thus individual actions consistent with expected patterns, as well as projected actions consistent with such patterns, could become the received signals to which normative communications are the response. Further, normative codes may specify patterns of action defined by any combination of the elements by which a communication event is defined: signal pattern, channel, and terminals. For example, it may be that a signal in a given channel is expected to bring a response in certain channels.

Norms may also specify patterns of action defined by any one of the elements of a communication event. For instance, they may specify what patterns of signals in other modes are proper to transmit, or to hold as attitudes, and thus define expectations about what world views, values, and prescriptions are to be espoused in the communication environment. Again, norms may define the form that a message must take in order to be recognized as being of a given kind (for example, an authoritative directive), and thus specify the proper channels for such messages. Again,

norms may specify a differential response to a given transmitter of messages, not because of its individual identity or qualities, but in accordance with its position in the communication environment.

In summary, normative attitudes identify patterns of action which an actor takes to describe stable patterns in its communication environment; that is, that specify the structure of a social group. Normative attitudes judge, or intepret, actions consonant with those patterns as proper, conventional, or to be expected within the group. A communication in the normative mode proposes its receiver's acceptance of a given pattern of action as conventionally proper. A second-order processing in the normative mode evaluates the event which is its referent in terms of whether it is normatively expectable or proper.

f. Explicit metacommunication.

Before I conclude this chapter, one other point arising from the discussion of communication deserves mention. Consider again the second-order processing that generates a statement. That second-order processing involves a modal judgment of a referent, which is a first-order processing, and that statement expresses the first-order processing's modal judgment of its own referent. However, the modal judgment which is part of the second-order proces-

sing is, in general, expressed only in the second-order statement about that processing; it is only implicitly metacommunicated in the statement itself.

Similarly, the second-order processing that leads to a communication involves a modal judgment of a referent that is a first-order communication event, and the communication expresses the modal judgment involved in that first-order communication event. However, it can be shown that the terminal's second-order modal judgment of that first-order communication event may also be expressed in the communication itself. In other words, a second-order statement expressing the processing that generated a communication, instead of being a separate statement, may be embodied in the communication itself, as a kind of explicit metacommunication.

To see how this situation arises, consider the following. In the case of a communication, as I have already shown, the referent of the second-order processing may be a proposed rather than an observed communication event. Now, whatever mode the communicating terminal judges that referent in terms of, it may make that modal judgment in a way that takes account of the proposed character of the referent; it may make a tentative or projected judgment, that embodies a recognition that the receiver may or may not enact the referent. The communication may then be so expressed as to reflect the conditional character of that judgment.

Further, the way in which such a judgment takes account of the conditional character of its referent will depend on what

the mode of the judgment is. Therefore, if the communication expresses the conditional character of the modal judgment that gives rise to it, it will do so in a way that expresses what mode that judgment is in. Some examples will show how communications can in this way express the various modes of the processings that generate them.

First, in the descriptive mode, a communication may express, not the transmitter's judgment about the reality of that processing (i.e., about whether it is enacted by the receiver), but rather the transmitter's concern to judge that reality. In such a case, the communication might be interrogative in form: does the receiving terminal follow the proposed processing? Similarly, in the evaluative mode, the communication may express the transmitter's concern to approve the processing of the receiver; such a communication might take on a hortatory character. In the prescriptive mode, the communication may express the transmitter's concern to bring about the processing in question; such communication might be imperative in mood.

Explicit metacommunication of the reflexive modes can also take place. In the formative mode, a communication may express the transmitter's imputation to the receiver of rules governing its critical process; such a communication might express the asserted logical necessity of the proposed processing, or other event ("if you agree that X, then you must believe Y"). In the normative mode, a communication may express the transmitter's impu-

tation to terminals in its environment of attitudes governing stable patterns of action; such a communication might express the socially required character of the proposed event ("that's just the way it's done").

Therefore, the interrogative character of a communication is an indication that the interpreting code that selected it is descriptive in mode; its hortatory character, that the code is evaluative; its imperative character, that the code is prescriptive; its asserted logical necessity, that the code is formative; its asserted social requiredness, that the code is normative. In these ways, the mode of the second-order processing that results in a communication, which would otherwise be expressed in a second-order statement corresponding to that processing, might be considered as explicitly metacommunicated in the communication.

The embodiment of a second-order mode in a first-order communication in this way seems to correspond to the "expression of attitude toward listener" which Ogden and Richards propose as one of the functions of language. It is of practical importance, in the analysis of political statements, to have an adequate account of such explicit metacommunication, for without such a concept, it is easy to confuse the metacommunicated mode of the second-order processing with the communicated mode of the proposed processing. For example, in the analysis of concrete data, it is necessary to distinguish between a communication urging the receiver, on value grounds, to accept a certain pattern of action as consistent

with norms, and a communication urging the receiver, on conventional grounds, to accept a certain pattern of action as evaluatively good. When the mode metacommunicated in a communication, expressing a code of the transmitter, is distinguished from the mode of the communication itself, proposed for or imputed to the receiver, such complexities can be properly sorted out. By my account, questions may be recognized as explicit descriptive metacommunication; avowed persuasive speech as explicit evaluative metacommunication; orders, instructions, and requests as explicit volitional metacommunication; and so on.

At this point I have incorporated into the scheme I I present all the modes suggested by the writers mentioned in section 4a but two. One of these is Gerbner's "importance." This mode seems in every case subsumpsible under one of the modes I have already introduced. For a thing to be judged important is for it to be taken as related in some way to an existing structure of thought, and any such structure must already have a modal character of its own, which would define the mode of the importance. Thus something might be descriptively important for its relation to an empirical theory, pragmatically important for its relation to an intended course of action, and so on. On the other hand, if what is at issue is the particular way in which a thing is related to an existing structure of ideas, then the mode will be that which

Gerbner calls "relation," which I have subsumed under Morris' formative mode.

The other remaining mode is Morris' "identificative," which seems genuinely modal in character. However, Morris himself holds that, while individual terms or signs may be identificative in mode, few statements are themselves so; and indeed I was able to analyze my interview data without reference to this mode. I will therefore give no account of it here.

I consider the account of the normative mode, which I have just given, to be the most significant proposal I make in this paper, with the exception of my account of politics-itself, which I introduce in the next chapter. My identification of the normative as a mode is itself an innovation, for not even Morris so identifies it, and the conceptions advanced by the other writers I cite are at best partial. I have systematically explicated the reflexivities inherent in the concept of norms, which (as the difficulty of the prose indicates) is difficult to accomplish without lapsing into confusion. I have not elsewhere seen this done, yet failure to do it properly generates confusion of the kinds mentioned in chapter one.

I have explicitly distinguished the normative mode from both the descriptive and the evaluative, failure to do which also leads to the kinds of confusions mentioned in chapter one. I have

taken care to distinguish empirical propositions about norms (such as that they arise from socialization) from defining statements (concerning the kind of judgment they represent of communication events), and to distinguish the empirical description of a normative entity (a description of the patterns which group members take to define a group) from a normative judgment of an empirical entity (the members' identification of an observed action as proper or normatively expected). These distinctions also depend on the use of the concept of levels of reflexivity; my systematic application of this concept to the analysis of normative phenomena is also innovative.

Finally, in developing my account of norms, I have drawn on both communication theory and semiotic in ways that demonstrate the possible relations between the two, and may conceivably foster the development of a single more powerful analytical framework in which the scope and power of each is increased by its relation to the other.

In short, I believe that the account of norms I offer, or something filling its place, is essential in several respects to a coherent understanding of politics. The role which my account of norms plays in formulating an adequate account of politics will be seen in the next chapter.

CHAPTER SIX.

COMMUNICATION AND POLITICAL ACTION.

"Cybernetics" . . . /is/ derived from the Greek
kubernētēs, or "steersman," the same Greek word
from which we eventually derive our term "gov-
ernor."   —Wiener.   (1)

The principal assertions of the previous chapters may

now be brought together into an account of politics that identifies

the central features of political events and provides a framework

for their empirical analysis. To arrive at such an account has

been the aim of the previous four chapters. To develop such an

account, it is convenient to begin by using the discussion of the

last chapter to explicate further the concept of norms, and their

role in political processes; this I will undertake in section a.

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[1] Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cyber-
netics and Society (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1950),
p. 15.

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In section b, I will use the concept of reflexivity, which I have been developing particularly in section 2c and in the previous chapter, to set forth an account of control consistent with communication theory, and to apply that account specifically to political forms of control. On the basis of these explications of norms and of control, I will then be able, in section c, to introduce my account of politics in explicit terms.

a. Norms.

In several ways, the account of the normative mode I give in section 5e contributes to a de-reification and demystification of the concept of norms. First, it draws attention to the concrete empirical referent of the norms of a group in the attitudes of individual members. It accordingly requires that a single individual still be said to hold a norm whenever he or she accepts a pattern of action as defining his or her group. To say that a group possesses a norm is, empirically, to say that the norm is held by a subset of its members such that the pattern of action specified by the norm tends to persist over time. Norms are, in other words, a special case of the communication theoretic proposition that the description of a group's structure can be recast as a description of the attitudes of individuals.

Second, the account in communication terms makes clear

that a norm cannot be said to exist on the grounds that a pattern of social action is observable, but only when members of a group accept a pattern as defining their group. Structure may be produced in a group's social action in a number of ways, but only when it depends on group members' identification with patterns of social action as defining their group may it be said to depend on norms. Similarly, individuals may apply various kinds of sanctions against others in order to influence their subsequent behavior, but only when the sanction is failure to respond to a communication with the response intended, on the grounds that the communication deviates from patterns to be expected in the group, will it be considered a normative sanction. Where these conditions are not met, patterns of behavior and sanctions may still be observable, but the codes on which they depend would not be norms.

Conversely, group members may hold common attitudes toward the pattern of social action in the group that are not normative; that is, that do not lead to behavior fostering that pattern because of its conformity to normative expectations. Such non-normative attitudes define the structure of the group in the same way as do the attitudes of an observer; the group members are in this respect in the position of observers. Through such attitudes, members of a group may recognize the descriptive structure of their communication environment; insofar as they share them, they tend to perceive that structure in similar ways. They may even act, through communication, to foster (or change) such pat-

terns; but, because they do not do so on the grounds that the patterns are the expectable or proper ones, they are not acting on the basis of norms.

In this way the communication account of norms clarifies the distinction between the patterns of action that in fact obtain in a group and those set forth by its norms. The former would be stated in the descriptive mode, and would express an observer's observations of the patterns actually being enacted. The latter kind of code defines what sort of behavior the terminal will expect, and may act to bring about simply on the grounds that it corresponds to the expectable or proper pattern. But a judgment that a pattern of action is normatively expectable need not arise from observation of the actual occurrence of the patterned action. While normative predispositions may be derived from observation of the existing communication environment, they need not be, since they may, for example, also be derived from socialization.

Again, normative attitudes contribute to the determination of observed patterns of action in a group, but, since predispositions in other modes also contribute to that determination, there is no necessary correspondence between the two. One should not be taken for the other, for group members may even act contrary to norms they themselves hold, if these conflict with other beliefs and motivations; that is, with predispositions in other modes.

The group structure that really exists will be reflected in descriptive statements; correspondingly, normative statements

might be said to specify the normative structure of the group. As a special case, the formal structure of a group will be defined by those group norms that are explicitly articulated, and recognized by members as defining that structure. A description of a group's formal structure could therefore be recast as a description of group norms.

Accordingly, the patterns specified in the attitudes that constitute a group's norms do not constitute a description of the group's patterns of action, even though group members themselves may hold that the latter is defined by the former. On the other hand, the existence of a norm does itself constitute a pattern of action in the descriptive sense; accordingly, a description of a group's norms is to be included in a description of its structure. In other words, norms, and the formal structures of a group, are second-order patterns of action, which must be distinguished from the first-order patterns but still recognized as patterns of action in their own right.

Finally, under the account of norms I give it is clear that the pattern specified by a norm may refer to any aspect of a communication process. A norm may, for example, specify as a response either an overt or an internal act; norms may thus regulate attitudes as well as behavior. Again, a norm may define a pattern of action not only by all, but also by any subset, of the elements characterizing communication events: by the terminals and channel, but not the signal itself, for example, or by the pattern of the

signal and its channel but not the specific terminals sending and receiving it.

The attention drawn to this point by communication theory supports an account of roles and institutions as well as of norms. In behavioral science, a set of norms prescribing patterns of action for anyone in a specified set of circumstances is called a role. In communication terms, a terminal's circumstances may be taken as described by the characteristic pattern of communication events that it participates in. Since these are in turn conditioned by the terminal's coding and critical process, it follows that a terminal may be identified by its circumstances. For instance, the members of a subset of terminals may be identified by possessing a communication environment common to the subset; that is, by their all being similar in respect to their position in a given pattern of social action. They may, accordingly, be said to have a particular role. In communication terms, therefore, a role may be defined as a pattern of social action characterized by the identities of the terminals in question, where such identities are described by their communication environment, as I showed possible in sections 2b and 3b.[2]

Similarly, behavioral science conceives an institution

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[2]George C. Homans, The Human Group (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1950), p. 124 and chaps. 6, 8; Alex Inkeles, What is Sociology? (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 67; Sidney Verba, Small Groups and Political Behavior (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton U. Pr., 1961), pp. 192-3.

es a set of related roles.[3] Roles define the identities of terminals, and the relations among terminals define channels of communication. When these persist they constitute a structure; therefore, an institution is a pattern of social action characterized by the signal channels of a given communication structure.

Further, when an institution is defined as a structure of communication channels, it can itself be treated as a terminal, possessing behavior and attitudes, as proposed in section 3b. The behavior of an institution is a summary description of the behavior of the individuals composing it, but the appropriate summation is not simply the average or net tendency of the individuals composing it. Instead, the norms which define the institution also specify the roles and influence that are to be assigned to its components in such a summary, and the forms which must be followed in order to establish an act as that of the institution. In other words, consistently with what I have said before, an institution is defined not only by the normatively specified patterns of its elements, but by the normatively specified patterns relating those elements. An institution is defined as a gestalt, as a pattern relating patterned elements.

As with any group, to describe events patterned in a given way as constituting an act of an institution is an empirical assertion if it means that the events correspond to normative pat-

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[3] Homans, Inkeles, and Verba, all loc. cit..

terms, held by members of the group, or perhaps other appropriate individuals, specifying that pattern of events as constituting an act of the group. To describe events as constituting an act of an institution (or other group) is to assert that appropriate correspondences may be observed to obtain between observed events and the normative attitudes of the group members. No reification is involved if the attitudes and behavior attributed to the group are composed of observable attitudes and behavior of individuals composing it.

Finally, in behavioral science, "norm" is sometimes used in a narrower sense to refer only to an attitude prescribing that signals with certain patterns be sent in a given communication process. Role, institution, and norm in this narrower sense may, accordingly, be regarded as attitudes that are parts of normative attitudes in the wider sense: roles define the terminals of a normative pattern of action, institutions its channels, and norms in the narrow sense the patterns of the signals involved. The three constitute, accordingly, aspects of the normative structure of the group; that is, not that structure of action which is observable, but that which the group, through the attitudes of its members, normatively expects its members to act consistently with. Any of them may, of course, be defined such that their prescriptions apply in circumstances defined by any or all of the elements that characterize a communication situation, and the formulation of an actual norm in any concrete case will likely involve all three elements.

For purposes of understanding politics, the most important of the principles I propose in this section are that communication need not represent an attempt to reinforce normatively defined patterns, but can equally well represent an attempt to alter or transcend them. Conversely, attempts to bring about the enactment of particular communication acts need not be motivated solely by normative considerations. Nevertheless, norms are of central importance for politics in any social group, because they define the patterns by which the group's members identify and define that group, including its roles and institutions. When norms exist defining an institution by normatively specified patterns of action, then events corresponding to those patterns can empirically be described as acts of the group.

b. Control.

To apply communication theory specifically to human political action, it is convenient to begin from a discussion of communication theory's concept of control. One terminal may be said to _control_ the action of another when the action of the first causes that of the other to become consistent with a specified pattern of action. If action by the first terminal, or controller, is capable of reliably producing the intended consequences in the other, or controlled, terminal, then the control of the former may

be called _effective_. If the actions of the controller do not absolutely determine the action of the controlled, but only affect its probability, it is common to speak of _influence_ rather than control. The concept of influence is, in other words, a probabilistic formulation of that of control.

As I indicated in section 5c, control is possible through communication, because the reception of signals modifies the coding, or state, and therefore the subsequent behavior, of the receiver. Except through such processes, control can be exercised only through the application of physical energy directly to bring about the desired circumstances. The latter corresponds to Deutsch's "power engineering" (3.4), in which, for example, not only the energy necessary to carry a radio signal would be broadcast, but the power to operate the radio itself. In "communication engineering" the receiver supplies the energy for its operation from its own resources (e.g., a wall socket or battery). Because the radio's coding allows it to interpret a broadcast signal, the signal alone can control the radio's behavior. The difference, as Cherry suggests, is between being able to tell people to jump in the lake and having to throw them in yourself.[4]

In this sense, as students of communication have commonly observed, the possibility of control depends on that of communica-

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[4]Colin Cherry, _On Human Communication: A Review, a Survey, and a Criticism_, 2nd ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1966), pp. 221-22; cf. Wiener, p. 98.

tion.[5] The conditions for effective control accordingly parallel those for the reliable production of particular consequences through communication.

First, effective control requires that the controlled terminal be part of an external feedback loop of the controlling terminal. For, unless the controller can receive responses of the controlled as signals, it can have no information about whether the controlled is exhibiting the desired pattern of action. Also, without such feedback, the controller can make no inferences about the coding of the controlled, and therefore cannot reach conclusions about what signals to send to bring about appropriate action by the controlled.

It follows that where control exists, both controlling and controlled terminals must act both as transmitters and receivers. The controlled will modify its action in accordance with signals from the controller; the controller will modify its transmissions, on the basis of the responses of the controlled, to bring about the appropriate response. Clearly, all effective control must in this sense be mutual, as the dog knows who trains a man to throw a stick whenever the dog fetches it. Kings who do not understand this principle kill bearers of bad tidings.

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[5]Wiener, p. 16; Karl W. Deutsch, The Nerves of Government: Models of Political Communication and Control, with a new introduction (New York: Free Press, 1966), pp. 76, 80, chap. 11; Charles Morris, Signs, Language, and Behavior (New York: Braziller, 1946), chap. VII, sections 7, 8, 10; and chap. VIII, section 8; Cherry, p. 58 f..

Similarly, effective control also cannot exist unless the controller can receive its own actions as signals. Otherwise, it could not know what behavior of its own was eliciting the responses of the controlled, and could not adjust its behavior accordingly. The exercise of control, in other words, requires reflexivity. In this sense control need not be mutual, for the controlled terminal's patterns of action may be modified without its being able to recognize those patterns as signals, while the controller's must be responses to patterns of action, or communication events, in which it participates, and must be selected as communication events in which it participates. Fully mutual control would involve two reflexive terminals, each bringing about intended patterns of action in the other.

It follows from the preceding account that any controller must be capable of recognizing communication processes in which it participates. A controller will therefore be able to impute causality to sequences of events in such processes. It may, in particular, infer causal connections between its own behavior and the actions of others. If codes embodying such inferences are among those conditioning a terminal's transmissions, then, according to the argument of section 5c, the terminal may be said to enact the behavior in order to bring about, or for the purpose of bringing about, the specified effect. In other words, the terminal engages in communication, in the strict sense of the term. In such a case I will say that the effect in question is the object of the termi-

nal's act, or that which the act is <u>oriented toward.</u>

Clearly, when such communications are based on norms, as in the cases discussed in sections 5e and 6a, then, to the extent that they modify the communication environment toward patterns specified by the norms, they constitute examples of control as here defined. However, controllers do not always attempt to influence group action only into patterns that normatively define the group. That is, norms are not the only basis for group members' communications influencing other members; predispositions in the behavioral modes, such as personal values and purposes, can also generate communications, as section 6e showed.

Such an account of control and influence illuminates a distinction between two kinds of social behavior made by virtually all students of groups. Through patterned behavior, a group's members may act either on phenomena external to the group, or on the group's patterns of action themselves. Consistently with the terms I use, patterns of the former kind may be said to define <u>task behavior</u>, and of the latter, <u>interactive behavior.</u>[6] When

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[6]Terminology differs. See Homans, chap. 2; Verba, chaps. 5, 7; John C. Wahlke, Heinz Eulau, William Buchanan, and LeRoy C. Ferguson, <u>The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior</u> (New York: Wiley, 1962), chaps. 6, 9, 16, 17; Richard F. Fenno, Jr., <u>The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress</u> (Boston: Little Brown, 1966), chaps, 1, 3, 5, 12, etc.; Bernard Berelson and Gary A. Steiner, <u>Human Behavior: An Inventory of Scientific Findings</u> (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1964), pp. 344-46; B.E. Collins and Harold S. Guetzkow, <u>A Social Psychology of Group Processes for Decision-Making</u> (New York: Wiley, 1964), chaps. 3-4; John W. Thibault and Harold H. Kelley, <u>The Social Psychology of</u>

the relevant external phenomena are parts of the group's physical environment, this distinction is like Deutsch's distinction between "energy" and "communication." I may include in each category the attitudes supporting the behavior in question, by referring to task action and interaction.

Norms, for example, are then a kind of interactive attitude. If they were the only kind, I could adopt the more common terminology and speak of maintenance behavior rather than interactive. behavior. But since, clearly, not all interaction derives from norms, nor serves as do norms to perpetuate the existing structure of a group, I consider the former term inappropriate. The failure to distinguish clearly among the various non-descriptive modes makes it possible for those who promote that term to overlook that action on a group need not be conservative.

Clearly, control of a group's patterns both of task action and of interaction may be carried out through communication processes. To the extent that it is so carried out, such control itself, in both cases, exemplifies interaction. A group member might, therefore, indirectly control the disposition of physical

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Groups (New York: Wiley, 1959), chap. 15; Robert F. Bales, "The Equilibrium Problem in Small Groups," in A. Paul Hare, Edgar F. Borgatta, and Robert F. Bales, eds., Small Groups: Studies in Social Interaction, revised ed. (New York: Knopf, 1965), pp. 445-76; Raymond B. Cattell, "Concept and Method in the Measurement of Group Syntality," in ibid., pp. 116-20; Paul Lutzker, "The Behavior of Congressmen in a Committee Setting," Journal of Politics 31 (1969), 140-166 at 159, and works cited therein.

phenomena by group members through communication processes, and therefore through interaction. A foreman's instructions to workers are an example. In the same way, a member might indirectly control patterns of interaction through other patterns of interaction. An executive's instructions on liaison among his subordinates are an example.

On the other hand, it is also possible that a group's patterns of interaction be indirectly controlled through action on material, or other external, phenomena. People receive signals from the environment external to the group; therefore, if that environment changes, the signals received by group members will change, and their responses with them. Bribery and patronage are possible examples. Finally, control over the physical environment can influence interaction through disruption of the physical matrixes that carry the group's signal patterns, and of other communication facilities of the group. Assassination and bombing are examples.

Consider now, however, a subset of a social group, which subset controls the patterns of action in the larger group through communication. If such a subset manifests patterned interactions of its own, it may itself be considered as a group. From the point of view of the larger group, the subset's control exemplifies reflexivity, because members of the subset are also members of the larger group. However, from the point of view of the subset itself, its control of those patterns of interaction is not reflex-

ive. I am saying that, considering the subset as a group, the control of the larger group exemplifies task action rather than interaction, even though it constitutes patterned action on patterns of action. In this way I restrict interaction to action on a group's own patterns of action. Interaction therefore by definition involves reflexivity, while task action need not.

Equivalently, it may be said that whether an individual's act constitutes task action or interaction will depend in part on the definition of the group with respect to which the action is being considered. If the object of the action is a communication event, then I will take it as belonging to the group if both terminals are members of the group. For example, the normative control of a group is to be considered internal to the group to the extent that the communication process through which such control is established involves only group members.

A group is defined by its member terminals and the relations among them, as well as by the patterns of signals themselves. Therefore, whenever the analysis of a signal concerns all its characteristics as a communication event, those characteristics define a group within which the event takes place. If, on the other hand, the other terminal and channel of a signal can be neglected for purposes of a given analysis, or if the communication event can for those purposes be reformulated as a simple signal, then such a signal may be regarded as not being part of the patterns of action of the group itself. It will still be social action, since not all

social action is action in a group (see section 3b). Now the signals received from physical objects, mentioned above, can be regarded as in the latter category. Accordingly, _task action_ can be defined as action whose object is simple signals, or their sources; _interaction_, as action whose object is communication events within the group they define. This account helps rigorize the distinction as formulated by social psychology.

The main points raised in this section that are relevant to the understanding of politics are that control requires reflexivity, because it requires understanding, on the part of the controller, of the patterns that define the entity it wishes to control. Through task behavior, a group may control action in another group (of which it may be a subset); through interactive behavior, it may control its own action. Whether an act is task action or interaction therefore depends on the group with respect to which it is being considered.

c. Politics.

The ideas introduced so far may now be used to support an explicit account of politics, political action, and political events. The explication already given for behavior, action, intention, influence, group, reflexivity, and norms will make it relatively easy to formulate and explicate such an account.

If a member of a group possesses a capacity for reflexivity, it may recognize the structure of the group as part of its communication environment, as described in section 5d. When that condition is met, the possible objects of the terminal's behavior include the structure of the group, or the patterns of action that define it, and the state of the group, or patterned actions within it. The actor may, accordingly, orient behavior toward influencing the group's structure or state. Since the structure and state of a group may be described in terms of the codings and critical processes of its members, the terminal may, therefore, attempt to influence the mental states and attitudes, including norms, of the group members.

I take such action to constitute politics; politics is behavior intended to influence the state or structure of a social group. Since state and structure are defined by patterns of action, this definition may be expanded to: politics is behavior intended to influence actions patterned in accordance with persistent patterns of action involving relations among individuals. This formulation makes explicit the reflexivity inherent in political action. In common language, and introducing constructs in the way discussed in section 3b, I may equivalently say that politics is behavior intended to influence the way a social group acts. This formulation also corresponds to the way I have been introducing terms up to this point: politics is behavior (section 3a) intended (4c) to influence (6b) the way (4.0-4.6) a social group (3b) acts (3a).

On several points, this definition will bear a word of explication. First, it is clear that overt political acts must rest on, or be caused or conditioned by, the attitudes and mental states of the actor, particularly since I define behavior as political in part by its intention. Indeed, such a relation between the behavior and attitudes of a terminal is required by the definition and account of behavior I advance in section 3a. I will say that attitudes or states that may condition overt political acts are political attitudes, but have thought it more consistent with common usage not to say that they are themselves politics. Accordingly, I take political to mean "pertaining to attempts to influence the way a social group acts." "Politics" is, on this stipulation, equivalent to "political behavior."

Second, I do not allow that all behavior that affects a group's state or structure is political, but restrict the application of the term to behavior intended to have such an effect. Without the proviso of intentionality, all behavior, or at least all behavior in a group, would be political, since, by the argument of 15.7, all would affect somewhat the coding of at least the behaving terminal. It may be considerations such as these that have led many students of politics, when they abandon a definition of politics in terms of institutions of government, to be unable to avoid the conclusion that all human behavior is political.[7]

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[7]Lewis A. Froman, Jr., "Politics," paper given at APSA convention, Washington, D.C., Sept., 1972, for example.

All behavior, at least all social behavior, will have social effects. Any behavior may have significant social effects; that is, may significantly affect patterned action, and patterns of action, involving relations among individuals. Such effects alone, however, do not make such behavior interesting to students of politics. Any behavior, also, may have significant political effects, that is, may affect patterns of political action. Political scientists may be found to concern themselves with such behavior because of such effects. However, I consider that if a definition of politics is formulated in such a way as to encompass all such behavior, it must fail to identify what is distinctive, or characteristic, about specifically political behavior.

It may, nevertheless, be objected that, consistently with contemporary usage, at least some events with significant political effects on patterns of social action should be included in the political. In particular, an observer may wish to draw attention to the potential effects of an act on social action even though its enactor may not recognize or intend those effects, and may for that reason call the act political ("Rape is a political act;" "in a repressive society, any expression of sexuality is political;" "long hair is a political statement."). To meet this objection, the formulation above may be broadened to include all acts whose potential effect on the way a group acts is recognized by some relevant individual, not only by the actor. If the individual in question is the actor, this formulation is equivalent to

the previous. If it is an observer who wishes to draw attention to the potential effects of the act, then to call the act political is for the observer to assert the possibility of such effects. Establishing an act as political in this sense then requires that the individual recognizing its potential effects be specified.

Third, I do not restrict politics to successful influence, but apply the term to all attempts to exercise influence. Absent such a proviso, it would be impossible to determine whether a given act was political in itself; its definition would depend on subsequent events. It seems to me more sensible to say that unsuccessful attempts to influence are poor politics than that they are not politics. In concrete terms, the alternate proviso would tend to support a conclusion, apparently empirical but actually enforced by the definition, that the powerless did not engage in politics.

Fourth, I hold that whether or not given behavior is political can be determined only when the relevant social group is specified. An overt act is political with respect to that group (or those groups) whose state or structure it is intended to influence. Each political act is oriented toward some specifiable patterns of action; these define a group with respect to which the act is political. If, however, an observer is concerned with a group not defined by patterns of action toward which a given act is oriented, such an observer will not consider the act in question political for the purposes of his or her analysis.

For example, if one group is a subgroup of a larger society, not every act that is political with respect to the subgroup ("Let's get Mom and Dad to take us to the movies") is political with respect to the larger society. On the other hand, an act within the subgroup, whose intention includes that of affecting actions patterned by the patterns that define the larger group, ("With that amendment in it, I think my Committee could accept your bill," or "I'm going to stop conforming to the stereotype that I should do all the housework."), may also be political with respect to the larger group. Therefore, the definition I propose supports and gives consistent sense to references to the "politics of the family" and of other nongovernmental social entities.[8]

As a corollary of this fourth point, my definition provides that any group may possess a politics as soon as its members recognize it as a possible object of action. That a group's members so recognize it implies their possession of norms defining the group as a stable, structured entity; in this sense the capacity for political action depends on normative predispositions. If members recognize the group only in the sense defined by such norms, as a normative or formal entity, they may exercise intentional influence only with respect to that normative or formal

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[8]The canonical examples include Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and James Coleman, Union Democracy (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1956); and R.D. Laing, The Politics of the Family (New York: Pantheon, 1971).

structure. If they recognize the processes actually obtaining in a group defined by such norms, they may exercise intentional influence over those actual processes and their patterns as well. Political action may accordingly arise from predispositions in other modes as well as the normative, and is not restricted to behavior maintaining or reinforcing normatively defined patterns. The latter, in fact, will be political with respect to the actor only if that actor intends such maintenance or reinforcement.

Fifth, the definition I propose defines behavior as political independently of its relation to political institutions, but also allows a consistent account of those institutions. For example, Dahl's formulation that

> A political system is any persistent pattern of human relationships that involves, to any significant extent, power, rule, or authority (9)

is widely accepted as a definition of politics. But what Dahl is here defining is not politics itself, but a political system. Therefore "rule" and "authority" seem fundamental to the definition, and political science develops potential intellectual difficulties with the concept of nongovernmental politics. Political scientists tend to be reduced to justifying the admission of such topics by indirect arguments, such as that politics in private institutions is somehow analogous to politics in government, or that such insti-

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[9] Robert A. Dahl, _Modern Political Analysis_ (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 6.

tutions affect politics in government.

These difficulties may be avoided, in a way compatible with Dahl's definition, by defining political institutions on the basis of politics rather than the other way around. According to my argument in section a, an institution is a persistent pattern of social action characterized by its channels, or the form of relations among those related thereby. This definition is compatible with Dahl's reference to "a persistent pattern of human relationships." "Political" means "intended to affect the state or structure of a social group." Therefore, a <u>political institution</u> may be defined as a normatively specified pattern of action intended by the members of a group to influence that group's state and structure, or, in other words, to control its task action and interaction.

Through such action patterns, in turn, the group's resources are manipulated and utilized. Some such resources will be material, such as capital goods and armed forces; others may themselves be communicationlike, such as cultural forms, expertise, and finance. Insofar as material objects are involved in the latter, their role is as a carrier of signals.

Such an institution, and the intention that it regulate a group's patterns of action, may be descriptively recast in terms of group norms (in the broader sense of the term) specifying a complex pattern of action, as follows. First, a norm will describe the institution itself as a pattern of action characterized by its channels, and perhaps by its roles and norms in the narrower sense.

Second, a norm will specify that a member's intention to influence the group be expressed in action patterned in the ways specified by the definition of the institution. Third, a norm will specify that the receivers of acts of the institution (that is, acts consistent with the pattern defining the institution, or defined as a summary description of such acts) modify their codings in ways intended by those acts. When these latter two norms are widely held by appropriately defined sets of group members, the institution may be said to possess <u>legitimacy</u>; legitimacy accordingly constitutes a special case of the consistency of behavior with applicable norms.

In the same way, the norms of a group may specify certain roles, and define the propriety or legitimacy of obeying directives from their holders. Such norms will set forth codes predisposing members to enact behavior specified by signals from the holders of those roles. The holders of such roles may then be said to possess <u>authority</u>. Authorities, in other words, are terminals for which normative attitudes of the group specify that they may properly enact behavior regulating the group's actions and action patterns. If such norms define all such behavior by those terminals as proper; their authority is absolute; if only certain kinds of actions, limited. If, on the other hand, a group member can secure modifications in a group's patterns of action, independent of whether a norm specifies that members are to enact such

modifications, he or she may be said to exercise _power_.[10]

Once political institutions exist, a group member may seek influence in the group not only through his or her own direct action, but by becoming a holder of authority, or by indirectly influencing the operation or structure of institutions, especially political institutions. A holder of authority may exercise indirect influence by giving directives, which the group members consider it proper to obey, to alter the pattern of their subsequent actions. One who does not hold authority may also exercise indirect influence, for example by persuading fellow members to a particular course of action through other than institutionalized actions, including the use of such influence on holders of authority.

To the extent that the state and structure of a group, both as formally or normatively defined and as actually observed, are effectively controlled by intentional actions of members of the group, through its norms and otherwise, the group may be called autonomous; to the extent that the group is controlled by intentional action of individuals not members of the group, heteronomous.[11]

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[10]On these concepts see Dahl, pp. 16-17, 31-34, and chap. 5; Deutsch, chap. 7; Harold D. Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan, _Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry_ (New Haven: Yale U. Pr., 1950), chaps. IV, V; Herbert Simon, "Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power," _Journal of Politics_, 15 (1953), 500; David Kovenock, "Influence in the U.S. House of Representatives: Some Preliminary Statistical 'Snapshots,'" paper given at APSA convention, Chicago, Sept., 1967.

[11]As far as I am aware, the latter term was introduced by Lasswell and Kaplan, op. cit.

Dahl's use of "power," in his definition quoted above, is essentially equivalent to mine of "influence." The two accounts of authority are also essentially consistent, and Dahl's "system" is equivalent to my "institution." However, my definition elaborates Dahl's in stating more explicitly the connection between politics and the institutions of politics, and between power and influence. It asserts that what politics is fundamentally about is neither the control of groups through power, per se, nor the elites who hold power, nor the institutions through which power is exercised. In other words, my definition does not restrict political acts to those governed by certain norms, those performed by holders of certain roles, or those enacted in certain institutions. It includes any behavior by which anyone tries to influence the way a group acts. All politics involves the use of power and influence, but it is the intention of the behavior, its orientation toward the state or structure of a group's task action or interaction, that makes it political.

The approach I propose, in other words, makes explicit that the capacity for politics, as a form of behavior, is in the first instance characteristic not of institutions or of holders of authority, but of human beings. In this way, the account I propose protects against treating institutions and other high-level abstractions as the fundamental empirical entities of politics, beyond which analysis need not go. It promotes the analysis of those abstractions as complex patterns of individual communication events

and elements, enacted by individual people, rather than as de-humanized entities subsisting somehow beyond the reach of human action and influence.

According to my account, political action governed by normative patterns can be understood as an important special case, whose special features are influenced by its normative character, but which is fundamentally similar to political action generally. Political action, rather than its abstraction in institutions, authority systems, governments and states, is taken as the defining case. Such an approach is valuable in allowing students of politics to transcend, through becoming aware of, their own prejudices about the political systems in which they live, and also because it promotes a genuinely empirical political science by allowing political analysis to base itself in concrete, observable events.

In summary, the definition of politics that I propose achieves the following:

1. It identifies the reflexive character of politics and explicates the implications of that reflexivity.

2. It identifies the political by empirical character-istics independent of institutional context or the simple presence of power, and independent of its merely exemplifying social behavior in a group.

3. It supports consistent accounts of control, influence, legitimacy, authority, and power.

4. It explicitly makes the political relative to the

group being discussed, and, through its connection with a communication theoretic account of patterning and norms, specifies how relevant groups can be identified.

5. It deals with both behavior and attitudes, and explicates the ways in which each may affect the other.

6. It supports a systematic account of attitudes and other mental states, which account justifies their introduction in political science as explanatory constructs. In particular, it explicates

    a. intentions and values, in order to deal with the purposive aspect of politics.

    b. norms, in order to treat institutions empirically and to describe the relations between normative expectations and action.

It is in the sense represented by this definition that I advance the claim of section 3a that "human behavior," and political behavior in particular, "may properly be viewed as a case of the phenomena covered by communication theory." I claim that the interpretive framework I propose allows the student to abstract, from concrete political processes, and to interpret in general terms, the phenomena that concern those interested in political events as a form of human activity. To find a framework that would make such an analysis possible was the task I set forth for this work in chapter one. In the next chapter, I give some illustration of how further empirical analysis grounded in this framework can actually be carried out.

CHAPTER SEVEN.

SOME SAMPLE APPLICATIONS.

/P/olitical science must start with a conception
of the human animal in nature and must conclude
with an account which will deal with the whole
phenomenon of politics, the choosing and creating
as well as the reacting and responding.
                                                    —Thorson.   (1)

a. Introduction.

In this concluding chapter I will do three things.

First, I will restate the results of the preceding discussion in

terms appropriate for their application to the analysis of concrete

political phenomena. Second, I will show how a number of hypotheses

selected from one of the leading current works on Congressional

committees can be reformulated in terms of the theoretical concepts

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[1]Thomas Landon Thorson, Biopolitics (New York: Holt,
1970), p. 178; quoted in Walt Anderson, Politics and the New Human-
ism (Pacific Palisades, Cal.: Goodyear, 1973), p. 87.

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I propose. I will argue that these reformulations help identify the intended empirical referents of the hypotheses, and thus render them more accessible to empirical test. Third, I will select one of the more central of these hypotheses as an example, and test it with my interview data from the House Judiciary Committee. By this means I intend to illustrate how, when propositions and data are formulated in the terms which my theoretical considerations generate, the one may be tested by the other in a more systematic and explicit way than has otherwise been possible.

The testing of hypotheses is not, in fact, entirely appropriate to this state of theoretical development. The testing of hypotheses depends on operational definitions of the terms of the hypotheses. Such operational definitions, and the hypotheses about the relations among the phenomena they define, should emerge from empirical accounts of those phenomena and their relations. Such empirical accounts, in turn, develop inductively out of careful and systematic examination of phenomena, informed by the question of how it is most illuminating and theoretically useful to describe those phenomena. After the analyst has developed in this way some idea of which forms of description are illuminating, those descriptions can be recast, in a form appropriate to a formal, deductive system, as definitions and hypotheses. Attempts to operationalize hypotheses that are not supported by inductive inquiry of this sort cannot be much more systematic than the ad hoc operationalizations I criticised in chapter one.

Consequently, the tests I can offer at this stage must resemble, to a degree, the conventional, essentially impressionistic use of interview data to substantiate empirical propositions. The translations into operational terms, consistent with my theory, of the abstract terms in which the hypotheses I am using are couched, are conjectural and tentative. However, the explications I propose are capable of systematic refinement through the analytic process I just described; ad hoc explications lack the criteria or context which could support such further criticism or revision.

Similarly, the way in which I adduce interview data to back up descriptive statements and propositions may seem little different from the way in which writers working from interview data are used to do the same thing. However, the methods I propose, if systematically applied, identify and collect under a single category all the statements bearing in each specified way on a hypothesis. In the normal procedure for the analysis of interview data, the only way in which statements relevant to a given topic can be identified is by the question to which they respond. Such methods risk including the irrelevant, overlooking the relevant in other parts of the interview, and enforcing on observations a conceptual structure which may be inappropriate or inadequate to the situation. The general classification I propose offers the possibility of treating systematically even open-ended interviews, such as mine, and second-hand descriptive accounts.

The proper next step for my own work would be to examine

my data, organizing and classifying them in the terms suggested by my account of politics, as I have so far developed it, with the object of seeing what patterns they actually exhibit.. I could then ask in what ways the observed patterns corresponded to the concepts invoked by ordinary discourse in descriptions of those phenomena; such correspondences would allow the explication and refinement of those concepts. At that point, hypotheses referring to those concepts could be operationalized, and tested, in a systematic and meaningful way. Further, the patterns of political events revealed by organizing political phenomena according to this account of politics could also be stated as hypotheses, testable by further data organized in similar ways. Finally, such investigations would foster further refinements and explications of the account of politics itself, and of the theoretical concepts associated with it.

I have already begun such work, and hope to be able to return to its systematic pursuit. However, I have thought it advisable not to present such results in this work, for two reasons. The first is that that analysis raises questions whose further consideration, or even whose presentation here, would properly require significant refinements and elaborations of the theoretical ideas so far presented; in other words, they involve substantial further explication of the account of politics I propose. Second, the inductive method I propose is sufficiently unorthodox that the significance and implications of its results might not be evident from their simple presentation. To show, even if with little system,

explicitness, or rigor, how my proposals function in more conventional methodological contexts may therefore, I conceive, help to justify in the eyes of others my continuation of the work at hand.

b. Reformulation.

The considerations I have advanced in the preceding chapters support the following assertions, which must be regarded as empirical conjectures. First, that every political event may be described as a communication event, or in terms of communication events; and accordingly every political event may be described by its terminals, its channels, and its simple signal pattern; that is, respectively, by who is involved in it, how they are related to each other by it, and what matters it deals with. The people involved in a political event, to elaborate further, may include the initiators of the action, those to whom the action is directed, and any audience that there may be.

I also propose, that these characteristics of a political event will capture those aspects of the event in which analysts concerned about political questions would have an interest, or about which it would be most useful for them to have information. This statement can hardly be established through any single study, and I do not regard it as established; I adopt it tentatively, as the motivating assumption of my work. It can be regarded as an empiri-

cal hypothesis that my account of politics can (or is capable of being made to) account for the observed phenomena of politics; a hypothesis, that is, about the relation between an identifiable complex of ideas and an identifiable field of phenomena. The success or failure, in the long run, of work along the lines I propose, will amount to the testing of this proposition.

Now, I propose, further, that every statement about a political phenomenon will have as a referent one or more of these characteristic aspects of political events or phenomena. If it is a complex statement, it is of course more likely to have more than one of these kinds of referent. Further, every description by an analyst of an observed political event will be equivalent to, or formulable as, such a statement. Therefore, data about political events may be presented in the form of statements, and those statements may be classified according to whether their referents are the actors involved, their relations, or the substance with which they are dealing.

The empirical assertion here is that statements about political phenomena can, in fact, be classified in this way. My interview data appear to admit of this classification without apparent obstacle; such difficulties as emerge are ambiguities rather than exceptions. Through applying this scheme to data, I find it useful to explicate the categories in the following way. I identify a statement's referent as actors, or terminals, if the statement is about political actors' identities, states of mind, attitudes,

or mental processes. I identify the referent as processes, or channels, if the statement is about an interaction between actors, about what kind or form of interaction it is; in other words, about what kind of political action is taking place. I identify the referent as the content, or signal patterns, if the statement is about the questions or issues with which that political process is dealing; that is, with policy or with the tasks of the political system.

Under these definitions, a political event, identified by its channel, or as a form of interaction, is a transmission. The signal which is one of the elements of that transmission will, in general, also be a statement. Its referent can, therefore, also be classified according to the scheme I propose. Similarly, if a statement refers to the mental states, processings, or attitudes of political actors, then that mental state may also be expressed by a statement (in fact, it generally will be, since the evidence I have for the mental state is most commonly a statement, expressing it, from an interview). The referent of that statement, or implicit statement, can also be classified according to the scheme I propose. In this way, not only statements about political processes, but the statements of which political processes are made up, can be analyzed in the terms I propose.

The analysis of any statements about a political phenomenon therefore proceeds through successive levels, the referent of each statement being treated as a statement for the next level of

analysis. These successive iterations of analysis stop when one of two things happens. The first is that the referent of a statement is the substance, or content, of the political process in question, and that substantive question is not itself a political process of the group under consideration. As I argued in section 6b, the task of a group, or the subject of a political process, can by definition be regarded, with respect to that political process, as a simple signal rather than as a communication event. It is communication events, not simple signals, that are expressed in statements. Therefore, when a statement has such a referent, that referent is not itself analyzed as a statement, and the chain stops.

The second thing that can happen is that the original statement, while containing enough information to allow the identification of its referent as a terminal or event, contains no information about the specific content of that terminal or event; that is, no information about the pattern identifying the simple signal of the transmission or the state of the terminal in the processing. In this case, while the referent of the original statement can be identified, that referent cannot itself be expressed in the form of a statement on the basis of the information given. It must, instead, be treated as a simple signal with respect to the original statement, and with respect to the analysis of that original statement. The iteration of analysis therefore again stops at this point.

It is in this fashion that the information about politi-

cal processes imbedded in a given statement can be explicitly noted and categorized. The method I propose also keeps straight such distinctions among levels of reflexivity as those mentioned in chapter one, such as that between an analyst's beliefs about a political situation, participants' beliefs about that situation, and the analyst's observation of people's beliefs about that situation.

Now, according to the arguments I have advanced, every statement has not only a referent, but also a mode of referring to that referent. Therefore, each statement about, or within, a political process is to be classified by its mode of reference as well as by the nature of its referent. This classification is to be carried out on statements at successive iterations of the analytical process as well as on the initial statements composing the data.

My empirical conjecture in respect of such modes is that any interpretation of any referent expressed in a statement about, or in, a political process, will exemplify one of the five modes that I introduced in chapters four and five. A statement that simply describes political phenomena can be classified as a descriptive statement; one that evaluates them, as evaluative; one that promotes or prescribes their occurrence, or indicates the intention of bringing them about, as volitional. Statements in and about politics may also exemplify the reflexive modes: a statement that expressed a judgment of the validity or correctness of a po-

litical phenomenon would be classifiable as a formative statement; one that expressed a judgment of their propriety or conventionality (that is, of their conformity with patterns defining the group in question to its members), as a normative statement.

As with the classification of referents which I propose, the complexities that arise in the application of this scheme to actual data seem to reflect ambiguities rather than contrary evidence. The case here is more difficult than the previous, however, particularly with respect to the reflexive modes. I did not arrive at the formulations with respect to the reflexive modes that I present in chapter five until some time after I had settled on the conceptualization of the behavioral modes presented in chapter four. In the interval, in fact, I had carried out a classification of the data in terms of the three modes alone. At that time I was I was attempting to interpret judgments in the reflexive modes as something other than modal judgments. This classification of the data is still the most recent which I have completely carried out, and which I have therefore used in preparing this chapter.

The form in which the data now are accordingly does not admit of testing any hypotheses containing terms whose referents may be found to involve normative or formative statements. In addition, some distortion no doubt occurs, in the current classification, as a result of the absence of these two categories from the scheme of classification, in the assignment of statements to the other modal categories.

Nevertheless, my existing classification is closely enough consistent with my current ideas to allow me to use it for some analysis of the political events to which its data refer. I do not consider the lack of a category collecting formative statements crucial, for such statements seem to play no major role in political processes. I also think that any errors in classifying data under the behavioral modes will not significantly affect the analysis. I am satisfied, from inspection, that in general, the data collected under those heads belong there. The main consequence of the lack of a correctly formulated category for normative statements is that the normative aspects of statements are overlooked or clumsily handled. The only serious problem of working with my existing classification of data is therefore, as I mentioned above, that I will be unable to deal with normative statements in as systematic and explicit a way as with statements in the behavioral modes.

In any case, I classified my data in their present form as part of an inductive investigation; that is, on the basis of premises that were to a degree unarticulated and implicit. Among the purposes of such classifications are to foster more explicit formulations of those premises, to uncover sources of ambiguity and perplexity, and to aid in developing more precise reformulations that remove such difficulties. In this case, the process of classification served its purpose, in that it fostered exactly that reformulation of the concept of the normative on the basis of which

I now criticise it. I now consider it important to carry out a reclassification of my data consistent with my newer formulations. However, the ambiguities and imprecisions of the existing classification, which make it less precise, less illuminating, and less analytically powerful than it might be, do not invalidate it. No scheme can be completely explicit, definitive, or final; such uncertainties can be diminished by successive reformulation, but not eliminated.

I have so far introduced two dimensions of variation for statements in and about political processes. There are, however, a number of other aspects of such statements relevant to a full and systematic analysis of political processes. To indicate the nature of some of them, I need only point out that not every statement about political phenomena refers exhaustively and unambiguously to a single observable event taking place, or state obtaining, in the context under consideration. A full analysis would therefore have to introduce several additional dimensions of classification, further describing the nature of referents and references in statements, even before addressing the question of what concrete configurations of political phenomena might be found to obtain in any observable circumstances.

I do not consider any of these dimensions in this work, for several reasons. In the first place, the two major dimensions I have already proposed are enough to introduce, in a work of this sort, in support of a theoretical approach whose usefulness and

potential are not yet tested or established. In the second, those two dimensions have received most of my attention in the development of my theoretical thinking to this point. In the third, and for that reason, I did not have a fully explicit account of those other dimensions at the time when I last classified my data, and therefore did not apply them, in the course of that classification, in a fully systematic way.

Instead of introducing further theoretical considerations here, therefore, I have restricted the analysis that follows to those dimensions for which I can give the most fully articulated accounts. I have eliminated variation in those other aspects of the data from the analysis that follows, by restricting that analysis to a subset of that data. I have eliminated from consideration, in the sections that follow, statements referring to uninstantiated generalizations about political phenomena, affirming normative propositions, involving explicit metacommunication of the kind discussed in section 5f, or referring to future, hypothetical, or conjecturally asserted phenomena. Clearly some of these losses are significant; they include direct expressions of enduring attitudes, including normative attitudes, orders and instructions, explicit persuasion, hopes, and predictions. What remains are statements about specific conditions actually obtaining in, or related to, the political processes I was investigating. They include references, in each of the behavioral modes, to each of the elements of political phenomena, viewed as communication phenomena.

For purposes of this analysis, in other words, the data are broken down into nine major categories. In the discussion that follows, I will use some simple abbreviated notation. The basis of this notation is that I will represent a reference to actors by A, to processes by P, and to content by C; correspondingly, I will represent a descriptive reference by D, an evaluative by V (for value), and a volitional by W (for will). According to these conventions, my nine major categories of data may be represented respectively by AD, AV, AW, PD, PV, PW, CD, CV, and CW.

It may be useful in clarifying the meaning of these categories to make some remark about the statements included in each. Descriptions of transmissions, clearly, will be represented by PD, and of processings, other states, and identifications of actors by AD. Similarly, statements classified AV will express their makers' opinions or evaluations of, or feelings about, other actors, and those classified PV will express such evaluations of political events. The class PW will express action intended by the maker of the statement.

The class AW ought to express intentions of actors, not to take a given action, but with respect to other actors; it does express such intentions, but they occur relatively infrequently, and first reflection may not make clear what such intentions are. A simple example is a chairman's appointment of a committee member to a subcommittee; that is, to a role, which is a kind of identity defined by normatively specified patterns of relation.

Finally, the three categories relating to content contain statements expressing the relation of political actors to the policy questions with which they must deal. The class CD will express their information about what "the problem" or situation is; the class CV, their policy values, or preferences for what should be done; and the class CW, their intentions to bring about such action. In classifying my data, in found it appropriate to designate such things as the content of a bill, the act of introducing it, and the act of voting for (or against) it, by CW.

6. Fenno's conceptual framework.

While I hope that my method and findings will be applicable well beyond the context from which I developed them, such application will no doubt involve a great deal of reformulation and generalization of my theoretical terms. I have therefore thought it best to begin the testing of my theory with respect to closely comparable contexts. One of the most advanced recent empirical studies of committees of the United States Congress is Richard Fenno's Congressmen in Committees.[2] Its focus is primarily analytical, its presentation and framework is clear and systematic, and it makes

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[2] Richard F. Fenno, Jr., Congressmen in Committees (Boston: Little Brown, 1973).

use chiefly of interview data. It concentrates on six committees of the House of Representatives, and includes one chapter comparing the six with their counterparts in the Senate.

Fenno's theoretical focus is not quite comparable with mine. He is chiefly interested in the role played in the legislative and policy-making process by the committees he studies, and with the impact those committees have on those processes. He accordingly concentrates, not on specific sequences of political events, but on questions of the influence exercised, or power possessed, by the committees over decision making in the area of their jurisdiction generally.

Fenno considers his data under five main headings, corresponding to his chapters, besides the chapter in which he applies the same dimensions of analysis to the Senate committees. He first considers the goals of committee members; that is, the purposes they hoped to advance by becoming, and in being, members of the committees. Next he discusses the environmental constraints on the committee; that is, what other actors have significant influence over the decisions taken in the respective policy areas or make particular demands on the committee. He then introduces the concept of "strategic premises" or "decision rules." These are the operating principles by which committee members guide themselves in formulating their decisions and actions. According to Fenno, members of a given committee tend to share a common set of decision rules, and such rules represent the way in which the members

standardize their perceptions of the decision context.

Fourth, Fenno discusses the decision processes of the committee themselves; that is, the kinds of interactions by which the committee arrives at its decisions. Finally, he discusses the actual decisions of the committee, the forms they take and their relation to the range of possible decisions. He contends that problems arise in finding suitable ways of comparing decisions between one policy area and another, because policy in different areas will be described by different variables.

At least in general, these categories seem easy to describe in terms such as I have introduced. Member goals are clearly value premises, and would be embodied in the evaluative predispositions of the committee members. Similarly, strategic premises would be embodied in the predispositions to action of the committee members. That is, a strategic premise can be viewed as an attitude prescribing to the committee member the principles by which he or she will organize his or her action.

Evnironmental constraints would be described by statements about other actors in the political environment, their resources and alliances, and their own goals and habits of action. An environment, described in this way, would affect the political sitiation on which any group acted, and the consequences of its actions. However, Fenno seems to intend, by the term "constraint," that the environment affects not only the situation in which the committee acts, and what the consequences of that action turn out

to be, but what action the committee chooses in the first place. The environment constrains the committee in the sense that the committee adjusts its actions, or decisions, to that environment.

Now, in communication theoretic terms, such adjustment of action to environment is only possible if the environment is received as a signal and thus affects the response selected. I propose, therefore, that environmental constraints, in Fenno's sense, must appear as predispositions of the actors describing the relevant features of the environment, by which they adjust their actions. This interpretation of Fenno's term is supported by his use chiefly of interview data from committee members to discover the environmental constraints operative on each committee.

It then appears that member goals would be found among the predispositions, in the evaluative mode (V), of members; environmental constraints, among their descriptive predispositions (D); and strategic premises, among their intentions, or predispositions to action (H). If any of these predispositions were, in turn, to be described in someone else's descriptive statement, that statement would be of the form AD.

As for Fenno's other categories, it will hardly be controversial to propose that a committee's decision-making processes exemplify political processes, and would be described by statements about events (PD). Similarly, the decisions of the committee, as characterized by their policy content, would be described by state-

ments about the substance of those decisions (CD).[3] If the first three of Fenno's analytic categories are described by statements about actors (AD), as I argued above, then Fenno's scheme has a very neat correspondence to the categories I propose, which, to the extent that one is confident of the systematic character of my theory's formulations, tends to validate Fenno's analytical classification as likely to be appropriate and in some sense complete. Conversely, Fenno's scheme may be taken to substantiate the plausibility of my own.

d. Influence.

Not all a committee member's evaluative predispositions, of course, will refer to his or her political goals as a member of a committee. Similarly, not all descriptive predispositions will reflect environmental constraints, and not all volitional predispositions will represent strategic premises. The interesting question, for Fenno and for empirical research, is which predispositions, in the corresponding categories, bear the appropriate relation to political processes.

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[3]These statements, applying to legislative proposals which had not secured final adoption, would describe messages that had not yet been sent, whose transmission was only a future potential. Strictly speaking, therefore, they would not appear in the data subset defined in section b.

In the case of committee members' goals, the question is what values they seek to promote by their membership on the committee. Fenno asks his respondents such questions as why they sought membership on the committee. The answers he gets, and the data on which he bases his conclusions, are therefore made up largely of expressions of general attitudes; I am excluding explicit expression of such attitudes from systematic consideration here. However, there should appear, among evaluative statements with specific referents, some in which values are invoked as motivations for one or another committee action, or as reasons for approving of it. These should also provide evidence for the operative goals of committee members.

In fact, I consider such statements more direct evidence of what Fenno wishes to examine than the statements to which his own analysis refers. In asking a political actor directly what his or her goals are, the analyst is asking the actor to act as on observer of him or herself. Such observation need not be more perceptive than that of the analyst; besides, such an observer may be biassed in his or her own reflexive perception, and may even have reason to misreport his or her own motivations, if, for example, he or she thinks that the researcher or the public would disapprove of them. On the other hand, the kind of evidence I propose, while in this sense more direct, is also more difficult to identify and gather; the method of classification I propose, however, should allow its systematic analysis.

In any case, if an analyst looks at all data classed AD, and selects therefrom those which refer to actors' values, the statements so selected will include expressions both of preferences in specific situations and of general attitudinal predispositions, so that I can make some reference to the latter even though I am not able, in the current state of the data, to select systematically for all such statements.

As I indicated above, the interesting empirical question, in any concrete case, such as that of a particular committee, is specifically what kinds of goals members of that committee have. Fenno identifies three different kinds of goals. Members of some committees tend to be primarily interested in promoting certain substantive policy values; of other committees, in improving their own ability to be re-elected or elected to higher office; and of still others, in securing influence for their committee and themselves with their colleagues in the House chamber.

In accordance with my thinking, I would classify policy goals as substantive evaluations (CV). Similarly, the desire for re-relection is a member's evaluation of an actor (namely, him or herself) defined by role, that is, by position in a communication process. Such evaluations ought therefore to be classified AV. If, therefore, I find CV or AV statements predominating in statements by members of a committee explaining or evaluating the committee's work, I would tend to conclude that those members maintained, respectively, policy and personal goals.

The third kind of goal presented by Fenno offers somewhat more difficulty, though it seems plausible that the goal of chamber influence might turn out to be identifiable as the valuing of a certain kind of process, PV. To sustain this interpretation, however, it is necessary to give some kind of empirical account of the idea of influence, and see whether the thing referred to can properly be described in terms of processes. Now, though the term "influence" is frequent in political science, its significance has been notoriously difficult to pin down. I am not going to offer any account here as definitive. The development of an adequate account of influence would require more than the adaptation of a few of my conjectures to a few of Fenno's. Any such ad hoc conjectures would require to be elaborated, refined, generalized and tested by careful analysis in various environments before they could be considered to amount to a theoretically consistent operational account.

Nevertheless, because this concept is important not only to Fenno's formulations, but also to political science generally, I will offer some analysis of it. My analysis is to be understood to differ from the ad hoc operationalizations which I have criticized in that it does not present itself as a definition or as an adequate account, but as an empirical conjecture that is part of a process of theoretical development, a first approximation that is both subject to and capable of further refinement.

Fenno provides some idea of what he means by "influence" in the context he is considering at several points. The following

statement is representative:

> An influential committee . . . is one which can
> make an independent policy judgment and win sup-
> port for that judgment in the House (p. 48).

To define influence operationally, in communication terms, there-
fore, it is necessary to specify what constitutes an "independent
judgment" and what it means for one to win House support.

A judgment on a matter of policy, I take it, would be
expressed in a statement of intention about the content of a polit-
ical process (CW). Such a judgment would be independent if it was
not adopted on the grounds that a similar judgment had been made by,
or at least was held by, other actors in the process. Such cases
may be expressed by introducing differing subscripts to indicate
distinct, differing or at least independent, predispositions about
the same referent. Then I can say that if other actors make various
policy judgments CW_j, and if the committee makes a policy judgment
CW_k, and if the judgment CW_k is not a response selected largely by
committee members' knowledge AD_j about those other judgments, then
the committee's judgment is independent of those other judgments.
Note that it is not necessary that the committee members be unaware
of the other judgments CW_j, but only that their recognition of those
judgments, expressed in their states AD_j, not be crucial as a recep-
tion conditioning their own judgments CW_k in such a way that k tends
to approximate j.

Evidence about the relation between the two sorts of
committee member states of mind, AD_j and CW_k, can be derived from

statements by the committee members about their decision making processes in that instance. Such evidence can be corroborated by statements by committee members about their evaluation of those others (AV), or perhaps of the acts by which those others urged their viewpoint (PV about transmissions expressing CW).

Now consider when such a judgment would be said to "win support" in the House. Most simply, if the acts by which House members expressed their intentions about the policy issue in question, including votes, all of which may be classified CW, corresponded to the judgment CW_k of the committee, the required conditions would be fulfilled. However, for such acts by House members to represent the result of a process of influence, it is surely necessary also that among the signals conditioning their selection of such acts is a recognition of what the policy position of the committee is. Such a recognition would be embodied in House members' descriptive states of mind about actors, AD, and the connection between that recognition and the members' policy judgment could be expressed in propositions evaluating those actors, AV. This situation is the opposite of the preceding one; here, House members' recognition AD_k of committee members' views CW_k is valued by the House members (AV_k) and leads them to respond with behavior embodying the same judgment CW_k.

These explications of Fenno's assertions are already fairly complex, but less so than some that will follow; therefore, to make subsequent formulations easier to comprehend, I will at

this point introduce some further notation. Let a given state (or predisposition) of a given actor be represented by the designation of the actor followed by the class of the state; for example, let House members' evaluations of actors be represented by

House members AV.

Second, let the referent of such states be represented, where appropriate, by a second line of notation describing that referent. Let each line of notation be numbered, and let each element mentioned on a given line, whether terminal, channel, or pattern, be identified by the sequence in which it occurs on that line. Then, let any element be designated by the number of the line on which it appears, a decimal point, and its sequential number on that line. If a given state refers to a particular element on another line, that reference may then be indicated by placing the number of the element referred to in parentheses after the designation of the referring state or signal. For example, House members' evaluation of a policy judgment by committee members will be given as

1. House members AV(2.2)
2. committee members CW.

If the reference is to the entire contents of a line, only the line number will be given.

Third, if one state is treated as a received signal contributing to the selection of a further state, let the relation between the two be symbolized by placing colons both after the symbol designating the selecting, and before that designating the selected,

states. A colon after a state may then be read as an arrow tail, and one before a state, as an arrowhead. Thus, a policy judgment by House members based on their understanding of that of committee members will be written

1. House members AD(2.2): :CWk
2. committee members CWk.

By reason of typographic limitations, I will from here on cease to depress subscripts.

Fourth, to represent an event, let the transmitter be designated, followed by any relevant state designations, followed by a comma, followed by a designation of the channel, followed by any relevant designations of the signal transmitted, followed by another comma, followed by a designation of the receiver and of any relevant state designations. If the channel of transmission, or either terminal, is unidentifiable or ambiguous, let "***" be written in its place. Thus the transmission of information, in unknown or indifferent form, from a committee member to a House member, about an action of the committee, might be written

committee member, *** PD, House member.

Finally, two details will be convenient to add. If the class of a predisposition is not identifiable, let the unidentifiable elements be represented by such lower-case letters as x, y, and z. In addition, I will for brevity write "H.mem." for House members and "C.mem." for committee members.

An independent policy judgment by committee members may

then be represented by

INDEPENDENT POLICY JUDGMENT

1. C.mem.   AD(2.2):   AV(2.1):   PV(2):   :CWk
2. others   CWj,   ***   CWj,   ***

Similarly, the winning of House support by a policy judgment of

the committee may be represented by

HOUSE SUPPORT FOR POLICY JUDGMENT

1. H.mem.   AD(2.2):   AV(2.1):   :CWk,   ***   CWk,   ***
2. C.mem.   CWk.

Here the ambiguous transmission in line 1 may include, but is not

limited to, votes cast on the House floor.

Thus, Fenno's account of when influence exists may be

formulated as

INFLUENCE

1. C.mem.   AD(2.2):   AV(2.1):   PV(2):   :CWk
2. others   CWj,   ***   CWj,   ***
3. H.mem.   AD(1.5):   AV(1.1):   :CWk,   ***   CWk,   ***.

It is the event defined in line 3 which defines the existence of

influence, in itself; the other lines of the formulation above

simply give the conditions by which the event would be identifiable

as that particular event. Therefore, for committee members to have

influence as a goal would be for them to value an event, and would

be represented by PV. The evidence for this goal in Fenno's data,

or in mine, would then be statements expressing evaluative judg-

ments about processes.

Fenno does not drop his discussion of influence at this

point, but goes on to investigate the process by which an indepen-

dent policy judgment can win support. He argues that a bill representing a committee's independent judgment, as distinguished from that of House members themselves, can pass the House only if the House members have confidence in the judgment of the committee members. Therefore, members of committees that seek chamber influence pursue what Fenno calls "floor success," that is, having bills which their committee has reported pass the House essentially intact (p. 55). He goes on to define "floor success" in terms of two elements:

> By floor success, we mean to include both House members' reaction to the content of a committee's decisions and House members' reactions to the committee as a decision-making collectivity. (4)

The committee's reputation is therefore important, because

> it is by reputation that a committee gains the benefit of the doubt in close legislative situations. And it is by reputation that a committee stores up working capital for future legislative fights. (p. 198).

This last sentence seems somewhat imprecisely stated to me; I think it might better be said that a committee's reputation constitutes a store of "working capital" for legislative fights. In fact, the term "floor success" might have been more coherently applied to what Fenno calls "influence," and vice versa. However, for present purposes I will work with Fenno's terminology.

Both of these elements of "floor success," reputation

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[4] Fenno, p. 80; emphasis in original. Cf. p. 197.

and acceptance of committee decisions, are included as elements of the formulation I gave above of the process of influence. Reaction to the content of a committee's decision corresponds to members' evaluation of committee members' substantive intentions, although when formulated in this way, those intentions might better be referred to as they are embodied in the Committee's report to the chamber. In that case the formulation I gave could be altered to include

FLOOR SUCCESS A

1. C.mem.   CWk
2. Committee,   report CWk,   House
3. H.mem.   PD(2.3):   :AD(1.2)
4. H.mem.   PD(2.3):   AD(1.2):   AV(2.1, 1.1):   :CWk,
                        *** CWk, ***.

This formulation begins to make explicit the nature of the interactions by which influence might be exercised.

Similarly, House members reaction to the committee, if the committee is considered as an actor or a group of actors, is designated in the above formulation by "AV(2.1, 1.1)." However, here too another interpretation is possible, which also illuminates the nature of the sequences of events through which influence might take place. Fenno's phrase, "the committee as a decision-making collectivity" might be taken as a reference not to the committee as a group of actors, but to the processes taking place within that committee. In that case the formulation of the process of influence that I am developing would have to be revised again to include reference to House members' evaluation of those processes, such as:

FLOOR SUCCESS B   (#1)

1. H.mem. PV(2): :CWk
2. C.mem., committee xx, C.mem.

Here I use "committee" at 2.2 to designate, broadly, the channel in which communications between committee members about committee business flow. I do not specify the kinds of signals that are transmitted between committee members because no information on their class is adduced.

Thus the full specification of what is desired by members who seek influence in the chamber through their committee, as I have so far explicated it, can be represented by:

INFLUENCE (EXPANDED FORMULATION)   (#2)

1. others CWj, *** CWj, ***
2. C.mem. AD(1.2): AV(1.1): PV(2): :CWk,
                committee xx, C.mem.
3. Committee, report CWk, House
4. H.mem. PD(3.3): :AD(2.4)
5. H.mem. PD(3.3): AD(2.4): PV(2): AV(3.1, 2.1):
        :CWk, *** CWk, ***.

Here House members' policy intentions, or acceptance of committee policy judgments, are shown to depend on their understanding of what the committee is recommending, what the committee members' policy-judgments are (which line 4 asserts to be connected with the first), what their own evaluation of processes in the committee (represented in line 2) is, and what their own evaluation of the committee and its members is.

Even this representation is not complete, since it omits, for instance, the relation between the interactions of committee members (line 2) and the committee's formal report to

the House (line 3). That relation involves normative elements,
since it involves the relation between individual interactions
and patterns of interaction that define an institution; therefore,
I am unable to consider it explicitly here without introducing
an account of such relations, data about the nature of that rela-
tion in the cases being considered, and a good deal of new nota-
tion. I will, instead, ask the reader to continue regarding that
relation in the usual, relatively unarticulated, way for purposes
of this discussion, which is in any case not intended as rigorously
systematic.

e. Partisanship.

The formulation given at the end of the previous sec-
tion asserts, in lines 4 and 5, that the way in which members of
the House regard processes within the committee, represented in
line 2, affects their response to the content of the committee's
substantive proposals. These processes constitute, or at least
include, those by which the committee reaches its policy decisions.
Fenno discusses these in his chapter on decision-making processes,
and in particular describes what kinds of decision-making processes
are characteristic of those committeess whose members seek, and
that tend to possess. influence in the chamber in the sense that
their independent policy judgments are often accepted. Fenno con-

siders a number of aspects of those processes, including participation, specialization, leadership, and partisanship. I will here address myself systematically only to the latter of these.

Fenno gives no explicit definition of partisanship, and indeed appears to shift his ground on the term's significance from time to time. At several points, he speaks of it in connection with differences in ideology, or in policy values, between the committee contingents of the two parties:

> . . . Education and Labor /Committee/ members
> eschew compromise in pursuit of policy partisan-
> ship or policy individualism . . . (p. 234)

> "Of all the committee's I've ever served on,
> Appropriations is the least partisan. That's
> because we're not a policy committee." (5)

If such differences could be taken to define the partisanship of a committee, it would be easy enough to describe such partisanship by comparing the general policy values (CV) espoused by Democratic with those by Republican members of a committee. However, Fenno makes clear that differences in ideology need not lead to committee partisanship:

> In terms of the member predisposition displayed
> in Table 5.3 /Mean Conservative Coalition Scores/,
> Interior looks to be the most partisan of the six
> Senate Committees. But, like its corresponding
> House group, neither its member goals nor its
> policy environment nor its strategic premises
> are partisan. (6).

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[5] Fenno, p. 184, quoting a member of the Senate Appropriations Committee. See also pp. 50, 56, 58, 169, and 240-42.

[6] Ibid., p. 177. See also pp. 160-61.

Therefore partisanship, as Fenno is using the term, cannot refer simply to the degree of ideological difference between the two parties.

At other points, Fenno distinguishes between partisanship in decision-making processes and partisanship in decisions themselves; the latter seems roughly equivalent to party-line voting. Contrasting the Education and Labor Committee with Ways and Means, for example, he says,

> Though the two committees share a high degree of partisanship at the point of _decision_, the importance of partisanship during the _deliberative_ stage of committee work differs radically from one committee to the other. Ways and Means members limit the play of partisanship to the final stages of decision-making and do most of their work in a nonpartisan atmosphere. Education and Labor proceeds, at all stages, in an atmosphere charged with partisanship. The two committees are, therefore, as different in their decision-making styles as they are similar in their voting splits. (7)

However, when Fenno speaks of partisanship without further qualification, it is clear that he intends a characteristic not simply of voting patterns but of decision-making processes. The latter cannot, therefore, in this context be defined by the former.

It appears, rather, that the core of the sense that Fenno gives the term refers to styles of interaction within the Committee. If members of one party tend to reject proposals by members of the other, and are unwilling to compromise to obtain

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[7] Fenno, p. 84. Emphasis in original.

broader support for a proposal, then Fenno calls the committee partisan. On the Education and Labor Committee, for example, which he characterizes as highly partisan,

> . . . party majorities will push their advantage
> to the utmost and at all stages. In the 89th
> Congress, Republicans were allowed only ritual
> involvement in subcommittees and less than that
> in full committee. (p. 86)

This kind of interaction may be expressed in communication terms by describing committee members' responses to received transmissions constituting proposals by other committee members, and the predispositions involved in selecting those responses. For present purposes, such proposals may be regarded as concerning policy (CW). A more exhaustive account would contemplate the possibility of procedural proposals (PW) or proposals about actors (AW) as well; further, since these are proposals, the mode which they express (W) will be a proposed mode, and the way in which they are presented might be expected explicitly to metacommunicate the mode in which they are proposed, as well as to express the mode being proposed. In the present discussion, however, I will not take up the question of the mode of explicit metacommunications such as these.

In connection with the concept of partisanship, one is interested in the predispositions toward actors (AV) which affect the receiver's response to such proposals. It is worth restating, though I am not treating these dimensions systematically, that such predispositions will be attitudes enduring beyond any specific

situation, corresponding therefore to general codes, or structure, rather than to specific states. Further, the aspect of actors being evaluated in this case is party affiliation, and party is defined, in any given context, by normative concepts of actors in that context; therefore, a complete analysis would have to make reference at this point to normative predispositions.

On the basis of the above considerations, I propose that a committee member be said to show partisanship, in Fenno's sense, if his or her response to a proposal by another committee member is affected by (the former's recognition of) the latter's party — positively, if the two are of the same party, negatively if not. To express this concept of partisanship in my notation, let "X" and "Y" designate the membership of a given committee member in a given party. "C.mem.X," for example, must be read as "committee members of a given party." The concept of partisanship just stated may then be formulated as

1. C.mem.X, committee CWj,
C.mem.Y AV(1.1): :PV(1.3): :CWk

with the stipulation that where X $\neq$ Y, j $\neq$ k, and where X = Y, j = k.

This formulation makes clear that partisanship involves not only opposition to proposals by members of the other party, but opposition at least in part because the proposers are members of the other party. To make this point more explicit, the formulation may be expanded by indicating that the source of the member's evaluation of other actors includes the member's own identi-

fication of him or herself as a member of the other party. This

change amends the latter third of the representation just given to:

...C.mem.X AD(1.4): :AV(1.1): :PV(1.3): :CWk.

Further, according to Fenno, partisan responses would

seem to involve not only states, but overt acts in opposition to

proposals from members of the other party. Such behavior can proba-

bly be regarded as consisting primarily of expressions of opposi-

tion to the proposals (CVk), counterproposals (CWm), and procedural

moves designed to thwart the proposal's adoption (PWk). Of course,

the actual nature of such behavior could only be determined from an

examination of empirical data, direct or indirect, about processes

actually taking place in committee, which Fenno does not offer.

This aspect of my explication must therefore be taken as conjectur-

al, and as subject to test through further research and inductive

generalization. However, if the conjecture is accurate, partisan

acts could be represented by some such formulation as:

PARTISAN RESPONSE   (#3)

1. C.mem.X, committee CWj, C.mem.
2. C.mem.Y AD(2.1): :AV(1.1): :PV(1.3): :CWk,
                committee CVk CWm PWk(1.3), C.mem.

In this formulation I have relocated the last third of the initial

formulation, which refers to the responses of the partisan Y, on

a second line, so as to emphasize the connection between the vari-

ous states and the behavior of that actor.

The above formulation arose from consideration of inter-

actions between members of different parties; that is, for situa-

tions in which X ≠ Y. Correspondingly, partisan response to members of one's own party would probably consist (though Fenno does not explicitly elaborate) in supporting a party colleague's proposals in part because of the shared party affiliation. This response can be expressed by the same formulation as given above, with the stipulations that the two designated actors be of the same party (Y = X) and that the position of the receiver be similar to that of the transmitter of the proposal (j = k); further, counterproposals CHm would probably not occur in such a case. Similarly, nonpartisanship would be represented by the same formulation with the stipulation that, although the two designated actors be not of the same party (Y ≠ X), the position of the receiver nevertheless be similar to that of the transmitter (j = k), or at least that the two be uncorrelated, when controlled for intervening variables other than the ones represented in the formulation.

The formulation I give in #3 may be taken as minimally adequate, although it omits much of the possible range of partisan behavior. In its present formulation it is limited, as I mentioned above, to responses to policy proposals of the opposition. It does include the idea that partisans will respond to opposition policy proposals with procedural moves designed to block their adoption ("PWk(2.3)" at 2.9). However, it does not quite express the possibility that partisans may use procedural control to block such proposals from even being presented to the committee, which would require something like the following expression to be integrated into

the previous:

PROCEDURAL PARTISANSHIP

1. C.mem.X CVj CWj, ...
2. C.mem.X AV(1.1): AD(1.2, 1.3): :PWk(1.2, 1.3),
           committee PWk(2.3), C.mem.

It also does not include the idea that partisan advantage may be built into the procedural rules and practices of the committee itself; such a formulation, of course, would require reference to normative predispositions.

Similarly, the formulation I give does refer to the sources of partisan deliberative practices in partisan attitudes, but does not consider the possible sources of those attitudes. One hypothesis would be that such attitudes come from perceived policy or ideological differences; another, that personal likes and dislikes may bring about or at least exacerbate tendencies to partisan behavior; another, that past partisan behavior tends to lead each side to respond in kind. Such hypotheses would have to be considered in the course of developing a complete account of the dynamics through which partisanship or nonpartisanship in a committee's deliberations appears and is sustained.

f. Partisanship and Influence.

On the basis of the preceding discussion, I can present formulations, in the terms I propose, of some of the hypotheses ad-

vanced by Fenno, or derivable from the discussion I have been giving
of his analytical concepts. One of the most interesting of Fenno's
assertions in this connection is that committees with nonpartisan
decision processes are more likely to possess a high degree of
influence in the chamber (pp. 84-86). In order to explicate this
assertion it will be useful to review some of the salient aspects
of Fenno's account of influence.

Fenno proposes, as I indicated in section d, that the
form in which the influence of committees in the House of Represent-
atives appears is that of floor success. Floor success, in turn,
has two aspects: acceptance by House members of the committee's
independent policy judgments and favorable evaluation of the com-
mittee's decision processes. Since Fenno's concept of partisan-
ship, as I have explicated it in section e, is a way of character-
izing those decision processes, it seems promising to begin expli-
cating the relation of partisanship to influence at this point.

Fenno's assertion, as stated above, would then be taken
to imply the proposition that House members' response to a commit-
tee and its members depended, in particular, on the partisanship of
its processes. That proposition could be expressed by inserting
the representation for partisanship, given at the end of the pre-
vious section as #3, as the second line of the representation for
the relevant aspect of floor success, given, as #1, in section d.
The latter formulation represented House members' evaluation of, and
response to, processes taking place within a committee; the combined

formulation would therefore express the proposition that House members are less likely to support decisions of a committee if they perceive the processes by which the committee reached that decision to have been characterized by partisanship.

That proposition could accordingly be expressed, in my notation, in the following form:

PARTISANSHIP AND FLOOR SUCCESS   (#4)

1. H.mem. PV(3):   :CWn
2. C.mem.X, committee CWj, C.mem.
3. C.mem.Y AD(3.1): :AV(2.1): :PV(2.3): :CWk,
        committee CVk CWm PWk(2.3), C.mem.
4. Committee, report CWp, House.

The fourth line is necessary in order to state the stipulation defining the relations that the hypothesis asserts to obtain among these elements. That stipulation is that, when the members designated are of different parties, their positions will tend to be dissimilar, and that the proposal reported by the committee will tend to be similar to the proposals of one party's members and not of the other's; and that, where all of these conditions are met, the position of House members will, other things being equal, tend not to be that of the committee. Symbolically, these conditions are that

where $X \neq Y$,
    $j \neq k$ and $p = j$,
and where these three conditions obtain,
    $n \neq p$.

Corresponding sets of stipulations will define the cases of House response to partisanship among party colleagues, and to nonpartisanship.

The "other things" that are being set aside at this point include not only the autonomous policy preferences CV of the House members, but their own party affiliations, both of which may in reality be expected to influence their evaluation of partisan actions by a given party contingent on the committee, and of the proposals resulting from those actions. Suitable complexities could be introduced into the above formulation to express such effects, but I am not here attempting to build up a complete theoretical model of all the processes by which committees achieve floor success.

The formulation just given represents an elaboration and specification of Fenno's assertion that a committee's decision processes affect its floor success through House members' evaluations of those processes. It is part of an explanation of just what kinds of processes are evaluated in just what way by House members. Now, floor success, in turn, was the concept invoked by Fenno to account for the process by which a committee exercised influence. Fenno's account of committee influence in terms of floor success was represented by the formulation given at the end of section d as #2. Therefore, Fenno's assertion, cited at the beginning of this section, that a committee's nonpartisanship tends to foster its influence, can be explicated, in my terms, by inserting the formulation just given, describing the relation of nonpartisanship to floor success, into that of #2, describing the relation of floor success to influence.

In my notation, the combination looks like this:

PARTISANSHIP AND INFLUENCE

1. others CWg, *** CWg, ***
2. C.mem.Y, committee CWj, C.mem.
3. C.mem.X AD(3.1): :AV(2.1): :PV(2.3):
   AD(1.2): AV(1.1): PV(1): :CWk,
   committee CVk CWm PWk(2.3),
   C.mem.
4. Committee, report CWp, House
5. H.mem. PD(4.3): :AD(3.8)
6. H.mem. PD(4.3): AD(3.8): PV(3):
   AV(4.1, 3.1, 2.1): :CWn,
   *** CWn, ***.

With the same stipulations as adduced for #4, this formulation represents a hypothesis that the more nonpartisan a committee's decision processes are, the more influential that committee is likely to be, and conversely.

The first salient feature of this formulation is that lines 2 and 3 of #4, which described party members' proposals and partisan responses in committee, have been inserted in elaboration of line 2 of #2, representing the previously unspecified committee processes which House members evaluated in ways that had political consequences. Therefore, second, House members' responses to those processes, represented by the expression PV(3) at 6.4, now refers to that new line 3. Notice also that committee members' policy intentions CWk, at 3.8, are represented as being affected by each of the previous four kinds of state in that line, representing respectively the member's evaluation of proposals by members of the other party, his or her recognition of the policy views of the other actors in that policy area, his or her evaluation of those

other actors, and his or her evaluation of the ways in which those actors expressed or presented those views.

This formulation exemplifies what I mean when I say that the concepts invoked in ordinary descriptions of political processes are abstractions of a high order. To break such concepts down into the observable events to which they refer requires careful analysis and generates explications of respectable complexity. I regard the discussion of the last two sections as the minimum necessary to explicate this hypothesis in sufficiently operational terms to allow it to be tested with data about concrete political events.

Omitted from the current formulation are great ranges of related considerations that would be necessary to any complete analysis of the political processes in question. These include, in the first instance, the questions of the sources of partisan attitudes to which I alluded at the end of section e. They also include reference to the processes by which partisan responses in the decision making process give rise to partisan decisions; that is, decisions primarily embodying the proposals of members of one party rather than a compromise between those of members of both. The one would certainly, on intuitive grounds, be expected to lead to the other, but this connection is an empirical relation subject to observational confirmation. Such a relation could only be accounted for by setting forth a communication process through which it would be affected. I have not offered any such account, and neither does

Fenno; for purposes of this discussion, I will leave this phase of the process unarticulated.

A third range of concerns omitted from the current formulation is that of the role of leadership within a committee in instigating, allowing, discouraging, or mitigating partisan tendencies. Fenno places emphasis, particularly in the case of the Ways and Means Committee, on the role of the Chairman in securing committee adoption of proposals that can command consensus within the committee (pp. 114-118). Such consensus, in general, is associated with compromise, and therefore with nonpartisanship; Fenno presents a consensual style also as one of the aspects of committee decision processes on which House members look favorably. He gives, however, very little specific information on the activity through which Chairmen promote consensus in such cases. Neither is he particularly interested in addressing chains of concrete political interactions nor do his informants answer his questions in terms of such interactions.

That Fenno presents such activity primarily as a function of formal leaders seems to indicate that the role of leader itself may in some way facilitate its holder's carrying out such consensus building activity. I would be inclined to suppose committee members' normative attitudes defining prerogatives of, and appropriate responses to, leaders, to be among the important resources of formal leaders in such cases. From Fenno's discussion, however, it is not possible to say just what such attitudes might prescribe or

how their existence might be utilized by a Chairman or other leader. In addition, their specification would require reference to normative modal judgments, which I prefer not to elaborate at this time. Finally, preliminary consideration of the question of leadership leads me to think it among the most complex of political phenomena to describe, and among the most subtle of political concepts to elaborate. In particular, the relations between normatively ascribed leadership and the observable exercise of individual influence in a political group strikes me as extremely difficult to state properly. For all of these reasons, my explication of the relation between partisanship and influence must also omit a systematic account of the place occupied in that relation by the consensus-building activities of the chairman.

g. Some other hypotheses.

I will, nevertheless, subsequently be able to offer a preliminary formulation of one of Fenno's formulations about leadership. In order to develop that proposition, it will be appropriate to begin by returning to some of the other dimensions of Fenno's basic analysis, namely, member goals, environmental constraints, and strategic premises. Fenno argues that the third can be expected to constitute a function of the first two; that is, that the premises by which committee members orient their interactions are likely

to represent prescriptions about how best to achieve their goals under the constraints of their environment (p. 46).

Since I have already interpreted each element of this proposition in terms of the concepts I am using, it may readily be stated in my notation:

C.mem.   xV: AD: :PH.

It must in this case again be remembered that, as Fenno states this hypothesis, each of these terms represents not a state of mind in a particular concrete situation, but a general orienting principle or attitude. I would argue, however, that if the connections proposed by Fenno obtain, they ought also to show up in rationales adduced, and sequences of events occurring, in concrete, individual political situations.

The chief interest of this hypothesis lies in the specific connections among its elements obtaining in particular environments. Fenno first considers the relation between member goals and environmental constraints. He holds them to be independent in one sense, but not in another.

Which other actors committee members regard as important constraints in their situation will depend on what goals they are trying to achieve in that situation. For example, members chiefly interested in policy goals are likely to treat interest groups sharing those goals as among the most important determinants of their political environment; those interested in House influence will rather be concerned primarily for the attitudes of their col-

leagues in the chamber (pp. 15-16, 26, 35). On the other hand, other characteristics of the groups thus identified are, in general, independent of their relation to committee members! goals. To continue the example just given, the groups in question may be well-disposed toward the committee or not, well organized to support its proposals or not, initiators of much independent action or not.(pp. 43-45).

If "importance" of the kind just described can be considered essentially evaluative in nature, this relation can be included in the formulation of the above hypothesis by saying that what committee members goals are affects what groups in the environment they consider important, and that those goals, together with the characteristics of those groups, are the sources of the members' strategic premises. That relation can be expressed by revising the representation given above to:

1. C.mem.   xV: :AV(3)   AD(3)
2. C.mem.   xV: AD(3):   :PW
3. others   xx.

In particular, according to Fenno's hypothesis, the important environmental constraints on committee members seeking influence in the House will be attitudes of members of the House. Therefore, to express this case, line 3 of the expression above may be expanded by replacing it with the expression previously developed for committee influence on the floor, which expresses the attitudes that will in such a case be important to committee members as a constraint on their actions. The reader will recognize

the last three lines of the following formulation as an abbreviated
expression of the relevant attitudes, as stated in section d as #2.

ENVIRONMENT, STRATEGIC PREMISES,
AND INFLUENCE AS A GOAL

1. C.mem. PV(3): :AV(3.1-3.4) AD(3.1-3.4)
2. C.mem. PV(3): AD(3.1-3.4): :PW
3. H.mem. PV(4): AV(1.1): :CWk, *** CWk, ***
4. C.mem., committee xx, C.mem.
5. Committee, report CWk, House.

This formulation leaves open, through the indefinite
formulation of line 4, the question of what specific attitudes mem-
bers of the House have toward committee procedures. It also leaves
open the question of what specific strategic premises committee
members would adopt in response to such constraints, as can be seen
by the lack of a specified referent for the expression representing
those premises, PW at 2.4. The development of an account of the
relation between environmental constraints and strategic premises
in this case therefore next requires further specification of these
aspects.

I have not developed a complete account of the attitudes
that affect House members' evaluations of, and responses to, the
independent policy judgments of the committee. However, I have pro-
posed, on the basis of Fenno's arguments, that among the more im-
portant of these are attitudes about decision processes in the com-
mittee, and in particular those supporting a favorable evaluation
of the committee and its judgments if its processes are nonpartisan.
The limited explication of nonpartisanship which I developed in the
previous section may therefore be substituted into the above formu-

lation at line 4, in partial elaboration and specification of the case in question.

Fenno then proposes, consistently with his general hypothesis, that committee members having a goal of House influence, facing as an environmental constraint a tendency of House members to support decisions arrived at in a nonpartisan fashion, will adopt strategic premises calling for nonpartisanship, accomodation, and compromise in their decision processes. For this special case, in other words, Fenno's hypothesis states that concern for influence with House members leads committee members to intend to enact the kind of decision processes that House members will approve of.

In this case, therefore, the behavior called for by the strategic premises will be that valued by the constraining group. In other words, the evaluations of processes and actors by House members (PV at 3.1 above) and the intentions with regard to processes of committee members (PW at 2.4 above) will have the same referent. This case may therefore be symbolized by replacing line 4 of the previous formulation with the expression for partisanship, last seen in #4, suitably modified for nonpartisanship, and by making that new expression the referent of both the strategic premises of committee members (appearing in this version at 1.4) and the evaluative predispositions of House members about those processes (here appearing at 2.2), as follows:

NONPARTISAN STRATEGIC PREMISES
AND INFLUENCE AS A GOAL

1. C.mem. PV(2): AD(2.2, 2.3): PW(4)
2. H.mem. PV(4): AV(1.1): :CWp, *** CWp, ***
3. C.mem.X, committee CWj, C.mem
4. C.mem.Y AV(3.1): :PV(3.3): :CWk,
               committee CVk PWk(3.3), C.mem.
5. Committee, report CWp, House.

where, in particular for $X \neq Y$, j, k, and p are not antagonistic.

Note that this above formulation does not state that the committee members do in fact enact such processes. Line 4 is in one case the referent of evaluative, and in the other of prescriptive, premises. In other words, it expresses in one case processes valued by certain actors; in the other, processes intended by other actors. The connection of these states of mind with behavior, and in particular the connection of strategic premises with decision processes, would be expressed in another proposition. Fenno, in this connection, states, not counter-intuitively, that a committee's decision processes are likely to be correlated with its strategic premises (pp. 137-38). In particular, a committee with nonpartisanship for a strategic premise ought to manifest nonpartisanship in its deliberations. Otherwise expressed,

1. C.mem.X, committee CWj, C.mem.
2. C.mem.Y PW(2): :AV(1.1) :PV(1.3)
           AV(1.1): :PV(1.3): :CWk,
               committee CVk PWk(1.3), C.mem.

Here the strategic premise prescribing nonpartisan behavior, at 2.2, is introduced into the formulation as an attitude bringing about the nonpartisan action, both states and behavior, which is its own referent.

A brief digression at this point will suffice to deal with the one hypothesis from Fenno involving leadership with which, as I mentioned at the beginning of this section, I will here deal. Fenno recurs to this proposition several times, and with unusual emphasis. He holds that

> the most critical fact about any chairman is his
> /sic/ relationship to the strategic premises
> espoused by the bulk of his committee's members, (8)

and that, in particular, the power or influence of the chairman over the committee's decisions and decision processes will be related to the degree to which he or she acts in accordance with committee members' strategic premises.

As I mentioned in the previous section, Fenno gives no explicit account of the processes by which a chairman may exert influence in committee processes. Suppose, however, that the condition of the chairman being influential in the committee can be defined in a way parallel to that by which I defined committee influence in the House, in section d, on the basis of Fenno's discussion of the term. In particular, let any individual (or group) be said to have influence in a given context to the extent that actors in that context tend to accept or support proposals more often or more intensely when they come from that individual than they do similar proposals from others. This formulation implies that those others hold an attitude favorably evaluating the individual in ques-

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[8] Fenno, p. 115. Emphasis in original. See also pp. 118, 125, 288.

tion, which attitude contributes to selecting favorable evaluations of proposals transmitted by that individual.

On this account, Fenno's hypothesis concerns the source of evaluations of actors (AV) that are favorable in this sense. It states that if the actions of the chairman, descriptively recognized by committee members.(PD), are consonant with strategic premises of members (PW), the members will tend to develop the appropriate attitudes AV and to accept the proposals of the chairman CW. In condensed form:

    1. Chair PWg, committee CWm,
               C.mem. PWg: PD(1): :PV(1): AV(1.1): :CWm.

Here the process intentions PW at 1.2 and 1.6, for which no referents are specified, are the general strategic premises of chairman and members respectively.

The reason that I am able to formulate this hypothesis explicitly, in spite of the restriction, which I placed on my discussion in this chapter in section b above, that I would not address propositions with an explicit normative element, is that in this case I refer to such norms only by designating the transmitter, in the event in question, as "Chair." By this formulation I avoid explicit reference to any normative predispositions defining the role of the chair. Any further elaboration of the connections asserted by this hypothesis, however, or of the consequences of the relation it asserts for other patterns of action on the committee, would require such reference. Even the reference to evaluations

of actors, at 1.9, ought properly to be supplemented by a reference to the normative premises defining the formal role by which the actor being evaluated is identified. The relation between normative predispositions of this kind and descriptive predispositions referring to what those norms identify is too complex to express, and too far beyond the purposes of this chapter, to be worth explicating further here.

In conclusion, to return to the main thread of my discussion, one further reformulation of the hypotheses so far discussed in this section will cast them in a form for which a test is available on the basis of my data. Many of the hypotheses for which I have so far offered formulations are not suited to this purpose, because the interactions and attitudes to which they refer involve members of the House as a whole and their relations to the committee. As it happened, no major legislation from the House Judiciary Committee reached the floor during the time I was observing it; therefore, my data contain a paucity of statements referring to such interactions and attitudes.

However, at least two of the variables associated by the preceding discussion refer primarily to attitudes of, and interactions among, members of the committee. It follows from Fenno's arguments that, if members of a committee chiefly seek influence in the House, their decision processes will tend to be nonpartisan. The chief specific goal associated with the general purpose of chamber influence is floor success, and one main element of floor

success is acceptance of the committee's policy proposals. It follows that committee members who seek House influence should, in particular, be concerned with floor acceptance of their proposals, and to that end should seek nonpartisan decision processes. They should accordingly adopt nonpartisanship as a strategic premise.

On the other hand, Fenno argues that committees whose members are primarily concerned with enacting their policy preferences are likely, under certain conditions, to adopt partisan decision procedures and strategic premises. The conditions are that the issues with which the committee deals are the subject of continuing conflict between stable "policy coalitions" made up of interest groups, government agencies, and Congressional committee members themselves, and tending to be associated one with each major party. Under these conditions, committee members will pursue a strategy which Fenno calls "policy partisanship," attempting to secure the adoption of policy proposals favored by the coalition with which they are more sympathetic (pp. 56, 74-80).

It therefore follows from Fenno's hypotheses that committees whose members have acceptance of their proposals on the floor as a goal should be found to exhibit nonpartisan strategic premises, and those with goals defined in policy terms, partisan strategic premises. In my notation,

COMMITTEE MEMBER GOALS
AND PARTISAN STRATEGIC PREMISES   (#5)

1. C.mem. PV(3): CV: :PW(5)
2. Committee, report CWp, House
3. H.mem. PD(2): PV(2.3): :CWp, *** CWp, ***
4. C.mem.X, committee CWj, C.mem.
5. C.mem.Y AV(4.1): :PV(4.3): PW(5): :CWk,
             committee CVk CWm PWk(4.3), C.mem.

Here the first line expresses the relation between member goals and

strategic premises; the second and third lines express the condition

of floor acceptance of committee proposals, to which PV at 1.2 re-

fers; and the fifth line, together with the fourth, expresses the

condition of partisan or nonpartisan committee processes, to which

PW at 1.4 refers, and which should be empirically observable as

well. These will be partisan in the case that j and k are antagon-

istic, nonpartisan in the case that they are not. My data, as cur-

rently organized, should allow a degree of empirical testing of this

relation.

h. - Judiciary Committee Member Goals.

       Examination of four key elements of the hypothesis

stated at the end of the past section will provide as good a test

of its validity in the context of my data as my methods can cur-

rently provide. The first of these is the category of Committee

members' evaluation of House member acceptance of their proposals,

represented as PV at 1.2 in formulation #5 at the end of the pre-

vious section. The referent of these predispositions is the process specified in line 3 of that formulation, which accordingly represents not events actually taking place, but those hoped for.

The second category to be examined is that of statements about Committee members' values with respect to policy, represented as CV at 1.2 of formulation #5. If Committee members seem to give more emphasis to promoting these values than to securing House acceptance of their proposals, I will say that the goals of members of the Judiciary Committee are policy oriented rather than influence oriented, and I will accordingly expect to find the other two elements to be examined to show the marks of partisanship; if the reverse emphasis of goals holds, I will expect nonpartisanship.

The third category I will examine, accordingly, is that of Committee members' evaluations of their colleagues of the other party, given as AV at 5.2 of formulation #5. If these generally convey approval or respect, they will indicate a spirit of nonpartisanship; if the opposite, of partisanship. Finally, I will consider Committee members' intentions to take specific political actions with respect to the tasks undertaken by the Committee, represented by PW at 1.3 and 5.4 of formulation #5. These intentions are the specific states of mind, in concrete political situations, corresponding to the general attitudes called strategic premises by Fenno. If they embody a spirit of accomodation and compromise, I will characterize them as nonpartisan; if one of intransigence and struggle, as partisan.

I will carry out my examination of these four categories of statement only at the level of the analysis of the committee itself. That is, I will seek out and discuss statements in each category that either conform to or contradict the relations predicted by the hypothesis. In other words, I will here show only whether the kinds of phenomena whose association is asserted by the hypothesis are in fact jointly present or absent within the context addressed by my data. This procedure amounts to reducing my entire data to one instance, either confirming or disconfirming the hypothesis.

More refined tests would also be possible, in which the specific connections between the various attitudes and acts were sought in individual actors and actions. Such tests would not only increase the effective size of my sample, but would allow me to test the hypothesis by examining not merely correlations, but the actual dynamics of political processes in specific instances, which I set forth as an ambition in chapter one. However, I do not yet have available the analytical tools that would allow me efficiently to trace out, in the mass of my data, all of those individual connections. I hope subsequently to develop computerized methods of organizing the appropriate statements and connections. Such methods would, however, require a more broadly and thoroughly articulated understanding of exactly how to define the various classes and subclasses of data and their relations. That understanding, in turn, can only develop from further inductive investigation.

For the same reasons, I will offer no statistical measures of the degree to which my data confirm or disconfirm Fenno's hypothesis. I do not consider the current organization of my data rigorously enough defined to make such tests meaningful. If a well articulated, exhaustive, theoretically cogent account of what kinds of statements should appear in each category was available, and the structure of the categories further elaborated so that those relevant to a given question could be picked out with more precision, then such measures might properly be applied. However, the current level of articulation of my theory is that of a first approximation, lacking as it does explicit and definitive accounts even of how various specific political phenomena, such as partisanship and influence, ought most consistently and usefully to be defined.

In addition, it seems to me that the number of statements of a given kind appearing in the data is not a definitive indication of their significance to a political process. They may appear in greater numbers because the interviewer, or the respondents, were more interested in talking about them; that salience need not correspond to their importance in the particular political dynamics observed. Nor is the frequency with which a thing is asserted always a reliable indicator of its correctness. In such analyses as I propose, the value of statements will depend less on their numbers than on how much they illuminate the dynamics of the political processes being investigated.

In the discussions below, I will support the conclusions

I draw from my examination of data with examples, in some cases extensive, of statements drawn from that data. I have removed sufficient specifics from those statements to prevent casual identification of the Committee members involved, except where such identification is unavoidable because the reference is to the Chairman, Emanuel Celler (D., New York), or the ranking minority member, William M. McCulloch (R., Ohio), in their leadership roles. Unless I explicitly specify otherwise, the source of each statement, and all individuals mentioned in each statement, are members of the Committee. The reader should also be reminded that, as I stated in chapter one, the remarks as reported here are not exact quotes, but close paraphrases drawn from notes. In cases where I I have recorded exact words, I have placed them in quotation marks.

In the remainder of this section I will consider the two categories of evaluations by committee members which I specified at its outset. The kinds of process evaluation that are relevant here are those that express judgments of processes outside of, and in any given instance subsequent to, the committee's deliberations. In particular, according to Fenno's propositions, the members of a committee whose chief goal is chamber influence ought to display a prominent concern for the response of House members to their proposals, and such concerns ought to influence their choice of proposals for which they try to secure committee adoption.

Statements displaying such a concern do appear in the data about process evaluations, but by no means in great numbers.

Only in roughly a dozen cases are there indications that a member
has explicitly based his[9] judgment of what the committee should do
in part on an estimate of the House's response. These are about
equally divided between the two major issues with which the Com-
mittee dealt during the time I observed it, reform of the Presiden-
tial electoral system and extension of the Voting Rights Act of
1965. In some of these statements, the member seems actually to
have modified his policy judgment on the basis of legislative
practicability:

> I would favor A——'s amendment to the Voting
> Rights Act /offered in Committee/, but I buy
> the argument that simple extension is necessary
> at this point to get the bill through.

> B—— was for a district plan /to divide elec-
> toral votes according to the winner in each
> Congressional District/, because he felt direct
> popular election might not succeed. (A lobby-
> ist.)

In other cases, the member seems willing to press for
the proposal he favors only after being convinced of its feasibil-
ity:

> C—— has shifted /to a position favoring di-
> rect popular election of the President/; he now
> thinks popular election is feasible. He under-
> stands that polls by the Republicans and his
> own polls show that it's feasible and necessary.
> (A member of the Congressman's personal staff.)

Most commonly, however, statements expressing an aware-
ness of possible difficulties on the floor for policy proposals do

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[9]In 1969 there were no female members of the Committee.

express not an inclination to modify the proposal to mitigate such

dangers, but rather one to persevere in the face of obstacles:

> I think the Administration /substitute for the
> Voting Rights/ bill will probably come up on
> the floor, which won't make things easy for
> us /supporters of simple extension/.

> On the floor if we try for our maximum plan
> /i.e., popular election of the President/,
> and amendments to it are beaten, it could go
> through.

> I don't know what the opposition will do /on
> electoral college reform/. But /the floor
> debate/ will be fun. . . . We need to organ-
> ize to round up votes against amendments . . .

> The Nixon statement makes it harder for us to
> get popular election.

> The testimony of the NAACP will make getting
> popular election more difficult.

> I'm worried about the Voting Rights Act now.
> The Administration will swing a lot more
> clout on this, where they care, than they did
> on direct election.

Such statements seem to come disproportionately from the more lib-

eral Democrats on the Committee, who might be expected to place the

most emphasis on policy goals; all of the statements just cited

come from easily identifiable members of that contingent.

A few cases reflect attempts to balance feasibility

with desirability. Typically, the committee member recognizes a

proposal's chances on the floor as a concern, but affirms the prac-

ticability of his favored position rather than being inclined to

modify it to secure broader acceptance. In other words, in the

act of balancing the two, desirability is the dominant, and feasi-

bility the subordinate, consideration. Such statements often seem to allow an inference that the policy position has affected the process evaluation rather than the other way around:

> I don't believe the Administration amendments /to the Voting Rights Act/ would make the bill lose much support. (A supporter of those amendments.)

> We want to extend the Voting Rights Act in its current form because we don't want to ruin it while trying to get more. (A strong supporter of the Act, who also favored further reforms in election law.)

The picture that emerges from this evidence is mixed. Concern for floor success is present, but not with great frequency or intensity; on the other hand, inclination to press for a maximum policy position is demonstrated clearly only for strongly liberal Democrats. To determine the extent to which the Judiciary Committee can be said to be an influence-oriented committee, therefore, some comparison with the alternative is indicated.

Statements expressing personal goals, such as re-election or election to higher office, would be included in the category of evaluative statements about actors (AV). Similarly, the goal of respect for the Committee on the part of House members, which Fenno describes as part of the goal of chamber influence, would be expressed in evaluative statements about actors. When I examined these statements in connection with the hypothesis in question, as I will elaborate below, I found few statements of either variety. This finding diminishes the probability that the chief goal of members of the Judiciary Committee was either re-election or chamber

influence.

The remaining kind of member goal proposed by Fenno is that of good public policy, which would be expressed in evaluative statements about the content of political processes, CV. This category of statements is, in my data, about twice as large as either of the other evaluative classifications. The sheer number of these statements is not necessarily significant, however. Many of them are members' simple statements of position, without indication of how that position would influence their political action. Many others (in fact, apparently the largest category) are estimates by some actor of the position of another or others, and again give no indication of the extent to which those positions impel action.

Nevertheless, examination of this category of data indicates that by far the most common form of explanation offered for the political actions of committee members on policy questions is that of consistency with members' evaluations of good policy. Such statements occur in a wide variety of types, and examples could be multiplied almost indefinitely. They are particularly common with respect to electoral college reform, which is not surprising, since this issue was generally viewed as "Constitutional" rather than "political," and therefore a matter properly to be decided on principle:

> Committee members will vote, on the issue of
> reform of the electoral college, on the principle
> of how the President should be elected, as will I.

There are too many arguments against direct popular election . . .

I'm for popular election; I've been moved by the testimony of the ILGWU /International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union/ that the question of whether big or small states have an advantage under the current system is moot, so I'm not worrying about that. . . . The other testimony has decreased my doubts and struck me with the argument that he is the people's President.

I talked with /seven colleagues of his own party on the Committee/. I don't know if they changed their minds because of it, but I used the testimony as an argument and I think it's the testimony that has caused the shift in sentiment on the Committee.

It was the testimony, particularly of the ABA President, that made people's fears of direct election lessen and lessen.

Chairman Celler didn't exercise much leadership on electoral college reform; many liberals would take a position for direct election anyway.

I'm for direct popular election. I've been active on the issue; I plan to work for keeping the runoff election in the plan.

Statements emphasizing the role of policy judgments in decisions on issues before the committee also show up persistently with respect to less salient questions:

D—— had doubts about the bill for State taxation of interstate commerce, especially about its effect on local laws, but was persuaded when he understood it was applying only to corporations of less than $1 million.

I don't know what to do on /a politically popular immigration bill/. The technical people tell me it's no good.

This, too, may not be surprising, since Congressmen might be ex-

pected to defer to, and rely on, technical considerations on routine matters. However, it is also not hard to conceive of such decisions being made on grounds such as their effects on a member's chances for re-election, as Fenno shows to be standard practice on committees primarily concerned with such goals (pp. 57-73).

Further, statements asserting policy considerations as a basis for decision also show up frequently with respect even to the most politicized issue before the Committee at the time, where one might most expect other factors to intervene. That issue was the extension of the Voting Rights Act:

> I think the votes are wrapped up /in favor of extending/ the Voting Rights Act, and will only explain my position /against it/ on the floor because I don't want to vote no without explaining. But this is a gut issue; people come to Congress with ideas on this and don't change them.

> E—— issued a statement after Attorney General Mitchell testified, saying that he favored simple extension of the Voting Rights Act. And he voted for it. (A staff aide to E——.)

> I voted for F——'s amendment but not G——'s, because I don't favor abolishing literacy tests /the object of the second amendment/. I'd favor further vote reform legislation, in this bill or any other.

It accordingly appears that policy values are prominent in the thinking of members of the Judiciary Committee under the entire range of observed circumstances. Before I conclude my discussion of members' policy evaluations, however, I wish to

mention two groups of statements whose forms of expression have

particular bearing on the connections I wish to illuminate. In

the first of these groups, explicitly partisan considerations in-

troduce themselves into the evaluations of policy:

> There was never any question on the Democratic side
> about the Voting Rights Act /i.e., that they would
> support simple extension/.

> We /several Committee Republicans of varying senior-
> ity/ may be opposed to Nixon's position /on the
> Voting Rights Act/, and may back not changing it
> but just extending it, against Nixon.

> Sentiment on electoral reform is breaking down
> on a party basis: Republicans on the Committee
> will be more for proportional or district plans.
> (A Democrat.)

That Committee members should link policy with partisan considera-

tions in this way tends to confirm Fenno's proposal that members

who emphasize policy goals tend to adopt partisan strategic pre-

mises. On the other hand, perhaps such statements are not as common

as that hypothesis would lead one to expect.

Statements in the second group to which I wish to draw

special attention are peculiar in making reference not only to poli-

cy considerations, but also to considerations of legislative feasi-

bility such as those discussed in the first part of this section.

Statements in this group, in other words, correspond to those judg-

ments of feasibility, examined earlier in this section, that also

made reference to policy considerations. They tend to confirm the

observation advanced there that Judiciary Committee members tend to

place more emphasis on policy goals than on feasibility:

H—— does think election law reform is a key issue.
But he deferred to the idea that amendments to the
Voting Rights Act could not be enacted now.

J—— was for direct election all along but had
doubts /at first/ about passage.

In short, it is clear that judgments of desirable public

policy are those most often offered by Committee members in support

of their chosen courses of action. It is also clear that, where

judgments of desirable policy and of legislative feasibility con-

flict, the former tend to have a stronger influence on the course of

action preferred. In addition, I have no reason to conclude that

the kinds of reasons expressed in the statements I have just con-

sidered do not correspond to those playing a part in their actual

thought processes.

It is, of course, plausible that considerations related

to the substance of policy issues would be prominent in the thinking

of Congressmen about those issues even of those Congressmen who did

not define their goals in policy terms. If so, then only broader,

comparative studies could establish whether the prominence of such

concerns among members of the Judiciary Committee was generally

greater than one might a priori expect. Similarly, it is possible

that Congressmen tend to justify their decisions to outsiders in

terms of policy considerations, even though such considerations were

not in fact uppermost in their mind.

However, the statements I have presented above, like

many others in my data, all bear some evidence of not just being

statements of preference in vacuo, but of having an actual influence

on the course of action pursued by the Congressman in question. I accordingly conclude that the Judiciary Committee context is likely one in which policy considerations are paramount, and that such considerations are often modified, though seldom overcome, by concern for legislative feasibility. Further evidence for this formulation is implicit, below, in the examination of statements about Committee members' intentions to take political action (PW), and in particular of the premises from which such intentions sprang.

The Judiciary Committee accordingly seems to be one whose members' goals are primarily, although not exclusively, concerned with policy. Fenno holds that such committees will display "policy partisanship" in their strategic premises, at least in cases where their environments are dominated by competing policy coalitions. Although an extended discussion of the nature of the Judiciary Committee's environment is beyond the scope of this paper, it seems clear that the proviso just stated adequately describes that environment; the Committee ought accordingly to exhibit "policy partisanship." Examination of the other categories of statements indicated at the beginning of this section will provide a test of this expectation.

i. Committee Personal Evaluations.

The most striking feature of Judiciary Committee members' evaluations of their committee colleagues (AV) is their generally favorable character. Democrats, in particular, tend to approve of their Republican colleagues much more often than not; in fact, this group of statements is the largest of the subcategories I will discuss in this section. The first individual mentioned, in particular, is often spoken of highly:

> I like A———. He's one of the most capable men, although we differ in political philosophy.

> B——— is sincere in the position he takes on election law reform; he's smart and active and aggressive and no weaseller.

> Some of the young Republican Committee members are very sharp on Constitutional and technical issues.

> I mentioned /a procedural plan of mine/ to a Republican member I thought I could trust and a Democratic member I knew I could trust.

> Ultimately the Republicans will vote for the Voting Rights Act and it will go through. C——— /a Democrat/ is wrong to be worried.

The corresponding category of negative comments by Democrats about Republicans is inflated by the presence of several criticisms of the same individual, the subject of the first following remark:

> D——— often sells out without giving the impression of doing so. Yet he is well respected.

> Maybe the Attorney General's testimony /on the Voting Rights Act/ will affect the Republicans on the Committee, but not us.

E—— might stick with the Voting Rights Act, but
I worry about him; he would hardly disagree with
/Minority Leader Gerald R./ Ford /R., Michigan/,
and the Administration will really operate on him.

Republicans, by contrast, are both less voluble and

less favorable in comments about their colleagues across the aisle.

About all any Republican had to say in favor of any Democrat was:

F—— was the leader on /an important issue/ last
year.

On the other hand, their strongest explicit criticism of Democrats

was:

I think the guys have gotten carried away by ideal-
ism /on electoral college reform/; I think they have
listened to the public opinion polls.

The Democrats worry about the Republicans on the
Committee maybe too much.

However, Republicans also sometimes implied personal

criticism of Democrats in remarks whose explicit subject was what

the Republicans perceived as partisanship in the Democrats' actions.

I mention these here because they have no counterparts among Demo-

cratic evaluations of Republicans, and because they manifest a

connection between actor evaluations and the partisan strategic

intentions which are the subject of the next section:

I don't think minimum reform of the electoral col-
lege will be given serious consideration, even if
I tried . . .

We are abdicating responsibility for this legisla-
tion. Clearly the ducks are lined up for support-
ing simple extension /of the Voting Rights Act/,
and the steamroller is rolling. Nobody wants to
legislate.

It is hard to evaluate the significance of the data so

far presented except with respect to some baseline. Comments by members of each party about their own party colleagues can provide such a baseline. Democrats approve of each other in most, but not all, cases:

> I'm glad G—— is chairman of the subcommittee
> . . . because he's conscientious and liberal and
> has been on the subcommittee a long time.
>
> H—— respects J——. (A staff aide to H——.)
>
> K—— is a moderate, with a /Eugene/ McCarthy-
> type wife. It's a conservative district; he
> does his best to come along with us when he can.
> He's a good guy.
>
> The kneejerk liberals will go for direct elec-
> tion, but the city liberals may follow the
> interest groups and people like that. (A con-
> servative Democrat).

Republicans, however, are as laconic about each other as they are about Democrats, though less negative. Pretty much the only evidence of their opinions about fellow partisans was:

> L—— respects A—— and consults often with him
> to help his own thinking. He doesn't always
> agree with A——. (A staff aide to L——).
>
> D—— and I were probably important figures on
> electoral college reform, he because he took a
> position early.

In a way it would seem that the Republican contingent on the Committee was leaving the entire job of interpersonal support and criticism to their ranking member, who made such remarks about his cohorts as:

> M—— is particularly good, presenting arguments
> without being arrogant or uncompromising. He's
> "a tower of strength," though he's very fair. He
> presents his argument well. I don't want to down-

grade any other Republicans on the Committee; they are thoughtful and have conscientious feelings. N—— was good too /on electoral college reform/; he came around /to McCulloch's, and the Committee's ultimate, position/. P——, who is /high/ ranking in seniority on our side, I was glad to have him say that direct election was the way we had to move.

This discussion can be summarized by saying that Democrats largely expressed themselves as comfortable with their colleagues on the Committee, although they sometimes criticised the men across the aisle; Republicans, on the other hand, were much less pleased, or at least hid their feelings more. These attitudes might, of course, have any of several sources. Perhaps Democrats in fact got treated better by Committee colleagues than did Republicans. Perhaps the feelings expressed are artifacts of the more general relative satisfactions of being, respectively, in the majority and in the minority. Perhaps there are differences in cultural styles of expression between Democrats and Republicans. For the Committee as a whole, however, it seems most accurate to say that, while similarity of party seemed to encourage favorable evaluations, difference in party seldom seemed enough, by itself, to give rise to a negative opinion.

The statements discussed so far all express Committee members' evaluations of other members considered as individuals. A corresponding pattern emerges if we consider Committee members' .evaluations of Committee figures considered in their leadership roles. Republicans offer no explicit personal criticism of their

formal leaders, and often indicate their support of that leader-
ship by describing their position as being solidly aligned with
McCulloch's. Democrats sometimes make corresponding remarks about
Celler, but also offer more explicit evaluations of their Chairman,
both positive and negative:

> Celler has such a way; he's civil. "That ole man
> is so damn nice." But he strips the arguments of
> his antagonist away. He really did it to the
> Attorney General /in the Voting Rights Act hear-
> ing/; those questions are so sharp, they get at
> the essence of the argument.

> I often think Celler compromises too much. He's
> a careful legislator.

> Celler runs things himself, and doesn't give out
> much for the rest of us to do. We go along, not
> antagonizing him, though, because he's good. . . .

Republicans also have both positive and negative
about the Democratic leadership of the Committee. These include:

> I disagree with Celler philosophically, but he's
> fair.

> I don't believe Celler is really interested in
> election law reform. He's got problems of his
> own in New York . . .

> The Chairman has too much power . . .

Democrats, on the other hand, have little occasion to
comment on the Republican leaders of the Committee, except for those
who deal with them in their own capacity as leaders. They appear
to view their counterparts with consistent respect. In the first
example, the speaker is chairman of the subcommittee on which the
Republican referred to is the ranking minority member, and in the
second the speaker and the Republican in question sit on the same

subcommittee.

> D—— is a willing ally on the /subcommittee's
> main/ bill; we break down the arguments between
> us / for presentation in floor debate/
>
> P—— has been campaigning for /higher office/
> and then /was absent for personal reasons/; it
> would have been rude and improper to go ahead
> /on a bill he was interested in/ without him.
> . . .

These cordialities between leaders reach their peak in
the working relationship between Chairman Celler and ranking minor-
ity member McCulloch. Each party's members tended to see the lead-
er of the other party as holding a favorable opinion of their own
leader, through which the latter tended to dominate the relation-
ship:

> McCulloch has a big influence on the Chairman.
> (A Republican.)
>
> What I wonder is, what is the hold Celler has
> on McCulloch? Even with his own Administration
> in power McCulloch has broken with it twice on
> major issues. (A Democrat.)

Such remarks, and abundant other evidence of their close working
relations, indicates the cordiality of feeling between the two men.

In general, examination of statements by Committee mem-
bers expressing opinions of the colleagues with whom they worked
shows some tendency on the part of Republicans, but very little on
the part of Democrats, for those opinions to be influenced by the
party of the individual evaluated. As I indicated above, such re-
sults could arise from characteristics of the evaluators or of the
evaluated. In particular, Democrats could be differentially evalu-

ated by members of the different parties because the former behaved differently toward the latter; on the other hand, Democrats could be more inclined to evaluate others favorably because their majority status, or their personality types, allowed them to take more satisfaction from the political environment of the Committee, and therefore be more generous in expressing it.

However, my purpose here is not to inquire into the sources of these attitudes, but rather to see whether attitudes characteristic of partisanship exist on the Committee. A tendency for members of opposite parties to evaluate each other more negatively than members of the same party would constitute such evidence. On this criterion, I consider that the data discussed in this section indicate the presence of such a tendency only in a very moderate degree.

j. Committee partisan intentions.

According to the formulations in section g, partisanship or nonpartisanship on a committee would chiefly be manifested, besides by committee members' evaluations of each other, by the character of their intended actions in the committee. Such intentions are the mental states that correspond, in a specific political situation, to the attitudes that Fenno calls strategic premises. If committee members generally intend to foster conciliation and com-

promise of differing positions, the committee environment may be called nonpartisan; if to promote antagonistic conflict and the victory of one position over another, partisan.

In this section I will accordingly consider statements about process intentions (PW) whose referents are intended behavior within the committee. The number of such statements is significantly larger than that of apposite statements about either process or actor evaluations. Whereas each of those discussions was based on a few dozen remarks, that which follows deals with nearly 150.

Nevertheless, as before, I will give no statistical analysis, for it is the general tenor and quality of the data rather than their distribution that I consider to provide the most illuminating information. In addition, quantitative measures of such statements, and of their referents, depend to a great extent on the choices of the analyst in classifying them, of the observer in noticing them as significant, and of the respondent in considering them worth expressing. These sources of ambiguity make frequency counts unreliable as more than suggestive indicators of magnitude. On the other hand, I consider my methods of analysis at least accurate enough to identify the bulk of relevant statements appearing in the whole body of data, and am confident that the statements so identified constitute the best information on the question being investigated available in my data. Accordingly, and because with a population of this size it may be helpful to do so, I will below indicate how many statements appear in various subcate-

gories.

Among intentions of political action within the Committee, I am to consider in this section those that represent responses to some point of agreement or disagreement involving committee members. Because the effects of cleavages between parties, and between views on policy, are significant here, I will identify the party and tendencies of the author of each remark.

In this category of data, statements describing partisan, or antagonistic, responses are not infrequent. The following are typical:

> We pay attention to "Dear Colleague" letters, if
> they are from the Chairman, and keep them in mind
> if they come from other good guys, but if they're
> from Republicans or someone like /a senior Demo-
> crat who was not well respected/, we just ignore
> them. (A liberal Democrat.)

("Dear Colleague" letters are those by which a member circularizes others to call their attention to a bill he or she is introducing and to invite their cosponsorship.)

> After all, I had to defend Nixon in the hearing
> when Celler tagged him with a position that the
> witness had just made look stupid. (A moderate
> Republican.)

> I tried to get more testimony against popular
> election. . . . I suggested to Celler that we
> might have some of the Senators in /to the hear-
> ing/, but he didn't like the idea. (A conserv-
> ative Republican.)

> I'm not disposed to drop the issue /of voting
> law reform and abolition of literacy tests/.
> I don't believe Celler is really interested in
> voting reform; he has problems of his own in
> New York, as you can tell from the hearings.
> (A liberal Republican.)

> I don't see why the Administration amendments
> shouldn't be added to the Voting Rights Act,
> because I favor voting law reform, and want to
> abolish literacy tests and residency requirements
> all over the nation. (Another liberal Republican.)

However, a more conciliatory posture is by no means un-
common either, as the following remarks illustrate:

> I didn't try to advance a certain position on
> electoral college reform to the /Republican/
> leadership, but rather to present an alternative
> to the Congress. (A conservative Republican.)

> The provision /in the Amendment to abolish the
> electoral college/ delaying the effective date
> beyond 1972 was also important /in securing its
> approval by the Committee/. It was a deal; this
> was a price they /Democrats/ had to pay to get
> it out of Committee. (An urban Democrat.)

> I would favor the A——— amendment to the Voting
> Rights Act /which was consistent with Administra-
> tion proposals/, but I buy the argument that
> simple extension right now is necessary to get
> the Act through. (A moderate Republican.)

The former group of statements might be taken to repre-
sent what Fenno calls "policy partisanship;" the latter, nonparti-
sanship with respect to policy issues. While it is clear in my
data that the former outnumber the latter, the meaning of this pro-
portion is less clear. Fenno's concept of policy partisanship,
and the statements just cited, involve differences both in party and
in policy views. If the party contingents on the Committee were
generally uniform and strong in their ideological views, the two
kinds of difference could perhaps be taken as essentially synony-
mous in the context of the Committee, as appears by Fenno's ac-
count to be appropriate in the case of the House Education and
Labor Committee (pp. 74-79, 85-87).

However, in the case of the House Judiciary Committee, the two kinds of cleavage obviously do not always coincide. Circumstances often arise in which policy differences are only doubtfully connected with partisan divisions, in which a lack of such connection is evident, and even which explicitly involve members of the same party. As the following examples show, such circumstances, like those above, may evoke intentions either to press, or to conciliate, such differences. The former include:

We won't compromise on electoral college reform. We'll try to get popular election through the floor. (A liberal Democrat.)

I was opposed to the Voting Rights Act amendments in executive session because I want simple extension. (Another liberal Democrat.)

I will vote /on electoral college reform/ based on the principle of how the President should be elected. (A moderate conservative Republican.)

I favor direct popular election of the President and will try to persuade the Committee. When the time has come for an idea nothing can stop it. (Chairman Celler, to newspeople.)

B—— /a liberal Democrat/ has been for election law reform for a long time, especially on literacy tests. I think I'd have to oppose him on this. (A moderate Democrat.)

The latter may be represented by:

I'm willing to try for popular election before my plan. (A liberal Republican.)

I favor popular election but will accept anything less that will provide a real change. (A moderate conservative Republican.)

I'd even be willing to eliminate the "bonus votes" /corresponding to each State's two Senators/ in a

proportional plan /to divide the electoral vote
of each state in proportion to its popular vote/,
and then the supporters of popular election
might accept it as a compromise. (A conservative
Democrat.).

I didn't want amendments on the Voting Rights
Act, because it would make passage too compli-
cated, and I accepted that argument, and sup-
ported it, too, although I would be ready to
back further election law reform. (An urban
Democrat.)

I'm willing to let the effective date wait
until after 1976 /sic/ if it's strategically
necessary, but I see no particular danger in
1972. (A liberal Republican.)

A good argument for abolishing literacy tests
can be made, but I was willing to accept the
Chairman's argument that doing so would make
it possible that we would lose the whole is-
sue. . . . (Another liberal Democrat.)

Comparison of the 26 cases discussed before, in which

policy differences are explicitly or probably accompanied by party

differences, with the 31 cases just introduced, in which party dif-

ference is not an evident factor, indicates that in the former case,

antagonism is somewhat more frequent than conciliation (16:10),

while in the latter, conciliation is correspondingly more frequent

than antagonism (22:11). This arrangement of the data therefore

supports the conclusion that differences in party do, to some ex-

tent, motivate members of the Committee to oppose each other antag-

onistically.

That party does play such a role on the Committee is sup-

ported by two further arguments from the evidence of the data in

this category. First, as the above examples may show, the antag-

onism expressed seems the more rancorous as party cleavages become more explicitly involved. Second, in addition to the statements counted in the previous paragraph, nine statements refer to conflicts across party lines in which no policy issue seems immediately involved; among these are the first two cited in this section. Of these nine, only one can be regarded as expressing a conciliatory intention.

On the other hand, there is also evidence from which, in conjunction with the above discussion, it is most plausible to argue that party differences are not at the root of such antagonism as exists. In every case not involving a clear disagreement on matters of policy, intentions are without exception conciliatory. Of these cases, 13 involve members of different parties, and 10, of the same party. The first of the following examples is particularly significant, because it represents the spontaneous development of active cooperation, based on a concrete agreement on policy rather than party ties or established working relations among leaders. It accordingly shows the extent to which policy considerations can overcome party cleavage.

> C—— /a conservative Democrat/ and I are submitting
> a coordinated counterproposal /to the Committee's
> plan for popular election of the President/ embody-
> ing the district plan. . . . We have gotten together
> with D—— /a conservative Republican/ and will offer
> the district plan first, then the proportional plan
> afterwards. . . . Because C—— and I were both for
> the district plan, we decided we ought to coordin-
> ate. (A conservative Republican.)
>
> It's very nonpartisan /in executive sessions on

electoral college reform/—ene amendment I offered,
a man on the other side was ready to offer. (A
moderate conservative Republican.)

I'm preparing legislation on voting residency
requirements. I said I was for this /election
law reform, which had been advocated by the
Administration/ at the proper time—later. (An
urban Democrat.)

There is a substantial, well-nigh universal de-
sire for broad comprehensive vote reform legisla-
tion. We both /i.e., he and the Chairman/ say
we're ready and willing to proceed as soon as
possible. (McCulloch, to newspeople.)

E—— /a Republican/ talked to me at a party at
the White House last week. I told him I could
back his bill but would go for popular election
on the first try. (A liberal Republican.)

We all will follow Celler's lead on the Voting
Rights Act. It's a battle where opinions are
already formed. Celler will hold the reins.
. . . /The strategy/ will be what Celler says.
(A liberal Democrat.)

Further, such sharing of policy positions by members of

both parties is frequent. It occurred, in fact, on almost every

issue addressed in the Committee during my observation of it. It

involved both proponents and opponents of direct election of the

President, both proponents and opponents of simple extension of the

Voting Rights Act, the sponsors of one of the two competing propos-

als on Irish immigration, and both proponents and opponents of the

bill on State taxation of interstate commerce. It was also present

on virtually all of the Committee's more routine legislation, where

controversy was seldom evident. Even the investigation of conglom-

erates, which was widely perceived as Celler's show and a Democratic

issue, was also seen as enjoying McCulloch's active support:

On conglomerates I've been trying to maintain a
balance, not run an inquisition. I think Celler,
McCulloch and /the Committee Staff Counsel on
the investigation/ have been pretty stringent
with witnesses, and that not all that the busi-
nesses did is that devious. (A moderate Repub-
lican.)

The probability of such bipartisan policy coalitions on
the Committee was doubtless enhanced by the close working relation-
ship between the Chairman and the ranking member, as well as by the
prior policy tendencies of the Congressmen who sought, or were
placed, on the Committee in the first place. The effects of such
aspects of the Committee's decision processes on its strategic
premises could be examined with data of the sort whose use I advo-
cate, but such an examination is not my purpose here.

The argument of this section so far about the strategic
intentions of Judiciary Committee members may be summarized in four
propositions. First, members who agree on policy uniformly adopt
a cooperative stance, independent of their respective party affili-
ations. Second, members who disagree on policy adopt conciliatory
responses more than half the time, if they do not regard the dis-
agreement as associated with partisan cleavage. Third, if they do
regard such policy disagreement as associated with partisan cleav-
age, they adopt conciliatory responses less than half the time.
Fourth, if members are in conflict about a matter not involving any
substantive policy issue, but based only on party cleavages, they
will hardly ever adopt a conciliatory posture.

Only when antagonistic responses are adopted in the third

case just described does policy partisanship, in the strict sense of Fenno's term, exist. Policy partisanship, in other words, describes a situation in which all policy disagreement tends to be across partisan lines. In such a case, it is not unlikely that policy disagreement will combine with tendencies to respond to the other party in an adversary way to create uniformly antagonistic intentions. Fenno presents the House Education and Labor Committee as exemplifying this case. The case of the Judiciary Committee, however, shows that partisan and policy factors need not coincide; ideological or policy coalitions need not follow lines of partisan a' :liation.

Where these factors are separable, the concept of policy partisanship will not suffice to describe the case. Instead, such a situation shows that concept to refer not to a simple empirical variable, but to a complex phenomenon in which at least three elements are mixed: policy conflict, party cleavage, and an adversary stance between antagonists. I consider that a method of analysis that focusses on concrete events, attitudes, and states of mind provides the kind of information that allows such concepts to be explicated and reformulated in terms of empirically observable phenomena.

In the case of the House Judiciary Committee, I would say that policy rather than party differences are at the root of political antagonism, because such antagonism does not occur in policy situations except where disagreement is present. However, where such disagreement occurs, party differences play a significant role in fostering intentions to respond antagonistically; the concept of

party held by Judiciary Committee members appears to imply the kind of antagonism usually associated with the word "partisan."

"Partisan" tendencies of this sort are, however, mitigated by the presence of agreement across party lines. Policy agreement is more important, to members for whom policy values are most salient, than partisan difference, so that, when such agreement occurs, members can adopt cooperative courses of action in spite of party differences. It may also be the case that members' experience that policy and party cleavages need not coincide facilitates their viewing policy disagreements as not essentially involving party. Further, the experience of cooperation across party lines may enable members more easily to adopt an approach of conciliation even when policy disagreement exists. In other words, while policy disagreement is a precondition for antagonistic response, it is not a sufficient condition in environments where bipartisan policy agreement is sometimes present. A concern with policy values rather than floor success can, therefore, in situations where the opponent of one day is the ally of the next, foster conciliation rather than "partisanship," even with respect to those opponents.

Nevertheless, the discussion I have given so far may understate the degree of partisan antagonism present on the Committee. To uncover further indications of such antagonism, I must examine another subset of the data on process intentions. All the statements discussed until now refer to states of mind affirmed by, or posited of, their possessors. In a number of instances, however,

such intentions are attributed to individuals only by inference from their subsequent actions; in other words, in the sense of section 2b, imputed to their holders. Such statements cannot be treated as equivalent to more positive descriptions; in fact, I was not infrequently astounded, when studying the Committee, at the implausibility of the motives Committee members attributed to each other, in relation to what I, on independent grounds, considered likely. Nevertheless, such attributions are significant at least for what they reveal of the Committee members' habits of perception, and therefore of the political atmosphere of the Committee.

For most of the subcategories I have mentioned above, attributions of conciliatory intentions far outnumber those of antagonistic ones. Where disagreement either in policy or in party is lacking, in fact, conciliatory statements are almost always ascribed:

> The coalition for extending the Voting Rights
> Act isn't fragile. (A liberal Republican.)

> The Republicans all see that despite their
> President's position, they must come behind
> popular election in order to get anything.
> (An urban Democrat.)

> There is a committment to voting law reform,
> and a Committee majority for it. Almost all
> the Democrats on the subcommittee, and a major-
> ity of the Republicans, accepted /simple exten-
> sion of/ the Voting Rights Act because they
> understood that this was so. (A senior Re-
> publican.)

> If Celler could get a large majority in Com-
> mittee by going for minimum changes or some
> other plan, he'd do it. (A liberal Democrat.)

> The opposition to direct election evaporated be-
> cause Celler was for it and the votes were there.
> (A conservative Democrat.)

The remarks cited in previous sections about breaking down the arguments for presentation in floor debate and about "the hold Celler has on McCulloch" also reappear under this head.

Exceptions to the ascription of conciliatory intentions occur in only two categories. The first of these is that of disagreement between party colleagues, of which the following is the strongest statement:

> We already tried to put a district plan in /to
> the electoral college reform Amendment/, for
> the sake of form. . . . But after Celler and
> "some of them had a caucus," he just took /the
> result of/ that /as a mandate/ and went ahead
> /with a popular election plan/. (A conserva-
> tive Democrat.)

(The caucus in question was, in fact, called by Celler in his capacity as head of the Democrats on the Committee, all of whom had been invited and most of whom, so far as I know, came.) The other three statements in this category all refer to disagreements between Committee Republicans and the White House. I suspect that reference to such situations reflects their frequency less than it does their salience; in other words, that such situations are significant to, and therefore tend to be mentioned by, informants exactly because they violate expectations.

The other category of attributed intentions in which antagonism appears is of more significance. Where the difference referred to is presented as both a policy and a party matter, antag-

onistic intentions are generally attributed; in fact, the relation obtaining in the cases discussed above is entirely reversed. In cases where policy and party disagreement are not both present, 33 of 37 statements attribute conciliatory intentions; however, in cases where both sources of difference are referred to, 22 of 27 attribute antagonistic ones. Suddenly such statements as the following become typical:

> Now it looks like the Republicans on the Committee are really pulling behind the Nixon statement /on electoral college reform/. There has been slippage in the support for direct election. (A liberal Democrat.)

> The Democrats may want to beat the Nixon statement /on electoral college reform/. (A Republican Staff Counsel.)

> Celler is clearly for direct election of the President, and has stacked the hearings accordingly. (A conservative lobbyist.)

> The Republicans are apparently trying to pay off some political debts with the Voting Rights Act. (A liberal Democrat.)

> F—— isn't interested in voting law reform; he's opposed to Attorney General Mitchell's position. Mitchell was set up by Celler /in the Voting Rights Act extension hearings/ for organization and power reasons, though; that may be part of the reason why F—— put in his amendment /which was consistent with the Administration position/. And also for party loyalty. (Staff aide to F——.)

> Note how Celler called on G—— /a liberal Democrat/ in the hearing with Attorney General Mitchell —it was prearranged. (A liberal Republican.)

> I noticed that Clarence Mitchell /of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People/ was always scheduled right after Attorney General Mitchell /in the Voting Rights Act extension hear-

ings, which were several times postponed/, and I
understood that this was on purpose so he could
criticise. (A conservative Republican.)

The statements previously cited, referring to "the ducks . . .

lined up for simple extension," and doubting that "minimum reform

of the electoral college will be given serious consideration," also

reappear in this category.

The impression, which this selection of statements may

foster, that the Voting Rights Act was the issue addressed by the

Committee in the most partisan way of all those taken up during the

period in question, is undoubtedly correct. This conjecture is the

stronger in that the first three statements above are clearly,

based on my other observation, the least plausible in the set pre-

sented.

The statements above, together with those previously ad-

duced, also shed light on the sources of partisanship within the

Committee. For the Democrats, it would appear, as one would have

predicted from the findings of section h, that one of the main such

sources was the strong policy orientation of the contingent's lib-

eral wing. Another was the tendency of Chairman Celler to make use

of his procedural powers and authority to secure the outcomes he

preferred. For the Republicans, one force impelling to partisanship

would seem to have been their desire to support the new Republican

Administration; another, reaction to partisanship attributed to the

Democrats. Republicans, however, also often take a conciliatory

stance; perhaps such a stance is the only viable one for a minority.

I suspect, on the basis of these observations, that some mechanism like the following may have been operating, although to test such complex conjectures would be a massive job. All members of the Committee tended to be most interested in winning legislative victories for their preferred policies. While policy views were not strictly associated with party affiliations, the positions that could command Committee majorities would most often resemble ones to which Democrats were sympathetic, because of the powers available to the majority party and to the Chairman, but also simply because there would probably be more Democrats than Republicans in any such majority. Republicans who wanted their views considered would therefore have to seek the inclusion of those views in a position essentially controlled by Democrats, and therefore to adopt a conciliatory strategy.

Democrats might then be likely to experience their victories as the simple triumph of a policy position in a legislative process, but Republicans to experience their recurring defeats, and needs to be conciliatory, as exclusion from effective participation based on partisan considerations. In this case, Republican partisanship could arise from the frustration of having to be conciliatory and yet being defeated, and Republicans could rationalize such partisanship by attributing partisan motivations to Democrats' pursuit of policy objectives. Democratic partisanship, on the other hand, would arise largely as a consequence of the pursuit of policy goals.

From the statements attributing conciliatory and partisan motives to Committee members, represented by the selection just given, it would appear also that Committee members were more disposed to see partisanship in the actions of members of the opposite party than to acknowledge it in their own. This inconsistency may be significant in the light of my suggestion, in section e, that partisanship may arise in part from the perception that the other party is being partisan. From the evidence at hand, to be sure, it is not possible to say whether the attributed partisanship overstates its actual influence, or whether, on the contrary, members' interpretations of their own intentions understate, or fail to recognize, the partisanship in their own actions. Undoubtedly both are true in degree, but to establish the degree would require a closer analysis than I am yet capable of giving. Deciding this question would also involve further explication of the concept of partisanship: is an action partisan if those against whose position it is directed, but not the actors themselves, perceive it as motivated by partisanship?

However, note that, in most of the instances above, the substance of the dispute seems to be a question of policy. The acts to which each statement refers tend to be directed to the furthering of the actor's own policy position. Nevertheless, the intention which the maker of the statement imputes to the actor is, at least implicitly, a partisan one. In other words, there appears a tendency for the antagonistic pursuit of policy disagree-

ment to be attributed to partisan, rather than policy, motivations. Such perceptions would be predicted by the mechanism I proposed above, and could, in the way there proposed, also foster subsequent partisan responses by those who felt themselves the victims of previous partisan actions.

One final group of statements about Committee members' political intentions is worth examining before I conclude this discussion. The statements in this group refer to intentions to act, not within the Committee itself, but in connection with floor consideration of proposals from the Committee. Examination of members' intentions of such action serves as a check on that of their evaluations of such action, expressed in the statements considered in section h. It would be consistent with the finding of that section, which was that policy considerations tended to carry more weight with Committee members than did considerations of legislative feasibility, to predict that the statements here adduced would more often express an intention to pursue a policy goal aggressively than one to seek accomodation and compromise.

The data are consistent with this prediction. Eight statements express intentions to fight on the floor for policy positions defeated in the Committee. In two cases, the differences in question are explicitly identified as party questions; in the others they are presented only as policy issues:

> Key amendments /to the Voting Rights Act/ may be
> offered on the floor to save the Administration's
> face. (A liberal Democrat.)

> I'll fight against the Voting Rights Act, maybe
> talk against it on the floor, and certainly
> vote against it. (A conservative Democrat.)

In only three cases do Committee members express a prime

concern for modifying policy positions so as to improve their

chances on the floor:

> H——— wanted his compromise plan on electoral
> college reform because he was afraid of the ef-
> fects of the Nixon position on the floor, so
> he offered it to mitigate Republican opposi-
> tion. (Staff aide to H———, a moderate Re-
> publican.)

In three other cases, however, members express an attempt to balance

the two kinds of consideration:

> Let's at least go to the floor with popular
> election, and we can pull out concessions if
> we have to. (A liberal Republican.)

This distribution, and the last remark cited in particular, again

confirm the impression left by previous examinations of process and

policy evaluations: that Committee members give some consideration

both to pursuit of their policy ends and to legislative feasibility,

but that the emphasis, in general, lies with the former.

k. Conclusion.

The conclusions of the last three sections can be quickly

summarized. The purpose of those sections was to test, with my

data, Fenno's hypothesis that the Committee members' political goals

would be associated with the strategic premises by which they oriented their action within the Committee. My examination of statements by Committee members, expressing evaluations of political events and of policies, revealed that, while Committee members showed some concern for reporting proposals that would pass the House, they placed more value on working to promote their policy preferences even in the face of potential defeat. This finding is supported both by the relative frequency of statements evaluating the one and the other, and by the individual characteristics of statements evaluating both.

I also found that the preference for policy values over those of feasibility tended to be most pronounced among liberal Democrats. Finally, I found that the determination to pursue policy goals was in some cases expressed in explicitly partisan terms.

Fenno's hypothesis holds that such findings should be associated with partisanship among Committee members. I find such partisanship, but not in extreme degree. Party differences do not prevent Democrats from regarding their Republican colleages warmly, in general, although Republicans do not seem as cordial toward Democrats, and their criticisms are sometimes explicitly associated with accusations of partisanship. Similarly, party differences alone do not engender antagonistic attitudes, and policy differences do not usually do so except when the policy differences are perceived as associated with party affiliations.

With regard to the former findng, I speculated that the

greater tendency of Republicans to express dissatisfaction with Democrats, sometimes on explicitly partisan grounds, might arise from the frustrations of minority status; that, being in the minority, Republicans more frequently found themselves either compromising or losing their policy preferences, and interpreted such losses and compromise as evidence of partisanship, or at least of personal unfriendliness, on the part of Democrats.

With respect to the character of Committee members' intentions, I found that party difference alone did not evoke "partisan," or antagonistic, attitudes. I found that policy disagreement was a necessary precondition for committee members to take such a stance, and that policy agreement always allowed conciliation even across party lines. On the other hand, the presence of a partisan aspect in policy disputes increased the probability of antagonistic responses. Further, policy agreement, even across party lines, motivated conciliation, and I speculated that the occurrence of such agreement appeared to foster such conciliation even in cases when such agreement was not present.

In consequence, I argued that Fenno's concept of policy partisanship had to be analyzed into component variables, because party and policy cleavages did not always coincide, and because neither party nor policy cleavage, nor even the combination of the two, necessarily fostered "partisan" intentions. The degree of actual correlation between these elements, in any given situation, would require an analysis more precise than I can now offer; how-.

ever, my analysis is at least detailed enough to show that the three may not be treated as identical.

I also found that party cleavages were more often attributed as a motivation for the actions of others than admitted as such a motivation by the actors. In other words, Committee members tended to attribute antagonistic actions to partisan motivations even when such actions appeared to arise primarily from policy disagreements. This finding reflects that, cited above, that members sometimes based an unfavorable opinion of another on the perceived partisanship of the other's actions.

From this discussion three possible reasons emerge for the lack of extreme partisanship on the Committee. The first, derived from the finding that Democrats tended to maintain favorable opinions of Republicans, would be that Democrats found such a stance unnecessary to the achievement of their policy goals. The second, based on the finding of policy agreement and conciliation across partisan lines, would be that the experience of such conciliation affected behavior even in situations of party or policy cleavage. The third would be simply that antagonism did not completely dominate conciliation in members' strategic intentions because policy preferences did not completely dominate legislative feasibility in their political goals.

Further investigation of these proposed explanations would, again, require a still closer analysis of patterns of action in the Committee than I have been able to give in this discussion.

However, the analyses I have carried out all converge on the con-
clusion that the strategic premises of the Judiciary Committee
seem to be, first, to prosecute policy partisanship (if the term
can be appropriately reformulated to cover competing, and shifting,
bipartisan policy coalitions), and second, to write bills that can
command the assent of the whole House. These are, coincidentally,
the same two strategic premises that Fenno assigns to the House
Ways and Means Committee (pp. 55-56), but in the reverse order of
importance, a circumstance fraught with possibilities for further
research.

In short, my investigation of the Judiciary Committee
with respect to Fenno's hypothesis reveals a relation between member
goals and strategic premises compatible with, and confirming, that
hypothesis. That relation does not correspond exactly with any of
those described by Fenno, but is within the range of alternatives
they define. However, my method of analysis, and its findings,
also demonstrate the need to refine, reformulate, and state more
precisely the terms of that hypothesis, and indicate how it may be
possible to do so.

The object of my theoretical reflections has been to de-
velop increasingly systematic, and better articulated, ways of de-
scribing and testing relations among political phenomena such as
those proposed by Fenno's hypotheses and revealed by my examinations
of data. The further development of such descriptions and tests
would require more systematic methods for the analysis of evidence

and more powerful ways of tracing complex patterns in the data.
The development of these capacities, in turn, must be based on
more extentively articulated accounts of those patterns. According-
ly, I see no way to advance such understanding except through in-
ductive empirical analysis, based on data about concrete political
events, processes, and other phenomena.

The theoretical concepts I propose are intended as a
contribution to such analysis and such understanding. They allow
concrete political information to be analyzed in terms that begin
to be both systematic and general. Even at their current level of
rigor, they allow me to draw conclusions of the sort adduced in
this chapter through the direct analysis of evidence about polit-
ical events, rather than through asking informants to provide their
interpretations of such events in terms of the researcher's own
a priori, and usually ill specified, abstractions. The categories
of analysis I propose allow evidence not gathered with any single
analytical concern in mind to be organized in a way appropriate to
illuminate any of various questions of theoretical interest. They
are not dependent on a given analytical or institutional focus,
because they are formulated in terms of fundamental observable
entities, not any particular set of abstractions. I consider that
characteristic a great advantage to analysis, and a great reason
for proceeding in the way that I have proceeded.

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